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Abstract 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an international organisation established in 
1981 between six Gulf countries, Bahrain,
1
 the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).  According to the GCC Supreme 
Council, it was established to foster and manage cooperation between these countries 
and to serve their common interests.2  This thesis explores another factor, that it was 
established in response to specific security concerns in the context of the energy crisis 
that arose after the 1970‟s war between Egypt and Israel, 3  the Soviet attack on 
Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution which was followed by the Iran-Iraq war.4 
 
It is a doctrinal study that aims to determine where the GCC fits as an international 
institution within the framework of international law and international institutions 
particularly.  Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to analyse critically what the GCC is 
and does exactly.  More specifically, it examines the type of organisation the GCC is, its 
relationship with member states and other international organisations and considers its 
future role as a key regional organisation.  
 
This thesis analyses the reason for its establishment, leaders‟ opinions about its nature, 
the GCC's methods for producing collective political attitudes and economic 
cooperation.  It also assesses the kinds of laws the GCC produces, their status, whether 
hard and soft law, as well as their enforcement.  This analysis is conducted from a 
combined legal positivist and international relations framework. 
 
From Nasserism to the Arab Spring, the GCC has withstood the waves of political 
movements in the Middle East.  This thesis provide a critical analysis of the GCC‟s 
overall achievements and aims, with a particular focus on its response to key political 
developments such as these.  This thesis argues that GCC members have been using the 
GCC as means to achieve their own ends.  Due to the nature of their governing systems 
– absolute monarchy – they are using the GCC to maintain the security and stability of 
their own ruling systems.  However, while the GCC has always focused on security and 
economic cooperation, its achievements are stronger in the latter because security is 
linked to external factors.  
 
                                                             
1 Now the Kingdom of Bahrain 
2The Supreme Council, First Meeting (1981). 
3 Anthony, J. D. (1982) 
4 Peterson, E. R. (1988) 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an international organisation established in 
1981 between six Gulf countries, Bahrain (now the Kingdom of Bahrain), the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  These 
countries are, according to the GCC, "fully aware of the ties of special relations, 
common characteristics and similar systems." 5   They desire "to effect coordination, 
cooperation, and integration between them in all fields,"6 in order to "pursu[e] the goal 
of strengthening cooperation and reinforcement of links between them." 7   It is "an 
endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all essential areas that concern their 
peoples and realize their hopes for a better future on the path to unity of their States."8  It 
is important to note that the GCC was established in response to particular security 
concerns within the context of the energy crisis that arose after the 1970‟s war between 
Egypt and Israel,9 the Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution which 
was followed by the Iran-Iraq war.10 
 
This thesis argues that since its creation, the GCC has withstood the waves of political 
movements in the Middle East: Nasserism, the Western push for democracy and, more 
recently, the Arab Spring.  A lot of media and political attention has focused on the role 
of the GCC in the 21st Century in light of its response to the Arab Spring 11  and 
significant political changes in the political climate in a number of Middle Eastern 
States. 12   This thesis aims to provide a critical analysis of the GCC‟s overall 
achievements and aims, focusing in particular on its response to key political 
developments.  It is a doctrinal study that aims to determine where, as an international 
                                                             
5 The introduction of the GCC Charter (1981) 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Anthony, J. D. (1982) 
10 Peterson, E. R. (1988) 
11 The phrase “Arab Spring” refers to the 2011 public revolutions in several Arab countries like Tunisia 
and Egypt against their dictatorial government. The phrase is commonly used nowadays although its 
authorship is unknown.      
12See Asharq Alawsat newspapers (15 Feb 2011), (27 Apr 2011), 11838, (7 Oct 2011), 12001, (1 Dec 
2011), 12068, and (2 Jan 2012), 12088 (All in Arabic). Reuters News (15 April 2011) available on 
http://ara.reuters.com; See The Economist (19 May 2011).     
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institution, the GCC fits within the framework of international law generally and 
international institutions particularly.  Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to analyse 
critically what the GCC is and what it does exactly.  More specifically, it analyses the 
existence of the GCC as an international organisation to examine the type of 
organisation it is, to assess critically its relationship with its member states and other 
international organisations and to consider its future role as a key regional organisation.  
 
1.1 Why focus on the GCC? 
 
In general, international organisations should be studied because they are major entities 
and their procedures and progression are not straightforward, which makes it difficult to 
evaluate them.13  Keohane asserts the importance of international organisations to states: 
“International institutions have the potential to facilitate cooperation, and without 
international cooperation, […] the prospects for our species will be very poor indeed.  
Cooperation is not always benign; but without cooperation, we will be lost.  Without 
institutions there will be little cooperation.  And without knowledge of how institutions 
work – and what makes them work well – there are likely to be fewer, and worse, 
institutions than if such knowledge is widespread.”14  International organisations have 
become a crucial element for helping nations govern themselves and helping explain 
why they fail, at times, to properly govern their relationship.  Studying international 
organisations provides a better understanding of how international rules are made, 
altered and function, as they have a significant role in creating and implementing law on 
both the international and national level.15 
 
There is a general scarcity of literature on the GCC: apart from what the GCC has 
published itself,16 the few pieces of literature on the GCC are now very dated.17  This 
                                                             
13 Keohane, R. O., Ed. (1996), p. 203. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Alvarez, J. E. (2005) 
16 Such as Abd-Alrahman Alatiyah, The Secretary-General (July 2010) Almaseera. 29 The GCC Process 
and Achievement (2009) GCC Secretariat-General (2009) The GCC : Process and Achievement (1992), 
pp. 117-119, News Section-Media Department (2006) Achievement of the GCC. Secretariat General 
(2003) The procedure and steps for adopting the GCC Custom Union. The Achievement of Cooperation, 
External Policy. Available on www.gcc-sg.org, The GCC Process and Achievements (2009). The GCC 
Record of Regular and Extraordinary sessions. Available on www.gcc-sg.org [Accessed on 25-11-2010]. 
17  Such as Alashal, A. (1983); Hawley, D. (1970) Hay, R. (1959) Heard-Bey, F. (1982) Husain M. 
Albaharna (1968) Peterson, J.E. (1987); Christie, J. (1987); Twinam, J.  (1987); Joseph, K. (1988); 
 
 
15 
 
thesis therefore aims to address this gap by offering an analysis of the GCC from a legal 
standpoint, rooted in international relations (IR) theory.  By combining the legal 
analysis with IR theory, this thesis provides the existing literature with a new unequalled 
study.  It also contributes to the growing literature on the significance of the Arab 
Spring itself and the global community‟s response.18 
 
As there is little written material either in English or in Arabic, directly on the GCC, this 
thesis draws upon the wealth of secondary literature dealing with international 
institutions generally, both from a practical and theoretical perspective.    
 
1.2 Approach 
 
In focusing on the GCC, an important aim of this thesis is to discover the real reasons, 
aims and motives behind the establishment of the GCC.  This thesis reviews the political 
environment of the Gulf region at the time of its establishment in 1980 when the 
countries involved were looking to have a stronger army for their defence.  This appears 
to be a strong reason for its establishment through what was published in newspapers at 
the time and especially in the speeches of the leaders of member countries.19  While 
there were discussions of security in the Gulf, of combining forces and having a strong 
shared army, there were no references to a single market, single currency and similar 
economic issues; in fact, this only happened later.  This raises questions as to whether 
the GCC was created for a specific function and each member country found it more 
beneficial to join this organisation to achieve their own individual interests rather than 
attempting to reach them alone, or whether it was created to set up an institutional 
framework that could develop independently to shape a common new interest that 
would not exist if each member was working alone towards its own interests. Whichever 
the case, is it still the same situation today or has it changed?  After these countries 
established the GCC, they may have felt more secure and considered that the threat they 
had felt did not exist anymore, or perhaps having achieved a high standard of military 
cooperation, it was then time to consider other aspects of cooperation.  The aim could 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Nakhleh, E. A. (1986); Peterson, E. R. (1988). Sandwick, J. A., Ed. (1987) Twinam, J. W. (1987); Ziade, 
M. G. (1987).   
18 Such as Mair, J., Keeble, R.L. (2011), Manhire, T. (ed) (2012), Hamid Dabashi (2012), Bradley, J.R. 
(2012).      
19 See Alriyadh Newspapers, 334 (3 Dec 1981). 
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still be military cooperation while economic issues are merely a smokescreen to hide 
this military alliance.  
 
Secretary General Abdurrahman Al-Attiyah has argued that: 
Coordination and cooperation in the field of external policy aim at adopting common 
positions towards political issues that are of common concern to the GCC States within 
Arab, regional, and international contexts, as well as behaving as a single group vis-à-
vis rest of the world within a framework of principles based on mutual respect, non-
intervention in internal affairs and the observance of common interests, in such a 
manner that maintains the common interests of the GCC Member States, enhances their 
stability and meets the approval of their peoples.
20
 
 
By examining both the GCC aims and its achievements, it can be observed that what is 
believed to be the required level of cooperation and the achieved cooperation do not 
match so far. 
 
This thesis aims to find this missing link, or perhaps, the missing next step.  
Accordingly, in the closing statement of its third meeting in November 1982, the 
Supreme Council encouraged all the bodies under its umbrella to move to the next step 
of cooperation and take the required steps towards implementation, stressing the need to 
take part in the common interest.  It seems that this „next step‟ has not being taken yet, 
though the leaders of the GCC have recognised that the GCC has to move in this 
direction.  In 2011, King Abdullah, the Saudi King, argued for member states to move 
from cooperation to unity.21 Taking into account that achieving unity among member 
countries is one of the aims set out in the GCC Charter,22 the problem is that the GCC is 
not able to take this step, because it has not been given enough independence and there 
is no GCC court of law. 
 
With regards to this last point, there is a need to analyse the framework of the GCC.  If 
it is viewed mainly from a realist position that member states joined to cooperate when 
cooperation appears beneficial and opt not to cooperate when it appears not to be, then 
the required next step may be to move towards giving the GCC more independence 
without worrying too much about the sovereignty of member countries.   By doing that, 
                                                             
20 The Secretary General Abdurrahman Al-Attiyah (2009), p. 13. 
21 King Abdullah statement in the 32nd meeting of the GCC Supreme Council in Riyadh, December 2011. 
Alsharq Newspaper (8 December 2011) available on www.alsharq.net.sa (in Arabic) [Accessed on 5 May 
2012] 
22 See the introduction of the GCC Charter (1981). 
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the GCC could have the ability to grow by itself and work towards shaping the common 
interest of member countries.  
 
The GCC bodies, roles and procedures are similar to what they were at the time of its 
establishment 30 years ago, in contrast to an institution like the European Union (EU) 
which has undergone many developments since its establishment in 1951.  It started as 
the Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and developed to three communities in 1970.  In 
1993, it expanded to what is known today as the EU.23 The EU started with only six 
members but has expanded to 27 members today, while the GCC membership remains 
limited to six members.  This thesis will demonstrate how the GCC did not really 
comply with the rules set up by international institution lawyers that an international 
organisation has to have clear membership rules.24 
 
The main purpose for establishing international institutions is to facilitate the process of 
making agreements between member countries.25  This thesis criticises the role of the 
GCC in facilitating agreements between member countries, taking into account the fact 
that the main agreement between GCC members, the Unified Economic Agreement 
(UEA), had been drafted before the first meeting of the GCC Supreme Council. The 
GCC had therefore not really facilitated the ratification of this agreement, as it was 
drafted before the GCC‟s existence.  In addition, although GCC leaders had ratified this 
agreement, it has still not completely been applied by GCC members, which raises the 
question of the capacity of the GCC in implementing its own rules.26 
 
One of the expected roles of international institutions is to help states create a new 
equilibrium as a natural result of interaction.  An international institution is then 
expected to keep this equilibrium stable by creating common expectations.  The first 
important aspect of cooperation for each member is the expectation that the other 
members will apply a rule or agreement in their internal laws, and the second is to be 
sure that this rule or agreement is beneficial.27  This leads to question the role of the 
GCC in creating common expectations, which has not yet been addressed in the 
                                                             
23 Eder, K. , Spohn, W. (2005).    
24 See Alvarez (2005); Klein, P. S. a. P. (2001).   
25 Beck et al (1996), p.166. 
26 See Alnoaimi A. (2006) available on www.emasc.co [Accessed 20 Feb 2009] 
27 Abbott, K. W. (1999) International Relation Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing 
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93,P. 361. 
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literature.  In this regard, the first GCC announcement stressed that member states have 
a similar culture, a common religion and economic system and that they all faced the 
same fears and challenges.28  This announcement assumed that these similarities shared 
by member countries would facilitate cooperation between them, but in fact, that would 
not help if there were no common expectations of how the GCC rules would be 
implemented in each member country.29  This thesis uses the case of Bahrain breaking 
the Gulf Economic Agreement (EA) as a case study to analyse the importance of 
common expectation for cooperation.30 
 
Before the end of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, detractors stressed that the GCC was 
no more than a smokescreen whose identity depended on the end result of that war.31  
Others argued that the GCC was not only misunderstood but had also become an object 
of misinformation.  Interestingly, neither the words “union” and “unity” nor any similar 
words were mentioned in the first GCC meeting of 1981.32  The main criticisms about 
the GCC, mentioned above, were in books predating the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 
1988, however, after 1988, the literature written about the GCC has not openly 
attempted to critically identify its nature and question the reason behind it existence.33  
There is therefore a need for a more recent analysis of the existence of the GCC and an 
evaluation of whether or not that has changed since its establishment. 
 
This thesis argues that the GCC was created in 1981 in an attempt to maintain the 
security of member countries from the surrounding danger.  That danger was two-fold, 
danger threatening their countries posed by some conflict in the region (e.g. Iraq-Iran 
war, Afghanistan war) and the designs of Iraq and Iran on some of the members‟ lands.  
The second danger was the threat to their political royal system – absolute monarchy – 
posed by Nasserism.  In the present time, both kinds of dangers still exist: Iran still 
poses a major threat to Bahrain and the Arab Spring (2011) is challenging a number of 
Middle Eastern political systems. The GCC is a chosen path for these countries to 
strengthen their security and economy in order to be capable to stand up against these 
                                                             
28  (2008). )نورشعلا و حعتاضلا جروذلا ىلإ ىلولأا جروذلا هم( ىلعلأا شلجملا خاروذل حٍماتخلا خانٍثلا. 
29 Keohane, R. O., Ed. (1996) 
30Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, 9534, 4 January 2005. 
31 Joseph, K. (1988)  
32 Anthony, J. D. (1982) 
33 See Anthony, J. D. (1982) Anthony, J. D. (1986). Joseph, K. (1988). Nakhleh, E. A. (1986). Peterson, E. 
R. (1988). 
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dangers.  This thesis argues that the GCC has always focused on security and economic 
cooperation, but because security is linked to external factors, its achievements are 
better in economic matters.  Although the GCC has achieved more in terms of economic 
cooperation, it is still not at the expected level.  Due to the nature of the governing 
systems in member countries, they are not willing or, maybe not able to, take the 
required step by giving the GCC more room for independence as well as creating a GCC 
court of law.   
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
In undertaking the analysis of this thesis, reference is made to primary source material, 
including historical documents detailing the creation of the organisation, as well as 
secondary sources including books, articles, reports and websites.  In other words, a 
qualitative research methodology is used in this thesis.  In many parts, the analysis relies 
on the material published by the GCC Press,34 which is regarded as the public gateway 
for the GCC to publicise achievements and the closing statements of the Supreme 
Council, the Council of Ministers, etc…  The Supreme Council meets once per year and 
after each meeting the Printing Press publishes the Council‟s closing statements.  A 
review and analysis of these closing statements enables this thesis to explore the 
direction and the framework of the GCC and to determine whether the GCC‟s interest in 
politics, security, economy and social cooperation, has changed or not.  Also, this thesis 
critiques the GCC‟s own news about its achievements 35  and compares these 
achievements to the GCC‟s declared principles and aims.  
 
A significant amount of literature on the GCC is published by GCC Printing Press, 
written by the Secretariat General Media Department or by the Information Centre 
Statistical Department. Until now, this literature has been published primarily in Arabic 
(142 in Arabic and 41 in English) and much of this literature is available as electronic 
books on the GCC website under the “Digital Library” link.36 This literature addresses 
comprehensive matters about the GCC:  agreements, customs, economics, education, 
environment, industrial law, patents, plants, population, statistics, transit and youth and 
                                                             
34 Many of them are available on: http://library.gcc-sg.org/English. 
35 See GCC (2006).  
36 Available on  http://library.gcc-sg.org/English [Accessed on 7 May 2011] 
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sports. This easily accessible literature gives this thesis a good number of resources 
about the GCC.   
 
The materials written by the Secretariat General Media Department or by the 
Information Centre Statistical Department are subject to critique due to their lack of 
objectivity as they are what the GCC publishes about itself.  The core of this material is 
on three subjects. The first subject contains an official record of the GCC, such as the 
statements of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers and the laws created by 
the GCC.37  These Councils‟ statements can be analysed in order to find out what the 
GCC common interests are.  The second subject relates to GCC achievements, which 
are subject to critique and can also be the object of studies, relating achievements to 
comparable organisations, namely the EU.38  The third subject of the material is research 
about common issues in the Gulf area. This research material, although not from an 
independent body, still substantiates this thesis with valuable data.   
 
The analysis within this thesis is based on three sub-disciplines of international law and 
international relations: international institutional law, international law theory and 
international relations theory.  International institutional law scholars have empirically 
studied international organisations to discover the common rules that the majority of 
international organisations recognise.
39
  That provides a framework for this thesis to 
analyse some topics such as the GCC structure, its bodies, its Charter, law-making 
system, creating treaties, the voting system and membership system.  Some of the key 
literature in international institutional law analysed in the development of this thesis are: 
Alvarez, J. (2005) International Organization as Law-makers, Sands, Philippe and 
Klein, Pierre (2009) Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, White, D. Nigel (2005) 
The Law of International Organizations.   
 
In terms of international legal theory, legal positivism as well as legalisation theories 
allows this thesis to measure the strengths and weaknesses of the laws created by the 
                                                             
37 These statements of both Councils, all in Arabic some of them are in English, are available on the GCC 
official website on www.gcc.sg.org. [Accessed on 15 Jane 2012]. 
38 See for example, GCC Process and Achievement (2009) and the Common Market. Secretariat (2007) 
39 Alvarez (2006), p. 61. 
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GCC, situated between hard and soft law.
40
  The key literatures here are: Hart, Herbert 
L.A. (1961) The Concept of Law and Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsil, Slaughter and Snidal (2001) 
The Concept of Legalization. Legalization and World Politics.  
 
Meanwhile, in terms of international relations theory, particularly in analysing the 
overlap between international law and international relations, this thesis draws mainly 
on J. Craig Barker (2000) International Law and International Relations.  One of the 
main sources for this thesis on international relations theory is Beck, et al. (1996) 
International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations, a 
book which gathers the significant works of many great writers on international law and 
international relation theory.  The first part of this thesis will focus in particular upon 
realist and neorealist theory.  This thesis relies on some authors on neorealist approach; 
mainly Kenneth N. Waltz (1988) The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.  The concept 
of the balance of the power is a realist concept which allows this thesis to analyse why 
the GCC exists in the first place.  Neorealist theory helps understanding the GCC‟s 
creation because it is a theory of security and survival.
41
  The second part looks at the 
future of the GCC and the required development.  In this regard, institutionalism is the 
applicable theory because institutionalist scholars believe that although states are the 
main international actors, international organisations are still significant because states 
have various international economic interests and therefore need international 
organisations as agents to help states cooperate internationally.
42
 
 
Each one of these disciplines has different roles in this thesis: international institutional 
law is used to reveal when the GCC is not in line with the majority of international 
organisations.  By examining the GCC upon these roles, this thesis reveals when the 
GCC has to give explanation; for example why it has unequal systems such as its 
membership system - this will be analysed in chapter seven.  Legal theory is used here 
to break down the process as to how the GCC‟s laws pass from being soft to hard law.  
The distinction between hard and soft law is particularly important when looking at the 
GCC and the impact of its law making.  Realists, with their concept of the balance of 
                                                             
40See chapter two of this thesis for more detail.  
41
Waltz (1988), p.618. 
42
Beck, et al. (1996), p. 166. 
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power, as well as the neorealist, with their survival theory, are central in analysing why 
the GCC exist and why it functions this way.  Institutionalist theory is important in 
channelling the way for more development by demonstrating the vitality of giving the 
GCC more independence in order to be able to develop better.           
 
The thesis draws upon a range of primary and secondary documentation.  Inevitably, it 
relies heavily on a lot of materials produced by the GCC itself.  It was however 
recognised that the materials written by the Secretariat General Media Department or by 
the Information Centre Statistical Department lack objectivity.  It proved difficult or 
impossible to obtain information from the GCC beyond what the GCC already 
published.  Nakhleh argues that “[m]ost Gulf countries regard population statics as vital 
information.  In some countries, population figures are almost a state secret; therefore 
population data can vary from one source to another.”43  This research has noticed that 
information nowadays is much available than the time of Mr. Nakhleh, yet, there is still 
a lot of information which is kept secret without a clear reason.   
 
Three examples can perhaps illustrate the difficulty I faced.  Firstly, I went to the 
Secretariat General headquarters many times to speak with senior officials and several 
employees in the Legal Department in order to gain access to a wider range of material 
on the GCC such as: more detail about the debate between the member countries before 
creating the GCC, the debate of the drafters of the GCC Charter, the Security 
Agreement and the Economic Agreement. Yet, they refuse my request and kindly 
provided me with a lot of material already published by the GCC.    
A second example is that I sent a formal letter to the GCC Secretary General 
Abdurrahman Al-Attiyah asking him to accept that I volunteer for the GCC (without 
salary) for a few months for the purpose of my PhD research as other organisations 
sometimes offer internship programmes to researchers.  A few months after, I received a 
letter from the Secretary General saying that he was sorry to refuse my request because 
the GCC does not have any internship programmes.  Therefore, I was unable to get an 
internal insight of the GCC.   
                                                             
43 Nakhleh (1986), p.vii.  
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The third example is that I needed to have a copy of the Security Agreement which 
remains unpublished by the GCC, unlike the Economic Agreement.  I asked the director 
of the Legal Department in the Secretariat General to provide me with one copy of the 
GCC Security Agreement but he responded to say that I should write a formal letter to 
the Secretary General.  I then sent the letter per his instructions and followed up with a 
phone call to the Office of the Secretary General after few days.  They told me that my 
letter had been transferred to the Military Department in the Secretary General.  I 
phoned the Military Department several times, over several days, but each time they 
asked me to phone them back the next day.  After a few days, I phoned again and they 
told me that they are sorry to refuse my request because they only give copies of the 
Security Agreement to a formal governmental body but not to an individual researcher.  
It is not a secret agreement but all these difficulties are because of the bureaucratic 
system.  Even though I thought there would be no way to obtain a copy, I fortunately 
found a copy of the GCC Security Agreement in an unpublished research.          
 
The hidden information may be important to this thesis or not, however, the available 
information is still considerably rich.  Such information includes the full text of the 
GCC treaties, the Supreme and Ministerial Council statements, the GCC publications 
about its achievement, the statements of the leaders of the membership etc.  Also, it was 
necessary to draw upon other sources secondary literature, newspaper, journals, reports 
etc.  All such information gives this thesis rich material which is subject to analysis and 
criticism.  One example of going over the problem of the hidden information is that 
there is no recorded debate about Kuwaiti‟s objections about the Security Agreement.  
But this thesis goes over that by examining the articles of the GCC Security Agreement 
on light of the Kuwaiti Constitutional law.  By this analysis this thesis has recognised 
the conflict between the Kuwaiti Constitutional law and the Security Agreement this 
conflict should be the reason behind the Kuwaiti objections.           
 
1.4 Outline 
 
The second chapter is a theoretical chapter which provides the framework for the 
analysis in the following chapters. This chapter starts by giving a brief introduction 
 
 
24 
 
about international institutional law to illustrate where it fits within the field of 
international law.  It also classifies different types of international organisations in order 
to specify to which type the GCC belongs and to direct the focus of this thesis.  This 
chapter outlines the theoretical foundations of this thesis in two parts.  The first part 
reviews, analyses and criticises the theories presented by scholars of international law.  
The main focus is given to legal positivism and to the theory of legalisation.  The 
second part discusses, analyses and evaluates international relations theories. 
This chapter applies IR theories focusing in particular on idealism, realism, 
institutionalism and constructivism.  Though this thesis uses a doctrinal analysis of the 
rules that govern the GCC, the analysis is enriched by applying a variety of schools of 
thought from IR theory,44that add the dimension of political factors behind legal rules.  
This way of studying the GCC rules has not yet been undertaken in the literature, and 
this thesis therefore aims to contribute to studies of the GCC by adding the broader 
scope of IR theory to link the doctrinal analysis with political motive according to which 
the rules governing the GCC have been established.  
 
In measuring GCC strengths and weaknesses, the thesis draws directly on 
regime/institutionalist theory, an IR theory which places international institutions at the 
centre of international interaction and argues that cooperation is best achieved through 
such institutions.45  The study of regimes has produced an enormous amount of original 
literature that seeks to describe the emergence and determination of cooperation and the 
foundations of state uniqueness and interests,46 but this type of explanation has not yet 
been applied to any study of the GCC. 
 
This chapter contributes to the growing tendency in the literature to blur the borders 
between international law and IR theory. 47 During the last 20 years, IR theory has 
generated some enthusiastic studies in international law.48  Similarly, this thesis aims to 
give the reader a different way of looking at the GCC, a way that sheds light on what 
has been in the shadows, inspired by institutionalist approaches to international law.  
Although this is first and foremost a doctrinal study, IR theory helps to lessen the 
                                                             
44 See Abbott (1999),  Barker, J. C. (2000), Beck et al (1996),  Brown, C. (1992) and Jahn, B. (2006). 
45 Beck et al (1996). 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Ibid p 3. 
48 Abbott (1999).  
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abstract and autonomous nature of a doctrinal analysis by considering the political 
motives behind the legal rules and institutions.  So, IR theory enriches this doctrinal 
thesis which examines the role of the GCC in its political context and predicts the ways 
for GCC ideals to become a reality. 
 
The third and fourth chapter of this thesis examine the history of GCC member 
countries and of the GCC itself.  One crucial part of this history is the history of the 
governing systems and the history of the ruling families which based their governing 
style on Islamic and Arab tradition.  This thesis does not aim to give a complete history 
of GCC countries but rather to address the parts that help better understand the aims of 
establishing the GCC.  Nigel White states “For a fuller understanding of how the law    
relating to international organisations has been shaped, such institutions need to be 
examined in their wider context”.49 
 
The head of the Kuwaiti Parliament Ahmad Al-Sadon states that cooperation between 
GCC countries is a vital goal, and GCC countries have to develop this cooperation more 
quickly to become a stronger union.  However, he continues, unity cannot exist between 
countries with different political systems.  There cannot be a union between a country 
like Kuwait where there is freedom of speech and the right to local and national political 
participation and other countries where there are many prisoners who were imprisoned 
for having expressed their opinions. 50 The similarities and differences between the 
differing governing systems of member countries therefore require close examination.  
This evaluation is also relevant to current debates surrounding the recent invitations 
extended to Jordan and Morocco to join the GCC in 2011.51 
 
The fifth chapter critically examines the GCC‟s political, economic and security 
achievements and argues that its political achievements are questionable, as the GCC 
was ineffective during the most dangerous period of the region, when Iraq occupied 
Kuwait in 1990.  It further argues that the GCC had no active role in all the assumed 
political achievements, which were actually achievements of the individual member 
states.  It was not until 2011, with the Arab Spring, that member countries succeeded in 
                                                             
49
 White, Nigel (2005), p. 2.  
50 Ahmad A-Sadon, The Head of the Kuwaiti Parliament. Al-Arabia TV 20 Feb 2012.  
51  See, for example, the Club Fit for Kings (19 May 2011), The Economist Available on 
www.economist.com [Accessed on 21 April 2012]. 
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allowing the GCC to take an important role in helping revolutions, especially in Yemen.  
As, this time, the Secretary General of the GCC was more in charge of leading the 
direction of the Yemeni revolution than individual members countries.    
 
In terms of economic cooperation, this chapter considers that the GCC had initiated the 
process from the outset starting with the free trade area, followed by the Customs Union 
and the Common Market.  People in these countries can now travel, live, work, do 
business, buy property, etc… in any member country: all member countries treat any 
person from another member country as if they were nationals.   
 
In terms of security cooperation, one of the objectives for creating the GCC was to let 
these countries achieve their independence on their terms without the intervention of 
international powers and to keep the Arabian Gulf free from Western military bases.  
This chapter will show how the GCC has not met this aim, considering that there are 
now some American military bases in Kuwait and Qatar. 
 
The sixth chapter deals with the law-making role of international organisations 
generally and of the GCC especially.  International organisations have the ability to 
create international law; in fact they remain the main producers and implementers of 
international law today.52 Generally, the issue of the binding force of international law is 
well addressed in the literature,53 yet in this context, what is not analytically addressed is 
the binding nature of the laws created by the GCC, regarded as a part of international 
law, nor their enforcement and how that would affect the GCC‟s role and reputation.  
Moreover, it examines how the GCC's law-making process could hinder its ability to act 
as an international organisation and to sign treaties with other countries or organisations.   
 
This chapter provides significant analysis, comparison and examination of the laws and 
rules that govern the GCC, especially the Charter which is regarded as the first ratified 
agreement under the umbrella of the GCC.  The aim is to determine what member states 
agreed on in the Charter, comparing to other organisations, when appropriate, to analyse 
why the Charter is written in this particular way and to speculate about what would 
happen if it were written in a different way.   
                                                             
52 See Alvarez, J. E. (2005) 
53 See Barker, J. C. (2000); Brownlie, I. (1999). 
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Key GCC laws and rules are analysed, evaluated and compared with rules of other 
organisations where appropriate, relying on the rich literature written about international 
organisations54 and international law55more generally as well the existing literature on 
the GCC itself. 56 Focus is given to the key GCC treaties, especially the Unified 
Economic Agreement (UEA), which is regarded as the second ratified GCC agreement 
of 1981, and the Economic Agreement (EA).57  On this point the binding nature of GCC 
laws is analysed in light of the extensive discussion about the binding nature of 
international law.58 
 
Chapter Seven analyses several recent GCC actions in order to get to the bottom of its 
identity and interests.  Taking a neorealist perspective, 59 this section argues that one 
major goal of the leaders of the GCC countries was to establish the means to ensure the 
survival of their royal political systems.  There have been three different kinds of 
pressures on the governments of GCC countries since the GCC was established to date.  
Firstly, the older Arab revolution known as Nasserism 60, when there was a serious 
influential political movement in the Arab world in the 1980s which led to the collapse 
of several Arab monarchies (Egypt, Yemen, Iraq and Libya).  Secondly, there has been 
the continuing pressure of the influence of democracy. This part explores how the GCC 
helps its member countries stand up against the international push towards 
democratisation.  Thirdly, there are the newer pressures in the form of the recent Arab 
revolutions (the Arab Spring). The GCC's 2011 decision to extend membership to two 
additional countries and its unique decision to intervene militarily in Bahrain was a 
direct response to the Arab Spring.  This chapter will explore how in the GCC reaction 
to these three kinds of pressures, one of the main concerns of GCC countries has been 
the survival of their royal political systems. 
                                                             
54 See Archer, C. (1992); Klein, P. S. a. P. (2001); Alvarez, J. E. (2005)..  .غ ,يذنجلا  (1990); .ا .ع .ع ,راٍطلا 
(2004). 
55 See Brownlie, I. (1999); Hart, H. L. A. (1996). Beck, Arend, and Vander Lugt (1996); Lowe, V. (2007); 
Rajagopal, B. (2003);  Shaw, M. N. (2003); ذٍمحلا ,م .س .ع.  (1977); ةشخات ,ع .أ .ب.  (1992).  
56 See Anthony, J. D. (1982); Anthony, J. D. (1986); Houlahan, T. (1999);  Ismael, T. Y. I. J. S. (1994).; 
Nakhleh, E. A. (1986);  Peterson, E. R. (1988).; Sandwick, J. A. (1987);  Snider, L. W. (1988);  افولاوتأ ,أ.  
(6991); لعشلأا ,ع .ا.  (6991). 
57 See the full text of EA in Annex. 
58 Barker, J. C. (2000); Beck, A. C. A. R. J. (1993). 
59 This theory argues that states do cooperate in order to ensure their survival.  See detailed analyses of 
this theory in the last chapter.  
60 As discussed below, Nasserism is an Arab nationalism and anti-Western political movement.  
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1.5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis provides new insights into the GCC contributing to the development of a 
better understanding of the GCC as an organisation.  It takes readers beyond the image 
that the GCC is trying to portray about itself by examining the factors contributing to its 
establishment and offering a critical analysis of the GCC‟s achievements and aims.  It 
also contributes to debates on the future of the GCC as it evaluates how the GCC can 
become a more effective organisation.  It suggests that enabling the GCC to be more 
independent, as well as establishing a GCC court of law, could give the GCC the ability 
to be more effective and to be in a better position to shape the common interests of the 
member countries.   
 
The analysis presented in this thesis is based on a legal framework and is rooted in IR 
theory.  It focuses on the GCC law-making process and analyses the main laws and 
treaties created by the GCC, mainly the GCC Charter and the UEA.  In addition to the 
legal analysis, this thesis applies IR theory to the GCC, focusing on idealism, realism, 
institutionalism and constructivism.  IR theory allows this thesis to provide greater 
insight into the political factors influencing the legal rules.  For example, the thesis 
argues that one chief aim of the GCC is to ensure the survival of the existing political 
system of GCC member countries, which is absolute monarchy. This argument is based 
on a realist analysis of the GCC‟s responses to several key political movements, namely: 
Nasserism, the Western push for democracy and, more recently, the Arab Spring.  
 
Finally, when criticising the GCC, this thesis does not ignore its significant 
achievements but provides an academic analysis that may help contribute to the 
development of more creative role for the GCC.  As an Arabic proverb states, “Your 
friend is the one who tells you the truth about yourself, not the one who believes 
everything you say”.  Thus, by illuminating these criticisms, it suggests ways of solving 
the issues raised here.  Although the thesis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the 
GCC, it does not purport to provide the perfect solution.    
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Chapter Two –Theories of International Law and 
International Relations 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is the basis for the analysis presented in the following chapters, providing 
the theoretical foundations of this thesis.  This chapter reviews, analyses and criticises 
the theories presented by scholars of international law in the first part, and those 
presented by international relations scholars in a second.   
 
2.2 International Law Theories 
It is important to analyse the difference between what is law and what is international 
law.  There are many methods to analyse this, but the one used here is legal positivism, 
which focuses mainly on what the law is and not what the law should be.  This approach 
has been selected for this thesis because it is the best way to examine what the law is or 
if there is actually a law on a given matter.  This chapter therefore applies a legal 
positivist approach to analyse the laws that the GCC is creating, by which it governs 
itself and governs the cooperation between the member countries.  This chapter focuses 
on the development of Hart‟s legal positivist theory, which states that a legal system has 
to have two kinds of rules: primary rules which tell what individuals have or do not have 
to do, and secondary rules which consist of three elements: rules of recognition, rules of 
change and rule of adjudication.
1
  Hart‟s theory is further developed by the legalisation 
theory established by Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsil, Slaughter and Snidal.
2
  This theory 
states that legal rules are measured based on three elements: obligation, delegation and 
precision, in order to classify them accordingly between hard and soft law.
3
 
 
                                                             
1 Hart, Herbert L. (1961) The Concept of Law. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
2Abbott et al (2001) The Concept of Legalization. Legalization and World Politics. Cambridge, The MIT 
Press. 
3 See ibid p. 19. 
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2.2.1 Legal Positivism 
 
Legal positivism is a general approach to law which focuses on what the law is, and not 
on what it should be.
4
The root of this approach goes back more than 300 years even 
though it is still a main legal approach today.  Arend highlights the importance of this 
approach in the contemporary legal analysis of international law, stating “Modern 
international law is founded largely on positivist principles.”5  Legal positivism pushes 
legal analyses of international law to become more systematic and scientific.
6
 
 
Positivism comprises a number of approaches where the main focus is describing the 
existing law; additionally, for positivists, law is free from morals.
7
  In other words, 
morals can be taken into account when creating law, but should not be taken into 
account when determining what is law.  Positivism views international law and 
international organisations as forming real legislation only if they are backed by states‟ 
will. However, when the will of states is absent, positivists would argue that states have 
the freedom to do what they like as long as they do not restrict themselves.  State 
consent can be explicit, such as by signing a treaty, or implicit, for example, through 
state practice.
8
  Positivism tends to limit the subject of international law to include only 
states and only organisations that are recognised by states.   
 
Some positivists, such as Austin, disregard not only international organisations but also 
the whole system of international law; in fact, they do not consider it as a part of a legal 
system at all.  With his „command theory,‟ John Austin (1790-1859) identifies law as 
"the command of the sovereign backed by the threat of punishment,"
9
 which means that 
there is no law without the formal enforcement by the relevant authority.  In this 
traditional view, international law is not real law because it lacks a formal authority 
                                                             
4 Beck et al (1996)  International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations. 
US, Oxford University Press. p.56. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Mccoubrey & Wight (1996), p. 293. 
8 Beck et al (1996), p. 56. 
9 Austin (1995), p. 125. 
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capable of enforcing it; he sees international law as mere „positive morality.‟10  Austin 
disregarded international law as law stating, “The body by whose opinion the law is said 
to be set, does not command, expressly or tacitly that conduct of the given kind shall be 
forborne or pursued.  For, since it is not a body precisely determined or certain, it cannot, 
as a body, express or intimate a wish.  As a body, it cannot signify a wish by oral or 
written words, or by positive or negative deportment.  The so-called rule which is 
opinion is said to impose, is merely the sentiment which it feels, or the opinion which it 
holds, in regard to a kind of conduct.”11  For Austin, international agreements are not 
law because states cannot be subject to international law; it is only morality which 
restrict states from breaking international agreements.  When states follow international 
law it is because they want to do so not because there are legal obligations.
12
 
 
This chapter briefly presents this traditional positivist theory because it is considered the 
basis of legal positivism.  However, throughout, this thesis relies more on recent 
positivist theory including Hart and the founders of the legalisation theory, Abbott et al., 
who provide an analysis of legal systems more apt for this type of analysis than the 
limited „command theory‟ which does not recognise international law as law because it 
is not backed by sanction. 
 
2.2.2 The Concept of Law 
 
Hart illuminates that a legal system has to have two kinds of rules: primary rules, which 
set what to do and what not to do, and secondary rules, which are the sub-rules that 
place the conditions by which primary rules are recognised, changed and applied.
13
  For 
Hart, international law is a set of rules rather than a complete legal system because it 
does not have the required secondary rules.
14
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13 Hart (1961), p. 208. 
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A very important development of legal positivist theory came from Hart who is 
commonly perceived as the key modern positivist.
15
  Hart explains Austin's command 
theory: 
On this simple account of the matter … there must, wherever there is legal 
system, be some person or body of persons issuing general orders backed by 
threats which are generally obeyed, and it must be genuinely believed that these 
threats are likely to be implemented in the event of disobedience.  This person or 
body must be internally supreme and externally independent.  If, following 
Austin we call such a supreme and independent person or body of persons the 
sovereign, the laws of any country will be the general orders backed by threats 
which are issued whether by the sovereign or subordinates in obedience to the 
sovereign.
16
 
According to this, Hart challenges Austin‟s „command theory‟, in a separate chapter 
about international law: his analysis of obligation challenges the assumption that 
international actors are led by force, arguing that actors obey international law not only 
when they are forced to do so but also when they feel there is a duty to do so.  
Explaining that legal systems have to have both primary and secondary rules,
17
 Hart 
says, “Most systems have, after some delay, seen the advantages of further 
centralisation of social pressure; and have partially prohibited the use of physical 
punishments or violent self-help by private individuals. Instead they have supplemented 
the primary rules of obligations by further secondary rules, specifying or at least 
limiting the penalties for violation, and have conferred upon judges, where they have 
application of penalties by other officials. These secondary rules provide the centralised 
official sanction of the system.”18 
 
This paragraph sums up Hart‟s view on international law, while the following 
paragraphs go into detail on his theory.  According to Hart, international law does not 
encompass the rule of recognition which is defined as “a general agreement among 
those to whom the law is addressed that the law is binding them.”19  International law, 
for Hart, is a set of rules but not a complete legal system because it does not have the 
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required secondary rules: “What is the actual character of the rules as they function in 
the relations between states?  Different interpretations of the phenomena to be observed 
are of course possible; but it is submitted that there is no basic rule providing general 
criteria of validity for the rules of international law, and that the rules which are in fact 
operative constitute not a system but a set of rules…”20  This analysis requires more 
explanation, as is provided below.  
 
2.2.2.1 Three defects 
 
Hart states that in any small society, there are primary rules which set community 
obligations, but these primary rules have three defects: they are uncertain, static and 
inefficient.  Primary rules therefore need three secondary rules to solve the defects: the 
rules of recognition, the rules of change and the rules of adjudication.  Hart illustrates 
his analysis of primary and secondary rules by giving an example of a basic community 
strongly united by ties of association, common attitudes and ideology in a secure 
situation.
21
  Members of this society could not have a successful social life without 
authorised rules.  Without any rules, such society would be out of order.  In fact, in this 
type of society, there are rules but there is no system: there are only some accepted 
standards without any clearly outlined rules.  In such a situation, if any member of the 
society questions what the rules are or what they mean, these is no authority to respond 
to such an enquiry, there are no authorised texts to refer to and no procedures for 
resolving issues.  These rules that identify such authorities, procedures or texts are 
different than the primary rules that set out the obligations. Hart call this defect 
„uncertainty.‟22 
 
Secondly, in such a society, rules are changed through a process that will naturally take 
place over a long period, but the second defect is referred to as „static.‟  In this society, 
rules change over a very long time, any social rule will start as routine then become 
usual habit, then become obligatory and so on.  Individuals have no means of modifying 
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the rules: there would be a permanent responsibility for each individual to do or not to 
do something, including individuals from a different society.  Individuals can choose 
neither to opt out of these obligations nor to prevent others benefiting from them. 
 
Thirdly, Hart has characterised the third defect as „inefficiency‟ because he believes that 
in this context, the social pressures on an offender that assure that rules last would not 
be effective. When a dispute occurs about whether or not a rule has been violated, there 
would be no authority to decide this.  There is also no authority that has the right to 
decide the punishment of the offender; instead this job is left to the individuals, which 
could lead to a dangerous situation where individuals are not organised and where 
sanctions are not controlled. 
 
2.2.2.2 Three remedies 
 
After exposing these three defects, Hart also provides the solutions, which are rooted in 
the distinction between primary and secondary rules: “The remedy for each of these 
three main defects in this simplest form of social structure consists in supplementing the 
primary rules of obligation with secondary rules which are rules of a different kind.  
The introduction of the remedy for each defect might, in itself, be considered a step 
from the pre-legal into the legal world; since each remedy brings with it many elements 
that permeate law: certainly all three remedies together are enough to convert the regime 
of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system.”23  He then explained why the 
union of primary rules with secondary rules is required for creating a legal system.  
 
According to Hart, the remedy for the first defect, „uncertainty,‟ is what he calls the 
„rule of recognition.‟ Rules of recognition are elements that identify which rules are 
supported by societal pressure and clarify the kinds of pressure.  There are many forms 
of rules of recognition, for example, a traditional form is an authoritative written 
document.  However, Hart specifies that writing the unwritten rules is not the main step 
towards recognition though it is a very significant step.  What is most important is the 
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acceptance of these written documents as authoritative and when there is such 
acceptance, there is a basic rule of recognition according to which it is easy to identify 
the primary rule of obligation.  In a developed legal system, the rules of recognition are 
not only written documents, but there are also specific authorised bodies, customary law 
and precedents, which can all contribute to the rule of recognition and decide whether 
the primary rules of obligation exist in a given area or not.
24
 
 
The remedy for the second defect of being „static‟ is what Hart calls „the rule of 
change.‟ Rules of change refer to the rules that give individuals the power to add new 
rules to existing primary rules of obligations or to alter them.  The third remedy for 
„inefficiency‟ are „the rules of adjudication.‟  Rules of adjudication empower the 
community to decide whether a particular action is regarded as breaking a primary rule. 
The rules of adjudication identify the individuals to be adjudicated and the adjudication 
procedure.
25
  In national law this remedy would be provided by the courts of law.  For 
this thesis, Hart‟s theory provides international law with much better means to be 
analysed and evaluated and to measure its strength and weakness.  Having explained 
Hart‟s theory, this thesis applies this theory to the role of international organisations.   
 
2.2.2.3 International Organisations and the Concept of Law 
 
Having reviewed Hart‟s distinction between primary and secondary rules, it is now time 
to analyse international organisations in light of this, to examine the role of international 
organisations in the development of international law.  Recalling Hart‟s explanation that 
“primary rules are concerned with the action that individuals must or must not do,”26 it 
should be noted here that in terms of international law, „individuals‟ refers to states.  
Therefore, international law has primary rules of obligation that outline what states must 
and must not do. However, the question remains as to whether international law also 
consists of secondary rules and whether international organisations can replace these 
secondary rules? 
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In terms of the rule of recognition, there is a basic level and a complex level of this rule.  
At the basic level, as mentioned earlier, these rules can involve putting into writing 
previously unwritten rules.  The International Law Commission (ILC), which is an 
organ of the UN, has played a great role in formally writing the unwritten international 
law.  The role of this commission is to develop international law “through the 
restatement of existing rules or through the formulation of new rules.”27  This notion of 
codification is based on the idea that “written international law would remove the 
uncertainties of customary international law by filling existing gaps in the law as well as 
by giving precision to abstract general principles whose practical application is not 
settled.”28 The General Assembly of the UN also “plays a significant role in the process 
of standard-setting and the codification of international law.”29  Both bodies are serving 
the same end which is writing up the unwritten international law.     
 
In this context, international organisations play an important role, for example, they are 
often established by a written document, which usually takes the form of a charter, a 
constitution or a fundamental statute.
30
  These charters could be the reference, 
authoritative text that provides accepted and recognised secondary rules as all member 
states of a given organisation have usually already accepted the obligations and 
responsibilities that the organisation‟s founding document imposes upon them.   
 
In a developed legal system, according to Hart, there is a specific authorised body, 
customary law and precedents, which can all act as rules of recognition, deciding 
whether the primary rules of obligation exist in a given area or not.  International 
organisations usually have an organ that can make decisions about whether a primary 
international rule has been broken, as does the UN Security Council.  An example of a 
primary international law that illustrates this point relates to international peace and 
security, which has to be maintained by the international community that has “to take 
                                                             
27 See the ILC official website, available on www.unorg/law. [Accessed on 13 Jan 2012] 
28 See ibid.  
29 Article 13, the UN Charter and see the official website of the General Assembly, available on 
www.un.org/en/ga. 
30 For example, the UN Charter and the GCC Fundamental Statute.  
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effective collective measure for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.”31  
This aspect of international law would not be a law if there was no authority to 
recognise whether this law was broken or not, namely the Security Council.  When a 
state considers an action by another state as a threat to peace, it can bring its concern 
before the Council,
32
 which then has the authority “to determine the existence of a threat 
to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken.”33 
 
Secondly, the rules of change provide a framework that gives power to individuals to 
add new rules to the existing primary rules of obligations or to alter them.  International 
organisations have contributed to international law by allowing for such secondary rules 
of change and they usually have a supreme council through which member states can 
propose to change or create new rules.  One example is the Supreme Council of the 
GCC, which has the power to amend the GCC Charter;
34
 another example is the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, through which states can propose new laws or propose 
to change existing rules.
35
  Although the GA Resolutions are not binding, it is a means 
of change when the member countries accept the change.  One example of such a 
change to international law it that the General Assembly has amended Articles 23, 27 
and 61 of the UN Charter.
36
 
 
Thirdly, in terms of the rules of adjudication, there are many international courts that 
can produce precedents which can be regarded as secondary rules of recognition, the 
main examples being the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  The ICJ was established in 1945, with functions designed in 
accordance with international law.  States can raise their disputes to be settled in front of 
the Court and they can ask the Court for an advisory opinion.
37
  The ICJ “continues to 
provide in-depth legal expertise to back its efforts in the development, promotion and 
clarification of international standards. It continues to advocate with governments, the 
                                                             
31 Article 1, UN Charter.  
32 See the Security Council official website, available on www.un.org/docs/sc. 
33See Ibid. 
34Article 20, the GCC Charter.  
35Article 108, the UN Charter.  
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legal profession, and civil society in order to insure implementation of these standards at 
the international and national levels”. 38   The ICC is an independent international 
criminal court; it is the first stable one “establish[ed] to help end impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of the concern of the international 
community.”39   
 
It is worth mentioning that the application of Hart‟s analysis still requires additional 
empirical research to clarify further the rightful place of international organisations 
within this legal system outlined by Hart.  However, it is shown here that international 
organisations play an important role in developing international law to become a 
stronger legal system.  Hart states that each one of the three remedies is “a step from 
pre-legal into the legal words.” 40  This section shows the role of international 
organisations in pushing international law ahead towards becoming a legal system.  This 
thesis finds that Hart‟s theory is rich and helpful for understanding international law and 
international organisations.  This theory helps frame this thesis in analysing the GCC as 
lawmaker as well as analysing the laws created by the GCC.  Following from Hart‟s 
theory, Abbott et al. further developed this positivist theory.   
 
2.2.3 The Concept of Legalisation 
 
In 2001, Abbott et al developed Hart's theory
41
 in order for it to apply to the legal 
analysis of the work of international organisations.
42
 They developed the legalisation 
theory which states that legal rules are measured based on three elements: obligation, 
delegation and precision, to classify them appropriately as either hard or soft law.
43
  One 
can argue that when politicians start managing their relations under an international 
institution, they are moving toward legalisation, because they are allowing their 
                                                             
38 See the official website of the Court, available on www.icj.org/court. 
39 The official website of the ICC, available on www.icc-cpi.int. 
40 Hart (1961), p. 90. 
41 Which states that a legal system has to have two kinds of rules: primary rules which tell what 
individuals have or have not to do, and secondary rules which is three elements: rules of recognition, rules 
of change and rule of adjudication.  See Hart (1961), p.212.  
42 See. Abbott et al (2001), p. 19 
43 Ibid 
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relations to be governed under certain legal rules. Their movements will then be 
measured, based on the above three elements.
44
 
 
“The Concept of Legalization” is an important study on international organisations 
written by Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and Duncan Snidal.  Basing their conception of legalisation on an empirical 
analysis of international organisations, their article introduced a series of articles 
applying and developing this same concept in the Summer 2000 special issue of the 
International Organization Journal (IO).  
 
According to their explanation, obligation means that states are bound by rules and 
commitments which put their behaviour under examination by international law.  
Precision refers to the rules that clearly outline the required implementation of these 
obligations while delegation means that the implementation, interpretation and 
application of these rules have to take place under the examination of a third party, 
which should also carry out the duty of dispute settlement and have the ability to make 
further rules.
45
 
 
In their conceptualisation, a legalising institution is an institution that has the ability not 
only to make decisions but also to impress them on governments.  One advantage of 
legalisation is that its function in the world of politics changes the processes of political 
decision-making.
46
  The primary reason discouraging international leaders from 
choosing to join a legalised institution is usually that they do not want to have long-term 
obligations.  There is no clear line demarcating legalised from non-legalised institutions; 
there is a wide range of legalised institutions from those that produce hard law to those 
that create soft law.  There is nonetheless, also a separation between legalisation and 
effects.  In other words, it is not necessary for a legalisation institution to be more 
effective than a non-legalised one because the function of international organisation is 
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not only to create law.
47
  Some scholars describe a kind of cooperation based on 
political partnership and the growth of international norms to illustrate enhanced 
obedience in the absence of more highly legalised institutions.
48
 
 
Abbott et al.‟s conceptualisation offers guidance to researchers of international 
organisations and provides the means for measuring their strengths and weaknesses.  It 
provides international law with a new discipline which is needed, especially in the 
absence of centralised coercion.  It generates a common base for scholars in both 
politics and law to let them move away from Austin‟s constricted vision of law which 
considers that there is no law without the enforcement by a supreme authority.
49
 
 
2.2.3.1 Criticising the Concept of Legalisation 
 
This next part now analyses the opposition to Abbott et al expressed by Finnemore and 
Toope in the article entitled "Alternative to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and 
Politics."
50
  The main conflict between the two positions is in their differing 
perspectives in approaching the subject: Finnemore and Toope write from an 
international relations perspective while Abbott et al. take a predominantly legal 
perspective.  Finnemore and Toope aim to widen the understanding of law compared to 
the view of Abbott and others.                   
 
Finnemore and Toope claim that the authors contributing to “Legalization and World 
Politics” attempt to connect a legal positivist theory of international law expressed by 
Hart in The Concept of Law to the theory of neoliberal institutionalism.  However, the 
authors of “The Concept of Legalization” make no reference to neoliberal 
institutionalism.  In fact, their work is to develop their own theory based on Hart‟s 
theory and they attempt to explain the implications of their theory on the study of 
international politics. 
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Finnemore and Toope argue that this work proposes that law is a narrow compilation of 
dignified and institutionalised characters.  This conceptualisation, which is an attempt to 
link international law to international relations, does not cover the entire role of law.
51
  
Without an exhaustive overview of law that leads to a plain understanding of legitimacy, 
the three components – obligation, precision and delegation – raise more problems than 
they provide solutions.  Abbott et al.‟s conceptualisation depends mainly on courts and 
cases or treaty negotiations to decide what the law is in a given matter.
52
  Finnemore and 
Toope, stressing the limitation of the theory, argue that “a fuller understanding of law is 
not simply a pleasing accessory to the framework proposed in” Abbott et al.‟s theory.53   
 
The question raised here is therefore why these three dimensions are more important 
than other legal features and what other dimensions might be significant.  Criticising 
these three elements of legalisation, Finnemore and Toope stress one missing feature 
that is more important than these three: that is legitimacy, which e lawyers believe is a 
crucial source of obligation.  Finnemore and Toope claim that “Law is legitimate only to 
the extent that it produces rules that are generally applicable, exhibit clarity or 
determinacy, are coherent with other rules, are publicized (so that people know what 
they are), seek to avoid retroactivity, are relatively constant over time, are possible to 
perform, and are congruent with official action.”54  This thesis agrees that legitimacy, 
which stresses the importance of coherence with other rules, is an important element.  
Yet, the second element of Abbott et al.‟s theory, that is precision, includes coherence 
with other rules.   
 
Finnemore and Toope argue that “The Concept of Legalization” does not apply to 
customary international law.
55
  At this stage, a short explanation of customary 
international law is required.  Danilenko provides this explanation by comparing 
customary international law to international treaties, stating “By contrast to the 
elaboration of [an] international treaty, which requires formal negotiations, custom is 
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created by conduct of members of the international community which constantly 
„negotiate‟ with each other by means of actual deeds, statements and other acts.”56 
Customary international law is therefore the law recognised by states in their 
international practice but that have not been highlighted or codified as international 
treaty law.  Based on this explanation of customary international law, this thesis agrees 
with Finnemore and Toope‟s assessment that customary international law is not 
included in “The Concept of Legalization” theory.  However, it does explain the process 
that customary law can undergo in order to become hard law.   
 
This chapter‟s response to Finnemore and Toope here is that they are criticising Abbott 
et al. for following the provision of legal positivism.  They criticise Abbott et al. for the 
fact that their conceptualisation depends mainly on courts and cases or treaty 
negotiations.  Yet, this is a legal positivist approach which only focuses on what the law 
is not on what the law should be.  With respect to Finnemore and Toope‟s main 
criticisms, Abbott et al. have never claimed that their conceptualisation is 
comprehensive but instead admit its limitations.  Although legitimacy is very important, 
Abbott et al. do not claim that their conceptualisation is the final word in the long-
standing debates on international law or that it needs further development.  However, 
there is a need for a standard to measure international organisations in terms of their 
legal bases and their legal effect on international law.  According to the mechanisms for 
measuring international organisations outlined in“The Concept of Legalization,” any 
international organisation can at least be somewhat identified as either a hard lawmaker 
or just a soft lawmaker, can be located within the framework of international law and 
can be compared to other organisations or states.
57
 
 
Although “The Concept of Legalization” can be criticised, it is useful to determine the 
GCC‟s place within this conceptual study of legalisation, as this thesis can benefit from 
this joint work of both political and international legal scientists that have developed the 
new standpoint that international law is significant even though it is affected by 
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politics.
58
  In this regard, the literature and studies on legalisation among international 
relations scholars is still narrow and needs more addressing.
59
Having analysed theories 
of international law in this section, the following section now turns to international 
relation theories.  
 
 
 
2.3 Insights from International Relations Theories 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
  
It is suggested that one should look not only to the positive law, its creation and its 
interpretation. The concepts of role and function cannot be fully understood without 
being considered in a broader context of the existence of the GCC as an international 
institution that may be expected and may seek to participate in the process of 
international law making and application as well as international politics more generally, 
International Relations (IR) theory helps give a more realistic take on the place of 
international rules and organisations within the wider picture of international politics.  
IR theories comprise a variety of schools of thought that attempt to explain the polit ical 
factors behind the legal rules.  IR scholars focus on political behaviour, relations 
between international actors and international affairs and the factors that influence 
international institutions.  They might regard the establishment of international 
institutions as incidents that can be explained.
60
 
 
According to Nardin, the key question for IR theory is "whether a body of rules 
governing the relation of states can exist in the absence of authoritative central 
institutions, not whether these rules are 'really rules'.”61  While international law theories 
can advise on what the law is or what the law should be, IR theories can advise on why 
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the law is as it is.  Theories of international law consist of legal methods which can be 
used as a means of responding to a doctrine question,
62
 like the response of legal 
positivists to the questions of whether GCC laws are soft or hard laws and whether the 
GCC has any legal means of enforcing them, presented in the previous chapter.  
Although they provide a better way of describing and explaining, theories of 
International Relations are not legal methods.
63
This chapter therefore aims to enrich the 
study of the GCC by adding the broader scope of IR theory to link the doctrinal analysis 
to the political motives behind the establishment and functions of the GCC.   
 
This first part of the chapter discusses a variety of key IR theories – idealism, realism, 
institutionalism, constructivism – each of which has a different view on international 
organisations.  While idealists are more enthusiastic about the key role of international 
organisations, realists perceive international organisations as merely tools in the hands 
of states, considered to be the main international actors.  Institutionalist scholars believe 
that although states are the main international actors, international organisations are still 
significant because states have various international economic interests and therefore 
need international organisations as agents to help states cooperate internationally.  
Finally, constructivist scholars turn the argument the other way, claiming that 
international organisations shape state interests.  Before dealing with these theories, the 
interdisciplinary link between international law and international relations scholars 
needs to be discussed.  
 
2.3.2 Interdisciplinarity Between International Relations and 
International Law 
 
Historically, neither international law scholars nor international relations scholars have 
been willing to complement the others discipline.  In fact, international relations 
scholars used to see international law as epiphenomenal or beside the point, law only 
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perceived as an elaborate matter for lawyers.
64
  At the same time, international law 
scholars generally ignored the work of international relations specialists in international 
law and international cooperation.
65
  Craig Barker explains this beginning of 
interdisciplinarity: “Indeed, international law was seen by the organizers of the earliest 
courses on international relations as being the „best integrated root discipline‟ of 
international relations.
66
  Particularly in the United States, early international relations 
writing was dominated by legal approaches and indeed „may be said to have sprung 
from law.‟67  Yet within the short time of the creation of the discipline, international law 
had come to be regarded as, at best, a necessary evil, at worst, a „blind alley.‟”68  
Overlap between the two disciplines started 20 years ago when scholars from each 
discipline began to enrich their field by adding elements from the other discipline to 
their work.  When this overlap started, international relations scholars did some very 
interesting work on international law
69
 and the value of interdisciplinary work became 
clear for scholars on both sides.
70
 
 
One example of this interdisciplinarity comes from Byers, who states “[Regime theorists 
and institutionalists] clearly sense that normal state behaviour does give rise to legal 
obligation, that some regimes and institutions represent a transformation of power of the 
kind that they have traditionally studied, into another kind or power – and that this other 
kind of power, „the power of rules‟, subsequently what states say and do.”71  Regime 
theory and institutionalist theory are IR theories which will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this chapter.  On the other side, Barker states, “in some area at least, 
international lawyers are already drawing on institutionalists approaches.” 72  Hurrell 
explains this point, noting: 
[M]any international lawyers have come to view international treaties and 
convention over such matter as the environment, not as a definitive and 
unchanging set of rules, but as a means of creating law-making framework.  
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Their purpose is to provide a framework for negotiation in which the techniques 
and the principles of international law can be employed, first to negotiate and 
formalise accepted but very general principles, and second to create means of 
facilitating ongoing negotiations from which more specific, harder rules may 
subsequently emerge.
73
 
 
Both disciplines are comprised of a number of different theoretical approaches.  This 
diversity of approaches, though it enriches the disciplines, makes them difficult to be 
investigated as theories.
74
  Koskenniemi states that there are no clear distinctions 
between legal methods and criticises “the suggested shopping-mall approach to 'method', 
the assumption that styles of legal writing are like brands of detergent that can be put on 
display alongside one another to be picked up by the customer in accordance with 
his/her idiosyncratic preferences.”75  Even for this thesis it is not easy to stick to only 
one IR theory as many aspects of these theories overlap in many ways.    
 
Although IR theories enrich the study of international cooperation, this enrichment is 
still limited.  Keohane highlights this limitation when stating that "It makes sense to 
seek to develop cumulative verifiable knowledge, but we must understand that we can 
aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalizations rather than to 
discover universal laws, and that our understanding of world politics will always be 
incomplete."
76
 There is no single theory that broadly explains the function, success and 
failure of international organisations.
77
 However, these theories can provide a better 
understanding of international organisations as they explore the reasons behind the 
behaviour of international actors.  Although the focus of this thesis is on institutionalism 
and constructivism, other international theories – namely idealism and realism – are 
discussed because these theories build upon one another.
78
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2.3.3 International Relations Theories 
 
2.3.3.1 Idealism 
 
Idealists assume that international rules by themselves would facilitate cooperation 
among states to live collectively in a peaceful style.
79
Idealist IR scholars – or 
functionalists
80
 – believe that international institutions can drive the world to obey 
international rules which will lead to the creation of a less anarchic world and a stronger 
international legal system.  Functionalists present a variety of approaches but their main 
argument in relation to this topic is that changing states require the creation of more 
international organisations and their enlargement.
81
  Antonio Cassesse explains that 
idealists were very enthusiastic about the expected revolution that would result from the 
creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (1922-1946) which 
initiated a new resource of international law, particularly general principles.
82
  
Explaining the concept of general principles, Barker states that they were “originally 
conceived as a mechanism for restricting state sovereignty in the absence of treaties or 
customary international law.”83  This original consideration of the implication of the 
general principles was the reason behind the idealist excitement.  However, general 
principles have had a more procedural implication, as Barker explains: “the category has, 
perhaps not surprisingly, given rise primarily to procedural rules aimed at assisting the 
court in the exercise of its functions.”84  The PCIJ emphasised the importance of general 
principles as a resource for international law.
85
  Article 38 of the ICJ mentions that “The 
Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply […] the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.”86  From the idealist perspective, the aim of this new development perspective 
is limiting state sovereignty:  
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[T]he supporters of the new source were politically motivated.  They intended to 
go beyond the traditional limitation of the international legal system by 
broadening the existing legal network through the addition of principles 
reflecting Western legal philosophy… However modest the scope of the 
principles, the attempt was revolutionary, because for the first time an 
international heteronomous law (that is, rules imposed from outside and not 
resting on the free will of States) was to be created … the role of the new law 
was self-evident: it was meant to restrict State sovereignty as much as possible 
whenever the absence of treaties or custom left States free to behave as they 
liked.
87
 
 
Many functionalists perceive the development of the international community as 
moving towards global governance in a sort of international federalism.
88
  In their view, 
international organisations have the ability to learn from their experiences and develop 
step by step.
89
  For example, after its failure, the League of Nations was replaced by the 
United Nations.  Gordenker explains these developments stating, “the most important 
embodiment of the experience during the nineteenth century with intentional 
cooperation was the League of Nations.  It was equally the direct forerunner of the 
United Nations, whose Charter borrowed heavily from the League Covenant.”90 The 
creation of the UN came after four years of discussing the strengths and weaknesses of 
the League of Nations and discussing how to create a better international organisation.
91
 
 
In response to idealists, the realist approach shows a disregard for the importance of 
international organisations as genuine international actors.  They believe in the state's 
centrality, and to them, international organisations are only the agents of states.  Realists 
consider an idealist anyone who believes that international institutions are key actors.   
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2.3.3.2 Classical Realism 
 
The classical realist approach has mainly been developed by E. H. Carr, Hans 
Morgenthau, George Kennan and others.
92
 Realists argue that foreign policies of states 
are guided by national interests, not by international rules, and that international affairs 
are determined by power relationships.
93
The main arguments of realists are that states 
are the main actors, that they act mainly in their own interests and that the international 
system is anarchic.
94
  The term 'classical realist' is used to distinguish them from the 
'neorealists' whose approach is closer to institutionalism, as discussed below.  For 
classical realists, state interests guide international politics, while international legal 
rules cannot be the guide.
95
  They do not believe that international institutions actually 
matter; rather, they are only tools while power relationships have the final say in 
international affairs.
96
  Even international law is not a real concern for them, although 
they agree that it should be observed.
97
 
 
Some very important work on the realist approach comes from E. H. Carr, who blames 
the international political community for all the critique that has emerged on 
international law: 
 
International law is a function of the political community of nations.  Its defects 
are due, not to any technical shortcoming, but to the embryonic character of the 
community in which it functions … Rules, however general in form, will be 
constantly found to be aimed at a particular state or group of states; and for this 
reason, if for no other, the power element is more obvious in international than 
in municipal law, whose subjects are a large body of anonymous individuals. 
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The same consideration makes international law more frankly political than 
other branches of the law.
98
 
 
Another key realist scholar is Hans Morgenthau who sees the role of international law as 
embodied in international relations.
99
  He believes in state centrality and therefore, for 
him, international law, including any international organisation, is merely the concern of 
states.  He concludes, “The great majority of the rules of international law are generally 
observed by all nations without actual compulsion, for it is generally in the interests of 
all nations concerned to honour their obligations under international law.” 100  
Morgenthau's work influenced some classical realists to ignore the insight of 
international law as a whole. Classical realists have challenged international lawyers in 
searching for the significance of international law.
101
  Slaughter Burly explains: 
International legal theories had long grappled with the theoretical conundrum of 
the source of international legal obligation – of law being simultaneously ‟of‟ 
and „above‟ the state.  Yet endless debates on this question nevertheless assumed 
that international law rules, however derived, had some effect on state behaviour, 
that law and power interacted in some way rather than marking opposite ends of 
the domestic-international spectrum.
102
 
 
Realism emphasises that states are the main actors in an anarchic world where there is 
no central authority capable of enforcing international law.  Security is states' principal 
goal and acting in their own interests is their leading attitude.  The varying types of state 
power can explain many international issues.  Realists believe that states do cooperate 
but only when this cooperation serves their interest.  
 
This realist approach developed during World War II and was the dominant approach in 
IR for three decades.
103
  However, this thesis suggests that international developments at 
the time may have shifted the concern of states to security rather than international trade.  
Though realists consider that foreign policies of states are guided by national interests, 
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the question here is whether states are aware of the benefits of meeting international 
obligations and the benefits of international institutions.  How keen are they not to face 
the consequences of breaking international obligations?  More engagement with the 
criticism of the realist approach in provided below with the critique of neorealism as 
both approaches face the same criticisms.  Building on the classical realist perspective, 
neorealists emerged to develop the realist theory to add value to the institutionalist 
explanation of cooperation among nations. 
 
2.3.3.3 Neorealism 
 
One of the main founders of neorealism (or structural realism) is Kenneth N. Waltz,
104
 
who states that it “presents a systematic portrait of international politics depicting 
component units according to the manner of their arrangement.”105  Neorealism can be 
summarised as the perspective that “States, which are deemed the major actors in world 
affairs, are conceived as unitary actors motivated primarily by the will to survive.  
Anarchy – the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force- is the essential 
structural quality of the system.  This structural quality provides an adequate 
explanation both for competition of states and for the observable though severely 
limited instances of states cooperation.  International regimes, institutions, rules, and 
norms are not independent causal factors … and affect the prospects for international 
cooperation only at the margins.”106 
 
In other words, neorealism makes five proposals:  First, states are the main international 
actors.  Second, if states fail to defend their resources, the international environment 
strictly disciplines the states; therefore, states behave as rational bodies and are 
“sensitive to costs.”  Third, the behaviour of states is mainly shaped by international 
anarchy.  Fourth, in this anarchy, states are concerned about power and security, which 
makes them subject to conflict and competition.  Fifth, international organisations have 
no real impact on state cooperation.  Indeed, states usually cooperate successfully even 
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if they do not have common interests.
107
  In their studies of international relations, 
neorealists basically “did not discuss law as such,”108 and just like classical realists, they 
basically ignored international law as a whole.
109
 
 
Many other IR theories might not conflict with some neorealist beliefs.  These shared 
beliefs are, according to Jackson, that “there is a strain in human nature that is self-
interested and combative.  They share a focus on analysis in which states loom large.  
They operate with a conception of international relations as anarchical.  They agree that 
power is important and that international relations consist significantly of power politics.  
They also agree that international theory is, in some fundamental respects, a theory of 
security and survival.  They recognize that the national interest is an important value in 
world politics.”110  A better understanding of the neorealist approach is achieved by 
comparing it with the most similar approach, namely classical realism.  
 
2.3.3.3.1 The Differences Between Classical Realism and Neorealism 
 
Neorealists did not modify the essential beliefs of classical realists but they did develop 
a theory of international relations that takes into account the basic insights of classical 
realism, that states are the main international actors.
111
  Waltz highlights the main 
differences between neorealism and classical realism.  According to him, neorealists are 
more interested in deepening the theoretical study of international politics while 
classical realists trust that “little systematic theory concerning international relations 
was possible.”112  Additionally, classical realists conceive power as the main purpose of 
states‟ international actions: for classical realists, states are constantly aiming to 
maximise their power while neorealists assert that survival and security are the main 
goals of states and that states use power as means for achieving these goals.
113
  They 
also believe that maximising power is sometimes harmful as it can lead to potentially 
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dangerous events such as the arms race.
114
  Neorealists believe that “the international 
system lacks a common power and is thus anarchic.  As a consequence, states are 
insecure.  A state can never be certain that a fellow state will not use military force 
against it.  Accordingly, states must engage in self-help measures to attempt to survive 
in the international system.  They do this by attempting to enhance their power within 
the system.”115  This neorealist perspective is the best way to explain the GCC reaction 
to the Arab Spring, as will be comprehensively analysed in the next chapter.   
 
Neorealists do take into account the structural aspects of the international system that 
may lead to international conflict, such as the security of resources (e.g. oil wells).  On 
the other hand, classical realists are only concerned about the structural causes that 
come from inside states (e.g. power) but not those that come from the international 
system.
116
 
2.3.3.3.2 Critique of Neorealism 
 
One of the main critiques of the neorealist approach is about their denial of the 
significant role of international organisations.  For neorealists, international regimes, 
institutions, rules, and norms, are not 'independent causal factors,' in other words, they 
can only be effective international actors if states want them to be, and their effect on 
international cooperation is seen as very limited.
117
  The neorealist disregard of the 
significance of international institutions is therefore two-fold: international institutions 
are not seen to be stand-alone influencing factors and they have little effect on 
international cooperation.   Taking this point into account, this thesis questions whether 
these two elements are linked in this perspective and which element impacts the other.  
If the latter were seen to be a consequence of the former, it would follow that the latter 
would not be true if the former were not true.  More precisely, if an institution were not 
an independent causal factor, it would not be able to affect international cooperation.  
Conversely, if the institution were an independent causal factor, it would be an effective 
one.  This thesis argues that if this is the neorealist argument, then there is little 
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difference between them and institutionalists.  As will be discussed below, 
institutionalists have stressed the importance of the independence of an international 
institution in order to be really effective.  Institutionalists may therefore have no 
problem with the fact that many international institutions are not independent actors 
because the states that form these institutions did not want them to be independent, as 
was the case with the GCC.  To sum up, if the neorealist problem with international 
institutions is that they are not independent and as a consequence not effective, they 
should discuss the significance of institutions when they are independent.    
 
The neorealists may say that international institutions are not important actors even if 
they are given a good level of independence.  This thesis argues that institutionalists can 
challenge this assumption, as there are many facts that prove the effective role of 
international institutions in international cooperation: from trade agreements to treaties 
of war and peace.
118
  The role of international organisations such as the UN‟s in 
maintaining international peace cannot be ignored.  For example, states were not 
interested in dealing with the issue of climate change until a UN report declared that 
human activity is responsible for climate change and that it can be reduced.
119
  This UN 
report helped support international treaty negotiations to deal with climate change.  
Additionally, during the Second Iraqi War, the Security Council declared its final 
warning that Iraq had breached UN obligations, which led the US to claim it had the 
right to wage war against Iraq.  A number of similar examples can be listed here.
120
 
 
Keohane analyses the significance of international institutions and his argument is 
presented here as a challenge to both classical and structural realists.  He argues that if 
states do not need agreements to manage their international relations and that all 
international agreements are useless, there would be no point for the existence of any 
international institutions.
121
  He then makes the opposite point: if cooperation was too 
easy to be achieved, in other words, if all international agreements could be achieved 
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without costs, there would be no need for non-state actors to help states create 
agreements.  However, he responds that the two conclusions are as wrong as saying that 
states would not gain any benefit from agreements.
122
  He continues "It is the 
combination of the potential value of agreements and the difficulty of making them that 
renders international regimes significant.  In order to cooperate in world politics on 
more than a sporadic basis, human beings have to use institutions."
123
 
 
Neorealists as well as classical realists are criticised and, according to Jackson and 
Sorensen, realism does not “capture all of IR or even its most important aspects … 
realism overlooks, ignores, or plays down many important faces of international life.  It 
overlooks the cooperative strain in human nature.”124  In response to the question of 
whether states recognise the importance of international cooperation, they state that 
“States are not only in conflict, they also share common interests and observe common 
rules which confer mutual rights and duties.”125 They are criticised for ignoring the 
significance of international law on the relations of states. Neorealists are also criticised, 
according to them, in playing down “the extent to which international politics are 
progressive, i. g. cooperation instead of conflict can prevail.”126 
 
Finally, with respect to all the criticism about neorealists theory, their perspective that 
survival is the main aim of states at the international level is a key idea in explaining the 
GCC reaction to the Arab Spring explored in the next part of this chapter.  However, the 
next theory is institutionalism, which is largely regarded as a response to the realist 
approach.
127
  In war times, realist theory becomes more applicable than during times of 
peace, when the theory of institutionalism becomes more applicable.  The international 
conflicts during the 1970s highlighted the importance of the realist perspective and, at 
the same time, undervalued the importance of institutionalist theory.
128
  Nevertheless, 
the international system did not fail; rather, intergovernmental cooperation continued, 
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giving institutionalists more motivation to develop their theory and to challenge realist 
thinking in the 1980s.
129
 
 
2.3.3.4 Institutionalism 
 
According to Beck et al., institutionalists “seek to explain the emergence of cooperation 
by discussing the functional benefit that rules and institutions provide to states […] 
Institutionalists have extensively explored the formation of international regimes and 
institutions, increasingly turning their attention to the implementation of regimes and 
institutionalized rules.  For these scholars, the primary concern is the role of institutions 
in affecting state behaviour.” 130   Unlike realists, institutionalists carefully examine 
international institutions and analyse the history of their functions and effects to develop 
their theory and to respond to realists.  That is why some scholars have referred to 
institutionalists and idealists as “functionalists.” 131   Institutionalism can actually be 
regarded as a development of the idealist approach.
132
Some institutionalists, like 
Alvarez, consider international institutions not only to be key for international 
cooperation but also a source of international law,
133
 just like the other traditional 
sources mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.
134
  Neorealists agree that 
institutionalist theory is the main challenge to realism as institutionalism does not accept 
the realist argument about state centrality in the international system and has a different 
understanding of world politics.  Institutionalists emphasise the importance of 
international institutions, regarding them as secondary main actors in the international 
system.
135
  Although institutionalists agree with realists that the anarchy of the 
international system – being without a central authority – restrains international 
cooperation, states can nonetheless achieve intergovernmental cooperation within this 
anarchy and states cooperate better through international institutions.
136
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This thesis argues that applying institutionalism to an organisation that has been given 
very limited power and independence is comparable to applying classical idealist 
thought to an independent and powerful organisation.  In other words, even when 
institutionalists sometimes appear idealist, their approach is still capable of channelling 
the means to achieve greater international cooperation.  Without the inspiration of 
institutionalism we perhaps would have seen the existing effective role of key 
international organisations such as the UN and the EU.  Institutionalist theory is thus 
more developed than idealist theory and institutionalists have challenged the realists by 
emphasising the real function of international institutions in ensuring international 
cooperation.  For a better understanding of institutionalism, this chapter provides the 
definition of institutions and how to categorise them below.     
 
2.3.3.4.1 Categorising Institutions 
 
International lawyers regard institutions as formal organisations, most often constituted 
by some form of constitutional framework. The international legal literature 
consequently refers to both institutions and organisations as indicating a constitutional 
structure within states operate to a greater or lesser extent. The terms “institution” and 
“organisation” are used interchangeably. International relations scholars take a broader 
view of institutions as constituting not only organisations but also regimes. Regimes are 
defined by Stephen Krasner as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and 
procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations"137, and need not be formally 
constituted as formal international organisations.  The study of international institutions 
has created a rich literature by both political scientists and lawyers.
138
 As this thesis 
examines the GCC as an organisation, both international law insights and international 
relations insights are relevant in terms of classification. 
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 International institutional law is part of public international law.
139
As Alvarez describes, 
“International law as a system is commonly distinguished from the national rule of law 
because of the absence of a legislature or parliament with authority to make the law for 
all states, the lack of a police or executive power capable of enforcing it, and the want of 
a judiciary with the compulsory jurisdiction to interpret the law”. 140   International 
institutional law sets the norms (or “rules” or “standards”) that emerge directly from the 
work of international institutions.
141
Scholars of international institutional law study 
international institutions “by way of example, to illustrate how different they can be, but 
also to show how it is possible to talk of a set of legal principles that transcend each 
institution.”142   
 
International institutional law is not clear-cut. Nigel White summarizes the debate 
between international institutional lawyers and politicians, explaining that “international 
lawyers have not yet fully converted political debate and ideas into legal concepts and 
principles.  These, though, have become the law of international organisations.”143 This 
thesis examines the clearer and more established rules of international institutional law, 
but avoids engaging in the more controversial ones as the latter would require 
considerably longer debate.  These established rules of international institutions are 
examined throughout this thesis, particularly in the analysis of topics relating to the 
GCC Charter, the GCC membership rules and issues relating to its independence.   
 
In reviewing the development of international institutional law, Nigel White states “a 
law of international institutions has developed in certain well-trodden areas such as 
international legal personality, legal powers, membership, finance, and decision-
making.”144 He explains how international institutional law is still controversial in many 
ways, “for example on the issue of the existence of legal personality and the extent of 
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institutional powers, or more profoundly the existence and extent of an organisation‟s 
separate will.  Though the terms of the legal debate have become much clearer, there 
remains plenty to argue about, given that these issues are heavily dependent upon 
political choices, and those political choices are themselves a product of the different 
ideologies or approaches to organisations.” 145 Taking this into account, this thesis 
addresses the GCC from a broader perspective that includes the political will of the 
leaders of the GCC member countries, the GCC‟s power and ways of making law. 
 
It is important to classify the different types of international institutions in order to find 
out where the GCC fits within this typology.  It has been argued that international 
institutions “are too complex to be reduced to typologies.”146 There have nonetheless 
been many attempts to classify international institutions, although the different purposes 
in classifying international organisations inevitably generates different results.
147
  First, 
in term of their structure and function, there are inter-governmental and non-
governmental institutions or public and private international institutions.
148
  Second, 
there are those institutions that function globally (open or universal institutions)
149
 and 
regional (or closed) institutions.
150
  Third, there are general institutions and technical or 
functional institutions,
151
 and fourth, there are supra-national institutions and non supra-
national institutions.
152
 
 
Inter-governmental institutions are created by states and consist of states while states are 
not involved as much in non-governmental organisations,
153
  The distinction between 
open and closed institutions is that open institutions have a universal membership open 
to all states, while closed institutions are restricted to “a closed group of States” where 
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“no Members are admitted from outside the group.”154According to Schermers, “There 
are three types of closed organizations: regional organizations, organizations of States 
with a common background, such as common language or common political system, 
and closed functional organisations.”155  In terms of the distinction between a supra-
national institution and a non-supra–national organisation, the main example of a supra-
national organisation is the European Union.
156
As will be examined in the coming 
chapters, the GCC is a regional or closed, inter-governmental institution, not supra-
national or general.  
 
With regard to the last point about (supra and non-supra institutions), this discussion is 
important because it goes to the heart of this thesis‟ criticisms of the limitation of the 
GCC.  The only supranational union in the world is the European Union.157   In such 
system, the member states “have transferred part of their legislative, executive, and 
judicial sovereignty to the supranational level.”158  The norms of a Supra-national legal 
system should have direct legal impact on all the member countries.159  In contrast with 
this, the member states in a non-supra-national institution, such as the GCC, do not give 
up any of their sovereignty to their institution.  
 
 It is significant to mention that actors when they decide to establish an international 
institution do not pick up one pre-existent class of institution.  Klabbers argues that 
international institutions “are social constructs, created by people in order, presumably, 
to help them achieve some purpose, whatever that purpose may be.  It is important to 
realize, indeed, that international actors do not purposely set out to create an 
international organisation following some eternally valid blueprint.  Instead, their aim 
will be to create an entity that allows them to meet their ends, endow those entities with 
some of the characteristics they think those entities might need (certain organs, certain 
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powers), and then hope that their creation can do what they set it up for.”160  It will be 
analysed in this thesis that the GCC leaders‟ established aims are incommensurable with 
the power and organs that they endow the GCC with.  This thesis argues that it is not 
fair to expect a supra-national achievement to come out of an institution that was created 
to be a non-supra- national institutions namely the GCC.  In chapter five about the GCC 
achievement, this thesis stresses that the GCC cannot be a supra-national institutions 
unless the GCC leaders give up some of their powers and their countries‟ sovereignties 
to the GCC.  It argues, also, the GCC cannot jump a lot of steps to become a supra-
national institution unless the member states give up at least minimum level of their 
sovereignty to the GCC.      
 
Within international relations theory, the term 'institution' is not a clear-cut concept.
161
  
Defining institutions is an important aspect of studies such as this because it discusses 
institutions from two disciplines: international law and international relations.  This 
thesis explores the differing views on institutions found in the two disciplines, which 
highlights how scholars from either discipline are not necessarily discussing the same 
thing, and even within international relations, the term 'institution' does not always have 
the same meaning.  This thesis agrees with Keohane, who stresses the importance of 
defining 'institutions,' and critiques other writers for not defining the subject they are 
writing about.
162
 
 
Some have defined institutions as “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and 
norms of behaviour that structure repeated human interaction.”163  It is largely accepted 
to define institutions as a “sort of establishment of relative permanence of a distinctly 
social sort.” 164   A short definition of institutions is “frozen decisions,” or "history 
encoded into rules."
165
  Yet, codification is not an issue, and the rules of an institution 
do not have to be codified, as evidenced by the fact that the British constitution is a very 
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strong institution though it is built on unwritten rules.
166
  To identify whether there is an 
institution or not, the following question has to be asked: “whether patterns of behaviour 
are indeed differentiated by role.  When we ask whether X is an institution, we ask 
whether we can identify persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape 
expectations, and prescribe roles."
167
  Institutions can be formal, such as international 
institutions, or informal, such as an international regime for money and trade, which 
combines rules and institutions.
168
 
 
Keohane analyses 'institution' as a concept that could refer to any of three meanings, two 
of which are: a „general pattern‟ of activity and a „particular human-constructed 
arrangement.‟169  Examples of the first include "the balance of power, international law, 
diplomatic mechanism ... and war," as well as "the institutions of international 
society."
170
  More examples include several individual activities like marriage and 
religion as well as some state activities like sovereignty and diplomacy.
171
  Examples of 
the second meaning – particular human-constructed arrangement – are, for instance: the 
United Nations, the General Agreement on Traffic and Trade, the World Bank and the 
Roman Catholic Church.
172
  However, it is considered here that all international 
institutions, such as the EU, EC, GCC, and the WTO can be examples of this.    
 
The preference of this thesis is to employ the simpler conceptualisation of institutions to 
facilitate the understanding of differences between institutions.  Therefore, instead of 
Keohane's terminology of 'general pattern' or 'particular human-constructed 
arrangement,' this thesis uses the term 'general institutions' for the former and 'specific 
institutions' for the latter.
173
  This terminology reflects the reality of each kind, as 
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general ones usually have no body, but reflects a kind of behaviour or principle more, 
while the more specific ones usually have a body, such as an international institution.   
 
What general institutions share with specific institutions is that they both, according to 
Keohane, “meet the criteria for a broad definition of institutions: both involve persistent 
and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behaviour roles, constrain 
activity, and shape expectations.”174  What divides the two kinds of institutions is that 
“specific institutions have unique life-histories, which depend on the decisions of 
particular individuals,” 175  while general institutions do not depend on individuals, 
whether individual persons or states.
176
 
 
Having highlighted the varying understandings of institutions, it is time to draw 
attention to the different focus of institutionalists and constructivists.  Almost all 
institutionalist work is focused on specific institutions
177
 while constructivists usually 
focus on general institutions.  This point is extremely significant because it helps clarify 
the difference between the two approaches: it shows that many conflicting arguments 
between institutionalists and constructivists were perhaps due to a misunderstanding 
because they actually focus on different institutions.  For example, constructivists 
criticise institutionalists for only examining the utilitarian benefit of cooperation and not 
analysing how institutions can develop out of human hands and state actions.
178
  
Obviously, such critique is no longer relevant or applicable if we take into account that 
the two approaches deal with a different kind of institution.  
 
The concept of state sovereignty, for example, has been created for a long time by the 
practice of the standard of sovereignty rather than created by agreement.
179
  Keohane 
explains that “Sovereignty seems to be prior to the kind of calculations of which 
rationalistic theory focus: governments‟ strategies assume the principle of sovereignty, 
                                                             
174 Keohane (1996), p. 191-192. 
175 Ibid p.192. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid, p. 195. 
178 See Ibid, p 199. 
179 Ibid, p 201.   
 
 
64 
 
and the practice of sovereignty statehood, as givens.  Some argue, according to him that 
“sovereignty is of even more far-reaching significance, since it defines the very nature 
of the actors in word politics.”180  Finally, as Young argues, “there are three paths to 
regime formation: spontaneous, in which regimes emerge from the converging 
expectations of many individual actions; negotiated, in which regime are formed by 
explicit agreements; and imposed, in which regimes are initially forced upon actors by 
external imposition.”181  It is worth noting here that the third one he mentions is what 
constructivists advocate, as will be discussed later.  This does, however, turn the focus 
to one of the primary contributions of institutionalism, namely regime theory.   
 
2.3.3.4.2 Regime Theory 
 
One of the main institutionalist outputs is regime theory.
182
  Yet some scholars, such as 
Hurrell, reject the idea that regime theory is a development of idealism: he states, “there 
was the need to achieve maximum distance from such perceived formalism and from 
anything tainted by the sins of idealism.” 183   Regime/institutionalist theory is an 
international relations theory which places international institutions at the centre of 
international interaction and argues that cooperation is best achieved through such 
institutions.  The study of regimes has produced an enormous amount of original 
literature that seeks to describe the emergence and determination of cooperation and the 
foundations of state uniqueness and interests.
184
  International regimes are “principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given issue-area.”185  Principles are a "basic generalisation that is accepted 
as true and that can be used as a basis for reasoning or conduct;"
186
 thus although 
'principles' are accepted as true, the practice of complying with them is not necessarily 
as accepted as the principles themselves.
187
  Norms are "standards of behaviour defined 
in terms of rights and obligations,” 188  while rules are "specific prescriptions or 
                                                             
180 Ibid. 
181 Beck, et al. (1996), p. 177. 
182 Ibid, p. 165. 
183 Hurrell (1996), p 201.  
184 Ibid.. 
185 Krasner (1996), p.167. 
186 Hyper Dictionary. 
187 See Cambridge Dictionary.  
188 Krasner (1996), p. 167.  
 
 
65 
 
proscriptions for action."
189
  Decision-making procedures are established practice for 
creating and applying choosing conclusions.
190
 
 
2.3.3.4.3 Regime is Broader than Agreement 
 
Agreements can refer to short-term arrangements that appear and disappear with every 
change in power unlike regimes, which cannot be based on a temporary shift of power 
or interests because they are comprised of principles and norms which are commonly 
accepted as a source of obligations.
191
  When states accept these obligations, which are 
based on principles and norms, they have to give up some of their temporary interests, 
expecting that other states will do the same, even if there are no binding rules in line 
with these principles and norms.
192
  Can friendly relations between states also be 
considered a regime?  Fred Hirsch answers this question, stating that “Friendship 
contains an element of direct mutual exchange and to this extent is akin to private 
economic good.  But it is often much more than that.  Over time, the friendship 
'transaction' can be presumed, by its permanence, to be a net benefit on both sides.  At 
any moment of time, though, the exchange is very unlikely to be reciprocally 
balanced.”193  So, the difference between regime practice and agreement practice is that 
state behaviour governed by a regime is a mixture of principle and norms while its 
behaviour under an agreement is led by short-term interests.
194
 
 
To sum up, institutionalists believe that regimes might lead to agreement, though they 
are not the same thing.
195
  Regime is different than agreement as Young explains, 
“Some writers have fallen into the habit of equating regimes with the agreement in 
terms of which regimes vary greatly in the extent to which they are expressed in formal 
agreements, treaties or conventions […] Though it may be helpful, formalization is 
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clearly not a necessary condition for the effective operation of [an] international 
regime”.196 
 
 
2.3.3.4.4 Regime Theory and International Law 
 
Barker has analysed the similarity between regime theory and international law.
197
  He 
supports Slaughter Burley in the assessment that institutionalists had been isolating law 
from their study of International Relations for 20 years before they developed their 
analysis to include the new concept of regime.
198
  After highlighting the institutionalist 
differentiation between regime and agreement, Barker states that the view of 
international lawyers on international law is similar to the view of international relations 
scholars on regime; international lawyers do not only focus on formal agreement, but 
they also focus on the broader picture by underlining the importance of "soft law."
199
 
The previous chapter therefore provided a legal analysis of international law taking a 
wider understanding than agreement.   
 
So, International Relations scholars were not interested in examining international law 
since for them, international law “continues to be viewed as peripheral, if not 
inconsequential."
200
  Accordingly, in analysing regime theory, Stephen Krasner 
concludes that "Fundamental political arguments are more concerned with norms and 
principles than with rules and procedures."
201
  He believes that to identify a regime and 
understand how it changes, it is crucial to distinguish between principles and norms, 
which are the first main characteristics of a regime.  The second set of characteristics is 
rules and procedures for decision-making.
202
  Krasner states that "Changing in rules and 
decision-making procedures are changing within regime" while "Changing in principles 
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and norms are changing of the regime itself."
203
  Barker explains that Krasner's division 
puts international law at the level of rules and decision-making procedures but not at the 
level of principles and norms.
204
  However, Young states that without taking 
international law into account, our understanding of international regimes would be 
limited.
205
  Slaughter Burley makes it clear that international law has being rediscovered 
by political scientists,
206
 but they are unwilling to express that.
207
  In this context, Byers 
states “[Regime theories and institutionalists] clearly sense that normal state behaviour 
does give rise to legal obligation, that some regimes and institutions represent a 
transformation of power of the kind that they have traditionally studied, into another 
kind of power – and that this other kind of power, „the power of rules‟, subsequently 
affects what states say and do.”208 
 
 
2.3.3.4.5 Regime Changing 
 
It has been mentioned that a regime is comprised of four elements: principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures.  A further analysis of the distinctions between 
these elements is significant for the following section.  Krasner stresses that these four 
elements are not on the same level, placing principles and norms on the one hand and 
rules and decision-making procedures on the other hand.
209
  A regime cannot remain the 
same if principles or norms have been abandoned; rather, the regime is changed to a 
new one or the old regime has already finished in a specific area.
210
  Two things can 
weaken a regime: the weakening of the rationale connecting the four elements 
composing the regime (principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures) and 
an inconsistency between the practice of a regime and its principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures.
211
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With regards to international principles, institutionalists believe that sovereignty is the 
main principle in international relations.
212
  While realists perceive sovereignty as 
anarchic, institutionalists perceive it as the principle that organises the behaviour of 
international actors and so it is the "constitutive principle of the present international 
system."
213
  If this principle changed, the regime (states) would be changed or come to 
an end.
214
 
 
2.3.3.4.6 Critiques of Institutionalism 
 
Institutionalist theory does have some limitations.  Institutionalists are not able to clarify 
why international institutions exist in some specific international relations and do not 
exist in other international relations.
215
  Also, in international cooperation, states are 
concerned with two elements.  First, they worry about the other parties complying with 
the agreed rules of cooperation,
216
 and second, states are concerned about the absolute 
benefit of cooperation: they do not only focus on what they gain but also on what the 
other parties gain, comparing their gain to that of the others.  If the other parties gain 
more than they do, states could stop cooperating even if the other parties are perfectly 
within the rules of the cooperative arrangement.
217
  Neorealists criticise the 
institutionalists for focusing on only the first element, while neorealists focus on both of 
the above elements.
218
 
 
Some scholars such as Beck et. al. distinguish between two types of institutionalists: 
rationalist institutionalists and sociological institutionalists, which are constructivists.
219
  
As this first part has already discussed the former, this next part now turns to 
constructivists.  
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2.3.3.5 Constructivism220 
 
Constructivists strive to answer the following question: “how is cooperation possible 
between states claiming sovereignty but competing for power and influence in a 
situation of anarchy?” 221   Hurrell explains that when constructivists state that their 
approach is searching for the origin of regime, they are not looking for the past use of 
the concept of 'regime' but to trace “similarities and differences between the multiple 
answers that have been given to this basic question.”222  It can be inferred from Hurrell's 
position that constructivism is not a single theory that can easily be distinguished from 
all other international relations theories but rather it is a mix of theories.  He explains, 
“the structuralist turn in the overall direction of international relations theory, and the 
need to achieve as much theoretical rigour as the other social sciences had purportedly 
been able to do.”223 
 
Constructivists, or members of the English School of International Relations, are 
interested “in the comparative analysis of „international systems‟ over time and space, 
particularly in terms of diplomatic practice and culture”.224  They analyse the so-called 
„society of states‟ which Alan James explains, “[a] society […] is subject to and 
expressive of the wishes and whims of those who […] make it up.  It reflects the actions 
and reactions of its constituents, or members.  And those members […] will be 
influenced by their element of human condition […] this is why the term society, with 
its voluntaristic connotations, is so much more apt than system to sum up the 
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collectivity of states.”225  Keohanse states that only by understanding how people think, 
can we understand international relations.
226
 
However, the main work of constructivists, according to Alexander Wendt, focuses on 
“the extent to which a state's action is influenced by “structure” (anarchy and the 
distribution of power) versus “process” (interaction and learning) and institutions.”227  
Constructivists “focus on the social construction of subjectivity and minimize their 
image problem.”228  In other words, it is a social theory “which seek[s] to explain 
identities and interests.”229 
 
2.3.3.5.1 The Similarities between Constructivism and Institutionalism 
 
Constructivism and institutionalism share the belief that international institutions are 
important.
230
  For both approaches, the norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
that constitute international institutions exert a significant influence – at least under 
certain circumstances.  The challenge to discover and to describe these circumstances 
undoubtedly will continue to animate Institutionalist scholarship for some time to 
come.”231  Also, both approaches agree with the neorealist belief that states are the main 
actors, that the international system is anarchic (unlike the national system where there 
is a central authority) and that international cooperation is better understood through 
International Relations theories.
232
 
 
2.3.3.5.3 The Differences between Constructivism and Institutionalism 
 
Constructivism differs from other approaches in believing that “understanding how 
people think about institutional norms and rules and the discourse they engage in, is as 
important in evaluating the significance of these norms as measuring the behavior that 
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changes in response to their invocation.”233  For constructivists, international institutions 
play an important role in constituting and reflecting the way that states use their power 
to cooperate with each other, and they focus on the „intersubjective meaning‟ of this role 
of international institutions.
234
More plainly, while institutionalists believe that 
international institutions only change the behaviour of states but not their identities and 
interests, constructivists believe that international institutions change both the behaviour 
of states as well as their identities and interests.
235
 
 
2.3.3.5.4 The Effect of Institutions 
 
Constructivists argue that with respect to the importance of the interests of states to 
realism and the interests of international institutions to institutionalism, there are some 
guides that emerge from interactions between international actors which leads states and 
international institutions to follow them although it was not initiated by them.  
Constructivists emphasise that "institutions are often not created consciously by human 
beings but rather emerge slowly through a less deliberative process, and that they are 
frequently taken for granted by the people who are affected by them."
236
  Constructivists 
focus on "institutions that are not plausibly viewed as the product of human 
calculation.”237  Obviously, the institutions that constructivists focus on are what was 
termed earlier as general institutions; which reveals that many of the arguments 
between institutionalists and constructivists should not exist because they are not 
actually talking about the same kind of institutions.  For example, Keohane's critique of 
institutionalists is that their theory is not complete because they do not discuss change 
consciously happening, they do not discuss how interests change and they ignore the 
significance of historical processes.
238
  The response to this critique can be that 
institutionalists are actually not focusing on general institutions but rather on 'specific 
institutions' such as the GCC. 
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2.3.3.5.4 International Lawyers & Constructivism 
 
International lawyers, constructivists, and institutionalists face the same challenges from 
realists that international institutions and international law are merely a reflection of 
political interests.
239
  In order for international lawyers, constructivists and 
institutionalists, to challenge this, they have to establish that international law and 
institutions are, at least to some extent, independent of the states which created and 
supported them.  The challenge is not just to establish this independence but also to 
establish that states follow international rules even when these do not match their 
interests.
240
  Both international lawyers and constructivists believe that the international 
system is a social construct which means that it can be affected like any society.
241
  The 
work of constructivists, such as Arend,
242
 has enriched lawyers‟ explanations of the role 
of international rules.
243
 
 
There are elements without which a social construct would not be able to develop.  
These elements are “first, shared understanding, expectations or knowledge; second, 
material resources; and third, practice.”244  Legal rules help construct the functional 
environment for a social system by creating a legal body under which these elements are 
more likely to gather.  An international institution is a body under which member 
countries build up their understanding and expectations by practicing cooperation.  
Legal rules generate other legal rules within the framework of a society of states.  First, 
legal rules create the environment in which state cooperation and expectations are 
developed; second, these practices and expectations create the perfect environment for 
new legal rules to emerge. Arend states that without the shared expectations of states, 
legal rules cannot exist.
245
  A charter of an international institution is the legal rule that 
creates the environment for member states to develop their social practice and 
understanding.  In this developed understanding of expectations, new legal rules 
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emerge. Constructivists provide a better explanation for the existence of international 
institutions, highlighting the importance of state practices which leads to the creation of 
norms.
246
 
 
Describing the constructivist approach, Koh explains that “far from being novel, 
domestic obedience to internalized global law has venerable historical roots and sound 
theoretical footing. Participation in transnational legal process creates a normative and 
constitutive dynamic. By interpreting global norms, and internalizing them into 
domestic law, that process leads to reconstruction of national interests, and eventually 
national identities. In a post-ontological age, characterized by the “new sovereignty,” 
the richness of transnational legal process can provide the key to unlocking the ancient 
puzzle of why nations obey.”247 
2.3.3.5.5 Why Constructivism is Able to Give More Answers than Institutionalism 
 
The theory of institutionalism is built on the assumption that states are interested in 
maximising their utility, and this assumption makes it hard to understand the origin of 
institutions and to understand how international institutions vary according to the 
culture and political interest of their surroundings.
248
  Constructivists do not share the 
commonly accepted belief held by institutionalists that “„man‟ is a hard-nosed short-run 
profit-maximizer suspicious of everyone he deals with.” 249   Unlike constructivism, 
“[Institutionalism] does not take in account the impact of social process of reflection or 
learning on the preferences of individuals or on the organizations that they direct.”250  
Institutionalism cannot explain why change happens, while constructivism can.
251
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2.3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter beings this theoretical discussion by briefly introducing international 
institutional law to illustrate where it fits within the field of international law.  It also 
outlined the different types of international institutions to place the GCC within current 
typologies and to situate the focus of this thesis.  It argued that the GCC is a regional or 
closed, inter-governmental institution, not supra-national or general.   
This theoretical chapter then discussed, analysed and evaluated various related theories 
in international law and international relations.  These theories are the basis of the 
analysis in the following chapters.  There are many methods to analyse what constitutes 
law, but this chapter argues that legal positivism, which mainly focuses on what the law 
is and not what the law should be, is the best way to determine what the law is or if a 
law actually exists.  It focuses on the development of Hart‟s legal positivist theory, 
which states that a legal system has to have two kinds of rules: primary rules which tell 
what individuals have or do not have to do, and secondary rules which consist of three 
elements: rules of recognition, rules of change and rule of adjudication.
252
  Hart‟s theory 
is further developed by the legalisation theory established by Abbott, Keohane, 
Moravcsil, Slaughter and Snidal.
253
  This theory states that legal rules are measured 
based on three elements: obligation, delegation and precision, in order to classify them 
accordingly between hard and soft law.
254
  This chapter discusses this approach to 
analyse the laws that the GCC is creating, by which it governs itself and governs the 
cooperation between member countries.  This approach will be applied throughout this 
thesis but mainly in chapter six (the GCC law making process).  This chapter will use 
Hart‟s positivist theory and Abbott et al‟s legalisation theory to analyses the GCC‟s 
gradual process of law creation.  It will argue that the GCC‟s process of law creation is 
by creating soft law first then, after the member countries have got used to the new 
proposals, the GCC would encourage the member countries to adopt this soft law as a 
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hard law.  It will highlight the fact that many soft laws were created by the GCC and 
then adopted in the national laws of each member country with their full will and 
without any enforcement by the GCC upon them.        
 
This chapter has, also, discussed a variety of key IR theories including idealism, 
realism, institutionalism and constructivism.  This provides the theoretical framework 
for chapter seven (pressure and identity: the future of the GCC) which applies 
neorealism, institutionalism and constructivism to this study of the GCC to enrich the 
positivist analysis outlined in chapter six (the GCC law making process).  This chapter 
adopts a neorealist perspective to argue that the main motivation of states‟ international 
action is their survival and to analyse the GCC response to the Arab Spring.  It also uses 
the constructivist theory of change to analyse the reason behind the Arab Spring.  The 
emphasis on the importance of international institutions and the importance of their 
independence throughout this thesis is mainly inspired by institutionalist theory and the 
belief that international institutions have a key role in contemporary international 
relations.  The fourth chapter of this thesis (the establishment of the GCC) uses a realist 
concept to analyse the reason behind the existence of the GCC, namely the concept of 
the balance of power.  Before moving on to consider these issues, it is first necessary to 
start with an historic overview of the development of GCC states and the cooperation 
between them as this provides the background to the establishment of the GCC and 
addresses the balance of power. 
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Chapter Three - The History and Development of 
the Gulf States and Cooperation between Them 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In order to achieve a better understanding of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this 
chapter briefly traces the history of GCC member countries. This history helps outline 
the reasons that led the leaders of the member countries to set up the GCC in the first 
place.  Even before member countries were established as individual states, there were 
political entities governed by powerful families on the west side of the Gulf.1  Each 
family governed its area; namely, Al-Nahyan in Abu Dhabi, Al-Khalifa in Bahrain, Al-
Sabah in Kuwait, Al-Bu Said in Oman, Al-Thani in Qatar and Al-Saud in Saudi Arabia.2  
Before the end of World War I in 1918, these ruling families, apart from Al-Saud, had 
been ruling their areas with different levels of political independence under Ottoman 
Suzerainty.3  After the end of the war, these ruling families, apart from Al-Saud, came 
under the protection of Britain. 4  Tracing this history reveals the reason behind the 
division in political systems between GCC members and the rest of the Arab world.  
This history also reveals the background of the GCC membership system which is more 
open to Arab royal systems.  It reveals, as well, the similarity and differences between 
member countries, which are divided on the expected role of the GCC.  When the 
leaders decided to launch the GCC they had different opinions about what kind of 
organisation the GCC should be: some were more focused on security cooperation 
(Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman) and others more on economic cooperation (Kuwait). 
 
This chapter discusses several key historical events that raised the significance of 
creating the GCC including the British withdrawal from the Gulf (1961-1971) and the 
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1970.  Also in 1970, an energy crisis arose 
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after the war between Egypt and Israel: there was a rise in the cost of petrol and in the 
demand for it in industrialised countries, which was problematic considering that two 
thirds of the world‟s oil comes from the Gulf.  Additionally, there was the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980.  These events muddled the balance of power 
between opposing countries in the Gulf which raised the threat facing the area and the 
West worried about the safety of the Gulf because there was no balance of power in the 
region.  On the other hand, GCC leaders, concerned about the safety of their countries, 
debated the potential of creating a very strong economic block.   
 
This chapter relies on resource material written about the history of the region as well as 
the material published by the GCC and the statements of GCC leaders.  This resource 
material provides this chapter with the needed information to analyse the background of 
the motivation of creation the GCC as well as the way this organisation functions.  The 
analysis of this chapter is built on examining the statements of GCC bodies as well as 
the statements of the leaders of member countries in the light of these historical facts.  
In this historical study, more focus is given to the ruling system of the member 
countries, the British influence and the effect of that on the GCC.  
 
3.2 The Ruling System in GCC Countries 
 
Rulers of GCC countries have in their own right, exclusive legislative, executive and 
judiciary powers.5  There is a key link between the way the GCC functions and the 
governing system of GCC countries.  While the governing systems of these countries 
are discussed in greater detail throughout, a common overview about these governing 
systems in all these countries is first given here.   
 
Some Western scholars have been concerned about the impact of this movement 
towards organised cooperation on the legal system of the member countries.  For 
example, Nicholas Angell comments, "Although it is very likely that the GCC will have 
an increasing influence on the future development of the legal system of the member 
states, the shape of this influence cannot be predicted right now."6  Angell appears to 
                                                             
5Albaharna (1968), p. 11. 
6 Angell (1987), p 107. 
 
 
78 
 
have no doubt that the GCC would positively affect the legal system of the member 
countries.  Perhaps the effect he was thinking about was more a movement towards 
adopting democracy, while one aim of the creation of the GCC was perhaps to give the 
legal system of these countries more legitimacy as is, without any vital movement 
toward democracy.  In the last chapter of this thesis, the link between the governing 
systems of these counties to the way the GCC functions as well as to the influence of 
international demand for democracy on the GCC will be discussed. 
 
The heads of these countries are commonly chosen by a key member of their royal 
families.7 In many GCC countries, the King or the Amir will appoint his oldest son to 
inherit the position of heading the country (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE), while in 
other countries the succession goes from brother to brother by age order (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia).  However, there has been a tendency in some of these countries to appoint the 
most suitable successor from the royal family no matter his age.  In other words, a 
suitable successor could be appointed even if he has older brothers if he is more suitable 
than the others.8 
 
The aim of this study is to illustrate how the creation of the GCC can help stabilise 
existing governments and give them a smooth, quiet and non-revolutionary way towards 
more public participation in politics, to create a model of Arab reproduced government 
system.  The governing systems in GCC countries are built on giving the head of the 
country immense comprehensive power.  The constitution of three countries, Kuwait, 
Qatar and Bahrain, mention that the governmental system is a democracy; however, 
only Kuwait has an elected parliament. 9   More details about the history and ruling 
systems in each member country now follow.   
 
                                                             
7 Albaharna (1968), p. 11.  
8 Ibid, pp. 10-11.  
9 Nakhleh (1986), p. 17.  
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3.3 The History of GCC Member States 
 
3.3.1 The Kingdom of Bahrain10 
 
Bahrain is a country of islands without any land borders with any of its neighbouring 
countries, aside from a bridge over the sea to Saudi Arabia.  It is an archipelagic country 
with one main and 32 small islands, and its nearest neighbours are Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia which are about 14 miles off the cost of Bahrain.  The whole land area of 
Bahrain is only 650 aq. km., making Bahrain one of the smallest countries in the 
world.11  The total population of Bahrain is estimated at 527,433 (51%) national and 
511,864 (49%) non-national inhabitants.12  Two thirds of the Bahraini population are 
Shi‟ah Muslims and only one third is Sunni Muslims.13  This sectarian division between 
the Bahraini people has been the cause of some problems as will be discussed in the last 
chapter of this thesis.    
 
Bahrain was under the control of the Portuguese until they were replaced by the Persians 
in the early 16th Century.14  However, the modern history of Bahrain goes back to an 
Arab tribe called Utub.  At the beginning of the 17th Century, the Utub tribe moved from 
Najd to Kuwait.15  The Utub tribe consists of two main families: Al Sobah, Kuwait's 
Royal Family, and Al-Khalifah, Bahrain's Royal Family.16  After the Al Sobah family 
became the rulers of Kuwait, their cousins Al-Khalifah, preferred to be the rulers of 
another place rather than being under the rule of their cousins, so they moved to the 
north west of Qatar where they created the al Zubarah State.17  In 1782 Al-Khalifah 
                                                             
10 The Kingdom of Bahrain used to be called the State of Bahrain, and the head of state used to be called 
the Amir.  In 2002, the Amir of Bahrain, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifah, declared a resolution that the 
State of Bahrain shall be transferred to become the Kingdom of Bahrain and that the head of Bahrain 
shall be called the King of Bahrain instead of the Amir of Bahrain. See Bahrain News Agency (14 Feb 
2002) available on www.bna.bh [Accessed on 21 August 2011]. 
11 Lawson (1989), p. 1.  
12 See the official website of the Government of Bahrain, available on www.bahrain.bh. [Accessed on 23 
August 2011]. 
13 Belgrave (1965), p.16.  
14 Sadik & Snavely (1972), p.5.  
15Najd is a large area in the middle of Saudi Arabia.  
16 Albaharna (1968), p. 2.  
17 See Sadik & Snavely (1972), p.5 
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decided to move from Qatar and to attack Bahrain with the help of their cousins Al 
Sobah.  They succeeded in occupying Bahraini land and became the rulers of Bahrain.18 
 
From 1870 to 1905, many serious attempts were made to occupy Bahrain by the 
Ottoman Sultan of Muscat and by Al Saud.  None of them succeeded and Al-Khalifah 
survived to continue as rulers of Bahrain. 19  That is maybe the reason why Bahrain 
sought British help during that period.  In 1880 and 1892 Bahrain concluded treaties of 
protection with Britain allowing Britain to protect Bahrain from external dangers and to 
become more involved in Bahraini affairs.20  All these dangers facing Bahrain were from 
the past, but old and new Bahraini worries came from Iran.  This danger shaped the 
Bahraini view of what the GCC should be about as will be discussed below.   
 
Since Bahrain was ruled by the Persian Empire when Al-Khalifah took over in 1782,21 it 
may be the reason that some Iranians regard Bahrain as their land which was taken by 
the Al-Khalifah.  Iran used to claim sovereignty over Bahrain but in 1970 the Shah of 
Iran and Bahrain agreed to adopt the decision of Mr Winspeare Guiccardi on who had 
claims to the land. Mr Guiccardi was appointed by the UN Secretary-General to be an 
independent one-man commission to find out whether the Bahraini people wanted their 
country to be an independent state or a part of Iran.22  He found out that the Bahraini 
people wanted their independence with full freedoms to establish their country's own 
international relations, which was supported by the UN Security Council.23 However, in 
1971 Bahrain was going through some changes as the provision of the British protection 
agreement came to an end, transforming the relationship between Britain and Bahrain 
with Bahrain becoming recognised as a fully independent state.24 
 
Since then, Iran has not formally claimed sovereignty over Bahrain but there are still 
Iranian officials who claim Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain and regard Bahrain as part 
of Iran. 25   Iran continues to constitute a direct threat to Bahrain.  For example, an 
announcement by Ali Akbar, the Special Inspector General in the Office of the General 
                                                             
18 See Sadik & Snavely (1972), p.5. 
19 See Albaharna (1968), p. 310.   
20 See all these agreements in Albaharna (1968), p. 313. 
21 Hay (1963), p. 14. 
22 Hawley (1970), p. 24. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See UKTS, No 78 (1971), 4827.   
25 Alkhwaildy (2011) Asharq al-awsat, Newspaper, 11796 (16 March 2011).     
 
 
81 
 
Guide Head of the Iranian Republic, claimed in 2009 that Bahrain is not an Arab 
country, but rather it is a Persian island and consequently a part of Iran.26  Though Iran 
has formally declared that it does not support Akbar's announcement and that it 
recognises Bahrain as an independent country, Bahrain still regards Akbar's 
announcement as an Iranian threat.27  This threat which predated the creation of the GCC 
was perhaps the reason why Bahrain is the only GCC country that states the importance 
of the GCC to Bahrain in its constitution.28  Also, it is clear that this threat affected the 
Bahraini view about what the GCC should be about when they proposed to create a 
mobile force and to keep this force at the disposal of any member country to request for 
help.  It will be discussed later that the GCC created GCC military forces29 and that 
Bahrain asked the GCC to send this force to Bahrain to help the Bahraini government 
face public demonstrations during the Arab Spring.30 
 
Since the Al-Khalifah occupied Bahrain in 1782, they have ruled Bahrain in a traditional 
tribal way, but in 1956 the Al-Khalifah established the Council of Administration.  The 
role of that council was to control the interaction of a variety of governmental bodies 
and to identify the main interests of the country.  This council was completely under the 
authority of the head of the country and all ten members of the council were chosen by 
the head of state. The President and six members of the Council were members of the 
Al-Khalifah Royal Family, and the three remaining members were government 
administrators.  Nonetheless, all of the members, whether from the royal family or not, 
were chiefs of some of the government bodies.31 
 
The council was established in 1956 when the head of the country Sheikh Khalifah ibn 
Salman ordered the creation of the Council.32  This order stated that half of the members 
of the Council should be elected and the other half should be nominated by the Bahraini 
Government.33  Albaharna explains that by mentioning this election in his order, the 
Sheikh was trying to satisfy public hope for an elected council even if it was only half of 
                                                             
26Al-Quds Al-Arab, newspaper (23 February 2009). 
27 Ibid. 
28 The Foreword of the Bahraini Constitution. 
29 See Chapter Two. 
30 See Chapter Three. 
31See Bahrain Government, Annual Reports, years 1950-65.   
32 Sheikh Khalifah ibn Salman is the grandfather of the present of Bahrain Sheikh Hamad ibn Esa ibn 
Salman. 
33See Bahrain Government, Annual Reports, years 1950-65. 
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the Council.34  However, the Bahraini people enjoyed their partly elected Council for 20 
years until August 1975 when Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa declared his decision to 
dissolve the National Assembly.  Since then, the limited practice of democracy in 
Bahrain has been suspended,35 because the Bahraini people boycotted the elections.36  
They probably did that to request more participation in deciding their government but 
the result was less than what they already had.  The Bahraini Government‟s attitude 
about democracy is perhaps due to the fact that the majority of Bahraini people are 
Shi'ah while the government is Sunni, as will be discussed in the last chapter. 
 
In 1972, Bahrain established a new constitution, which states that Bahrain is a 
democratic country and that the Bahraini people are the source of all laws.37  Although 
this constitutional law opens the door for the Bahraini people to partly participate in 
their government, it maintains greater power in the hand of the King.38  This historical 
account reveals both the security threat experienced by Bahrain and Bahrain‟s 
ambiguous attitude towards democracy.  The lack of security would be their main drive 
in support of the creation of the GCC.      
 
3.3.2 The United Arab Emirates 
 
The United Arab Emirates is the only federal country in the area, consisting of seven 
emirates; Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain and 
Fujairh.  Its total area, including islands, is 83600 km2 and its population is 8,200,000 
(2009 estimates).39  The UAE used to be seven small Sheikhdoms, known as the Trucial 
Coast of Oman.40  The founder of the UAE was Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan (1918-2004) 
and before he become the ruler of the UAE, he was the ruler of Abu Dhabi, the biggest 
state of the Trucial States.41  After the British declared their withdrawal from the area in 
                                                             
34Albaharna (1968), p. 14.     
35Al-shamlan (1997), p. 54.   
36 Alhaharnah (1968), pp. 14-5. 
37 Article 4, Bahrain Constitution.  
38 See Article 2, Bahrain Constitution. 
39The UAE official website, available on www.government.ae.  
40 Hawley (1970), p. 18.  
41See the official website of the UAE's government. Available on: www.government.ae [Accessed on 28 
August 2011].  
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1968, he took the lead in persuading the rest of the leaders of the Trucial States to unify 
under a single federal state.42 
 
The family lineage of all the rulers of the seven Trucial States goes back to the al 
Qwasim and Bani Yas tribes.43  The Bani Yas tribe migrated from the middle of the 
Arabian Peninsula to the coast of Oman in the late 17th Century.44  The rulers of Sharjah 
and Ras al-Khaimah are from the al Qwasim tribe.  Many of these tribes were seafaring 
and had influence on a larger area than the present territories of their states.  At times, 
they used to influence the west side of the Arabian Gulf.  This extension of their power 
led to conflict with the British sincethe British Government had an interest in all the 
important seas from the Trucial States to India and had an artificial alliance with the 
rulers of Oman, the al Bu Sa'id tribe.  The aim of this British-Omani alliance was to 
protect the Arabian Gulf.  The British Government needed Al Bu Sa'id to keep the 
French away from the coast of Oman and the Trucial States.  Al Qawasim perceived the 
British-Al Bu Sa'id alliance as a betrayal to the region with Al Bu Sa'id seeming to have 
given up the sovereignty of the region to the British Government. 45   Al Qawasim 
initiated attacks on British ships and the British Government responded by raiding Al 
Qawasim in 1805, 1809 and 1811.  As a result, the British Government named the area 
'Pirate Coast.'46 
 
In 1820, the British navy launched a major attack, during which they damaged and 
arrested all the ships belonging to Al Qawasim.  After that attack, British ships were 
travelling peacefully in the Arabian Gulf, leading to the Maritime Truce Treaty of 1833 
which established, to a great extent, British influence in the area.  This treaty was 
modified in 1853 and renamed the Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity, which was the reason 
the area came to be known as the Trucial States.  In the following decades, all the 
leaders of the Trucial States ratified the protection agreement with the British 
Government.47 
 
                                                             
42 See the official website of the UAE's government. Available on: www.government.ae [Accessed on 28 
August 2011]. 
43 Walker (2010), p. 365.  
44 Rumaihi (1986), p. 27. 
45 Walker (2010), p. 365.  
46 Albaharna (1968), p. 25, see also Walker (2010), p. 365. 
47 Walker (2010), p. 365. 
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Jenny Walker states that without the British help and encouragement for the Trucial 
States to unite, some of the Trucial States would now be under the sovereignty of Saudi 
Arabia.48  This is because the Al Qwasim – rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah – are 
influenced by the Wahhabi movement, an Islamic movement implemented by the Saudi 
Government.49 Walker's opinion may be true but not because Saudi Arabia had any 
ambitions in occupying UAE lands; Saudi Arabia was more interested in the stability of 
the area regardless of whether some of the Trucial States were under its sovereignty or 
an independent country.  For example, when the UAE declared its independence, Saudi 
Arabia did not try to prevent or reject this independence.  Albaharba stresses that the 
leaders of the Trucial States were independent for a long time before the British 
Government became interested in the area, 50  meaning that although the British 
Government helped these Trucial States unite as a federal country, each State was 
individually independent before the British became involved in the area.  Though it is 
true that Britain did not initially help in the creation of these Sheikhdoms, it cannot be 
denied that the Britain Government did help create the union between these Sheikhdoms 
that led to the creation of the UAE.   
 
Before the UAE became an independent country, the seven small Sheikhdoms in the 
area were governed by the Trucial States Council, in which the seven Sheikhdoms had a 
representative.  This council was initially set up by the British Government to ease 
discussions between the British Government and the leaders of the Trucial States.  The 
British Political Agent at Dubai used to chair the Council annual meetings and 
cooperation between Trucial state leaders through the Council was only limited to 
administrative cooperation for years.  The British Government encouraged these rulers 
to develop their cooperation, particularly in economic and administrative matters.  As a 
response, the leaders of the Trucial States created another Council, at a lower level than 
the Trucial States Council.  The main role of this Council was to implement the 
decisions of the Trucial States Council. In 1965, the leaders of the Trucial States held a 
conference sponsored by the British Government in Dubai where the leaders agreed to 
create the Trucial States Development Office.51  Also, the rulers of the Trucial States 
                                                             
48 Walker (2010), p. 365. 
49 See Albaharna (1968), p. 25.  
50 Ibid, p.5.  
51The Economist Intelligence Unit (1966), pp. 60-2, 8-19 
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and the rulers of Qatar and Bahrain52 initiated an economic cooperation by agreeing on a 
strategy for channelling the wealth of the richer states to the poorer states through the 
Trucial States Development Office.53  At the time of that agreement, oil had only been 
discovered in Abu Dhabi while the rest of the Trucial States were not yet producing 
oil.54  At this point the Trucial States were not yet united, and each Sheikhdom was 
regarded as an independent state, however, the British Government dealt with them as 
one block though the British Political Agency which was directly linked to the British 
Political Resident in Bahrain.  Also, in 1946 the British Government appointed a British 
legal advisor specialised in local administration to help the six Trucial States, excluding 
Abu Dhabi, in governing their relationships.55  These British activities in the Gulf reveal 
how Britain wanted states under its sovereignty to become independent states and not to 
be taken under the sovereignty of any larger neighbouring countries.     
 
The English East Indian Company (EEIC), which the British Government used to rely 
on in deciding its policy in the Gulf, wanted to control the trade and politics of the 
Trucial Coast.56 Beforehand, Britain had signed a treaty with the Sheikhdoms of the 
Trucial States in 1820,57 according to which these Sheikhdoms agreed to keep peace in 
the land and sea and to stop war and piracy.  This area was important to Britain because 
it was a strategic point for shipping between Britain and India.58 
 
However, when Britain withdrew from India in the mid-19th Century, its interest 
switched to the Trucial Coast as oil was discovered there,59 leading Britain to become 
more involved in the internal affairs of the Trucial Coast. 60   Previously, Western 
countries had never been interested in the Trucial States before oil was discovered.61  
Britain concluded the treaty of protection with all the Trucial States in 1892 and 
encouraged the leaders of these Sheikhdoms to unite under a single government.  These 
leaders then took the first step towards their union by establishing a Council of the 
                                                             
52 As already mentioned, there was intention to include Qatar and Bahrain in the UAE to become a single 
country but that did not succeed.  
53 The Economist Intelligence Unit (1966), pp. 60-2, 8-19.  
54 Ibid 
55 Hay (1959), p.115. 
56 Ibid, p. 32.    
57 Aitchison (1933), p. 245. 
58 Hawley (1970), p. 19.    
59 Luce (1970), p. 7. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Hawley (1970), p. 17. 
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Trucial States in 1951.  The aim of this council was to integrate the internal policies of 
each State by creating common laws for all their internal affairs.62  This was the first 
step towards creating a federal state made up of these seven Sheikhdoms.  The 
protection agreement with the British remained valid until the British Government 
agreed to withdraw from the area in 1971.63 
 
The United Arab Emirates was also supposed to include Qatar and Bahrain.  In 1971, 
the nine Sheikhdoms: the seven Trucial States plus Bahrain and Qatar were not 
recognised as countries yet.64  These nine Sheikhdoms signed the Dubai Agreement in 
1971, a treaty by which Bahrain and Qatar were included within the United Arab 
Emirates,65 but after this agreement, these nine Sheikhdoms spent three years negotiating 
their federal system.66  The idea was for the nine Sheikhdoms to create a council, where 
the nine states would have equal power with one voice for each.  Bahrain did not think 
this was a fair federal system, as they did not want to be on an equal level with a much 
smaller Sheikhdom like Umm Al Quwain or Fujairh.  At that time, Bahrain had a much 
larger population than some of the smaller countries and so they thought the fairer 
system would be to give the bigger Sheikhdoms two votes and only one to the smaller 
ones.  However, the small Sheikhdoms did not agree so Bahrain and Qatar decided not 
join the federal union and to become independent countries.     
 
3.3.3 Kuwait 
 
The whole area of Kuwait is 17,800 km2, a small state in the north-west of the Arabian 
Gulf. 67   Although the majority of Kuwaiti people have Arab roots, there is a 
considerable number of Kuwaitis with Persians roots.68 
 
                                                             
62 Hay (1959), p. 32.   
63 See all these agreements in Albaharna (1968), p. 313.  
64 Albaharna (1973), p. 62. 
65 Sandwick (1987), p. 8. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Berger (1978), p. 19.  
68 Ibid; It is claimed that the Kuwaitis with Persian roots did not always agree with the common attitude 
of GCC members, for example, the Kuwaiti refusal to participate in the GCC force that entered Bahrain to 
help the Government face the demonstrations in 2011.  More focus on this is given in the last chapter of 
this thesis. 
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The modern history of Kuwait, which has been governed by rulers from the Al-Sabah 
family, dates back to the beginning of the 17th Century when the al-Utub tribe arrived in 
Kuwait from the middle of the Arab Peninsula (Najid).69  It has already been mentioned 
that the history of the royal family in Kuwait is connected to the history of the royal 
family in Bahrain.  Indeed, Al-Sabah was faster than Al-Khalifah in taking the lead 
toward strengthening their position as the hereditary rulers of Kuwait in 1756 when their 
first leader, Sheikh Sabah, moved from an area called Umm Qasr to permanently inhabit 
a place called Kuwait, which is now the capital city of Kuwait.70 
 
Compared to the other GCC countries, Kuwait has a unique governing system, which 
has gone through two key stages.  Before independence, the Kuwaiti Government was 
very badly organised, as Sir Rupert Hay describes:  
 
The system of Government is patriarchal and the high offices of State are held by 
members of the ruling family, each of whom conducts the affairs of the department 
entrusted to him with the minimum of financial or any other control by any central 
authority.  In fact, each of these Sheikhdoms is a law unto himself, and there is much in 
the administration which depends on their relations with each other, their presence or 
absence from the State or the willingness of the Ruler to control their activities...71 
 
 
Hay focuses on the approximate period between 1940 and 1961.  The Kuwaiti 
governing system completely changed in 1961 when Kuwait became an independent 
country.  According to Hay, Kuwait has had an elected parliament, as well as an 
excellent administrative structure, constitutional system and an effective Council of 
Ministers.72  The Council has the executive authority.  Some of the members of this 
Council are from the Kuwaiti Ruling Family and some are commoners, 73  but the 
National Assembly cannot vote for “no confidence” against the Prime Minister or his 
government.  Consequently, there are no means to force the resignation of the Prime 
Minister.  The person who has the supreme executive power over the Prime Minister 
and the National Assembly is the Amir,74 and the only means for the National Assembly 
to force the resignation of the Prime Minister is to approach the Amir.  In this case, the 
                                                             
69 Albaharna (1868), p. 3. 
70 Ibid 
71 Hay (1959), p. 170.    
72 Europa Publications Limited (1966), pp. 135-6.  
73 Ibid. 
74The word "Amir" in Kuwait and Qatar is fairly the same as  the word "King" in Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain,  
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Amir has two options: to dissolve the National Assembly or to dismiss the Prime 
Minister.  In this context, Kuwait's Constitution does not allow the creation of political 
parties so all the candidates for the National Assembly have to be individuals.75 
 
It is clear that this kind of democracy is the closest one in the area to the general 
Western democracy yet there is a key difference between the two kinds of democracy.  
In Kuwait, people are participating in their government by elected Parliament, but the 
Amir still has the main power.  Those who support the Kuwaiti style of democracy 
criticise the absence of “intelligent opposition.”76  Others argue that Kuwait's political 
system opens the door for the National Assembly to approach the Amir, only to find a 
way to release the public anger against the government without real ability to change it.  
Yet, the real power is still in the hands of the Amir and the powerful figures of Al-
Sobah family.77  In this regard, the Kuwaiti system of government is closer to that of 
other GCC members in the way that supreme power still resides with the Amir and his 
family. 
 
According to the Kuwaiti Constitution, Kuwait is a sovereign, Islamic, hereditary 
Emirate and democratic country, but although it is a democratic country, the Amir, as 
head of state, still has substantial governing power as he keeps his position for his whole 
life and he is the only one who has the power to choose the Crown Prince which has to 
include a son of Mubarak al-Sobah or one of his grandsons.  The decision-making is 
quite a simple process: the decision is first made on the Amir's order, which then needs 
to be approved by the Kuwaiti National Assembly. If the Assembly refuses the Amir's 
order, the Amir has to propose three sons or son of sons of the late Mubarak al-Sabah.  
Then this order passes to the National Assembly which has no power except to choose 
one of these three chosen by the Amir to be the Crown Prince.78  Kuwaiti constitutional 
law gives more power to the people of its country than all other GCC countries do, as 
the Amir shares power with his cabinet, the National Assembly and the courts.79 
 
                                                             
75 Europa Publications Limited (1966), pp. 135-6.  
76 The Economist, 21 January 1967, p. 217.  
77 Kelly (1966), p. 633.  
78 Article 4, Kuwaiti Constitution.  
79 Ibid.  
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The relationship between Kuwait and Britain was primarily one of protection but also 
linked to very old trade relations.  In 1899, Britain signed the first political treaty with 
the head of Kuwait, but this treaty was secret because Kuwait was still under Turkish 
rule.80  Turkish authority over Kuwait ended in 1914 as a result of Turkey joining the 
First World War to support Germany.81  Afterwards, Britain started to control Kuwait's 
external affairs and became responsible for protecting Kuwait from external threats.82 
 
The dangers facing Kuwait mostly came from Iraq as Iraq claimed Kuwait as a part of 
Iraqi lands which had been unfairly taken from Iraq to form an independent country.83  
Some contend that this claim was not only supported by the Iraqi Government but also 
by the Iraqi people.  In 1962, as Kuwait was declaring its independence after British 
withdrawal, then Iraqi President Abdul Kareem Qasim resurrected the claim that Kuwait 
is actually a part of Iraq.84  This claim was based on the fact that Kuwait was part of the 
administrative region of Basra85 at the time of the Ottoman Empire before it came under 
British protection in 1913.  Soon after he declared Kuwait‟s independent, Kuwaiti Amir 
Abdullah al-Sobah applied for membership in the Arab League and the United Nations, 
as he wanted to confirm Kuwaiti independence through membership to these 
international organisations.  However, Qasim did not accept Kuwait as a sovereign 
country and asserted that Kuwait had to merge territories with Iraq.  As a response, 
Britain and Saudi Arabia both sent troops into Kuwait to face any Iraqi attacks.  It is 
worth mentioning that, Iraq was nearly left without an effective access to the deep-water 
in the Arabian Gulf, a geographical status which made Iraqis feel that their country 
deserved a larger access area to deep-water and there is no way to have that only though 
Kuwait lands. 86  These historical and geographical facts highlight Kuwait‟s insecure 
location, which was one of the motivations behind the Kuwaitis seeking more security 
through the creation of the GCC.    
 
                                                             
80 Albaharna (1968), p 3. 
81 Dickson (1956), p. 26. 
82 Ibid, p. 27. 
83 Sicker (2001), p.209. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Basra is one of the largest cities in the south of Iraq. 
86 Sicker (2001), p.209. 
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3.3.4 Sultanate of Oman 
 
The total area of Oman is 309,500 km2, located on the Southeast coast of the Arabian 
Peninsula and with a population of 3.2 million. 87   Oman has a curious geographic 
division: in the north of Oman there is one separate land (the Musandam peninsula) 
which is a small enclave on the Strait of Hormuz, pointing toward Iran.88 This location 
has strategic significance as all Gulf oil is exported through the Strait of Hormuz.  This 
particular location of Oman affected its perception of what the GCC should consist of, 
as will be discussed later, taking into account that since the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait 
in 1990, the United States (US) keeps some of its military force there to protect the 
Strait.89 
 
The modern history of Oman started with the first powerful ruler (Ahmad ibn Sa'id) 
from the dynasty of Al Bu Sa'id in1744.  Since then, all the rulers of Oman have come 
from the Al Bu Sa'id family.90  Ahmad ibn Sa'id was chosen by the Omanis to be their 
leader and was the first Imam from the Al Bu Sa'id family.  He gained the trust of the 
Omani people because he was successful in forcing the Persians off the coast of Badi.91  
The second electedImam from Al Bu Sa'id family was Sa'id ibn Sultan.92  Before 1797, 
the head of Oman used to be entitled “Imam,” a term linked to the Islamic tradition.93  
The Imam would be a member of the Omani Ibadi scholars and would be chosen by 
them to be the Imam.94  It is a very old position in Oman but the Al Bu Sa‟id family 
made the Imam the head of State.  This history reveals that as a state, Oman was set up 
according to Islamic rules.    
 
The third ruler of Oman was Sultan ibn Ahmad Al Bu Sa‟id who is highlighted here 
because he made a significant change to the ruling system in Oman in 1797.  He put an 
end to the traditional Omani governing system:  seizing the authority from the elected 
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Imam, he changed the title of the head of the country from Imam to Sultan, weakening 
the role of the Ibadi Scholars and declaring himself the secular leader.  Since then, the 
Ibadi Scholars have had no authority to elect the head of the country. 95 That led to 
conflict between the two authorities of the Ibadi Scholars and the Sultan of Oman.96  
Although Sultan ibn Ahmad led the process that weakened the Ibadi Scholars, it remains 
a considerable authority, similar to the Saudi Arabian high Islamic Scholars authority.        
 
The main external influence on Oman came from Britain.  The British-Omani 
relationship dates back to 1643, when there was contact between the EEIC and the 
Omani rulers.97  Unlike the rest of the GCC countries, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia, Oman had a long history as an independent country controlling both its own 
internal and external affairs.98  In 1798, Britain, represented by the East India Company, 
signed the first treaty for trade and navigation with the Omani leader.99  This agreement 
was not directly a protection treaty like those concluded between Britain and the other 
Gulf countries, but rather it was for adopting friendship and economic relations.  It was 
renewed in 1951 and is still active.100 
 
Until today, all the rulers of Oman have enjoyed a special position which gives them a 
considerable power over all other authorities, even the Ibadi Scholars.  Although all the 
rulers of the GCC countries are at the head of their political system, Sultan Qabus, the 
present ruler of Oman, has a more powerful position than in the rest of the Gulf 
countries,101 thanks to Sultan Sultan bin Ahmad (1797)102 who was the first to challenge 
the Ibadi Scholars.    
 
The Omani government consist of two main Councils: the Council of Ministers and 
Mjlis A‟Shora (the Parliament) and the Sultan has great governing power over both 
Councils.  He appoints the head of the Ministers as well as all the Ministers.  In 1991, 
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Sultan Qabus, decided to create the A‟Shora Council.103  This Council consists of 59 
members, all of whom used to be appointed by the Sultan.  In 2000, Sultan Qabus, 
decided to allow the Omani people to participate in the government by creating a new 
law that states that all members should be elected by the Omani people and not 
appointed by the Sultan anymore.  However, the president of Majlis A'Shora still has to 
be appointed by the Sultan.104  The role of this Council is to participate in law-making 
and to question the ministers when needed, yet, any decision of this Council is not 
binding unless approved by the Sutan.105 
 
Studying the GCC member countries government systems reveals that the Oman 
Council, which was created in 2007, is unlike the rest of the GCC government bodies.  
This Council consists of two councils: the Council of Ministers and Majlis A'Shora 
,while in the rest of the GCC countries such councils are separated.106  The role of both 
councils is to help the Sultan in governing the country107 with more power given to the 
Council of Ministers than Majlis A‟Shora as the role of the latter is to provide 
consultation to the former. 108   In comparing Omani history to that of other GCC 
countries, it reveals that Oman is similar to Saudi Arabia in that they were both 
established according to Islamic rules.      
 
3.3.5 State of Qatar 
 
Qatar is a peninsula extending from the western shoreline of the Arabian gulf, with 
some small islands, and its territory comprises of 11,850 km2.  Qatar‟s land border is 
only in the south-west, with Saudi Arabia.109  According to 2009 statistics, the total 
population of Qatar is 1.6 million and the gross domestic product (GDP) of Qatar is $ 98 
billion.110 
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Qatar‟s modern history started at the beginning of the 18th Century when the Al-Thani 
family moved from Najd111 to settle in Qatar. The first ruler from the Al-Thani family 
was Mohammad bin Thani who extended his ruling throughout Qatar and then in 1851, 
he forged an alliance with the Saudi ruler Faisal bin Turki Al-Saud, the ruler of the 
second Saudi Arabian State.  In 1867, he signed an agreement with Britain according to 
which Britain recognised Qatar as an independent state. In 1871, he asked Turkey for 
protection against any external attack, leading to Qatar coming under the suzerainty of 
the Ottoman Empire. 112  However, even if the external affairs of Qatar were under 
Turkish rule, Qatar was internally governed by Al-Thani.113 
 
Qatar relations with Britain started in 1867 when Mohammad Al-Thani signed an 
agreement with Britain recognising Qatari as an independent state.114British influence 
began in 1868, when the ruler of Qatar concludedan informal agreement with the British 
Government which stated that the Rulers of Qatar would not allow any attackson British 
ships in the Arabian Gulf.115Later, in 1916, Qatar signed a treaty of protection with 
Britain, 116  but as with other Gulf countries, Britain and Qatar decided to end these 
protection agreements and therefore signed the withdrawal agreements in 1971.117 
 
Qatar was governed by the Al-Thani in a traditional way without administrative bodies 
for their government.  In 1950, the Qatari Government started to develop by creating 
different levels of administrative bodies.  At that stage, the Qatari Government created a 
financial department and employed a British financial advisor who helped in preparing 
Qatar‟s budget, and a few years after that, the financial department became a Financia l 
Ministry.118 
 
At the time of Sheikh Ahmad ibn Ali Al-Thani (1960-1972), the first governmental 
council was established.  He established an Advisory Council to help him lead all the 
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country affairs, selecting all the members of that Council, which later became the 
Council of Monitors.119 At that stage, it was obvious that the Al-Thani were not willing 
to allow any kind of public participation in their government.120  More developments 
happened under the present ruler Amir Hamad Al-Thani, as he established a new 
Constitution but called on the Qatari people to vote for it before he ratified it.121  It was 
the first time in the history of Qatar for the Qatari people to participate in such a way.  
He also created Majlis A‟shora, a consultative Assembly which is a legislative body, 
and he issued a decree stating that by 2013, 15 members of Majlis A‟shora will be 
elected and 15 appointed.122 
 
3.3.6 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies four-fifths of the Arab Peninsula and spreads 
over an area of 2,240,000 km2, between the Arabian Gulf in the West and the Red Sea in 
the East.  According to 2009 statistics, the total population of Saudi Arabia is 27 
million,123and the gross domestic product (GDP) is $ 372 billion.124 
 
The current Saudi Arabia is the third Saudi state. The first Saudi state was founded in 
the early 18th Century when a Muslim scholar Mohammad bin Abdul Wahhab decided 
to renew Islam in the Arab peninsula.125  He was very disappointed that the Arabs in the 
peninsula were losing their religion and respecting their tribal tradition even if it was 
against Islamic rules.126  In the Arab peninsula there were many tribes, each with their 
own ruler, but bin Abdl Wahhap had the Islamic knowledge and bin Saud had the power 
to enforce this knowledge.  Bin Abdul Wahhab sought the help of Bin Saud, the ruler of 
a small town called Diriyah, to help him achieve his dream of reforming Islamic rules.127  
Bin Saud then started to challenge all the tribes in the Arab peninsula, taking them under 
his rule and applied bin Abdul Wahhab instructions about Islam. 128   The Ottoman 
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Empire was not happy with this development, so they decided to destroy it.  In 1818, 
Ottoman sent a large army force to the headquarters of Al-Saud (Diriyah), destroying 
the town and killing many of the Al-Saud family.129 
 
The second Saudi state was established in 1824, this time by the Saudi leader Turki Al-
Saud.  He succeeded in taking almost the whole peninsula under his rule by early 19th 
Century.  This second Saudi State adopted the same Islamic instructions of Bin Abdul 
Wahhab, but it was also destroyed, this time by a tribe ruler named Bin Rasheed with 
the support of the Ottoman Empire (1891).130  The Al-Saud family then travelled to 
Kuwait where Abdul Aziz grew up under the protection of the rulers of Kuwait (Al-
Sobah family), which, was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire at that time. 131  In 
1902, Abdul Aziz Al-Saud decided to go back to re-establish Saudi Arabia and he did 
not face great difficulties as the Al-Saud family was popular among the tribes in the 
Arab peninsula.  He first succeeded in taking Riyadh before gathering his army to fight 
all the other tribes in the Arabian Peninsula.132 
 
At that time, the rest of the Arabian Gulf countries came under the protection of Britain 
as a result of the end of the First World War.133  Britain was worried that King Abdul 
Aziz may extend his ruling over these protected countries.134  In 1915, Britain concluded 
an agreement with King Abdul Aziz, which stated that Britain recognised King Abdul 
Aziz as the Ruler of Saudi Arabia and that King Abdul Aziz agreed not to extend his 
authority over the Arabian Gulf states protected by Britain.135  In turn, Britain would 
support King Abdul Aziz against any external attack.136  King Abdul Aziz was focused 
on the safety of Saudi Arabia and on keeping a good balance in the relations between 
Saudi Arabia and the international supreme powers, especially the UK and the US.137 
 
Compared to other GCC countries, two aspects make Saudi Arabia more conservative 
towards Islamic tradition.  First, the history of Saudi Arabia reveals that there has been a 
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situation of coexistence between the two main parties: the Al-Saud ruling family and the 
Wahhabi scholars.  The former needs the latter to persuade Saudi people that the ruling 
of the Al-Saud is legitimate, while the latter needs the former to support them in 
implementing Wahhabi instructions.138  Second, in Saudi Arabia there are the two Holy 
Mosques: Makah and Almadinah, which allow Saudi Arabia to be at the heart of the 
Islamic world, where millions of Muslims travel every year to visit these two mosques.  
In 1986, former King Fahad of Saudi Arabia pronounced that he changed his title from 
His Highness the King of Saudi Arabia to Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.  This 
decision stresses the importance of Islam to the position of the King of Saudi Arabia.              
 
The system of governance in Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, according to Article 5a of the 
Constitution which states that "Rule passes to the sons of the founding King, Abd al-
Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa'ud, and to their children's children,"139 and 
more vaguely states, "The most upright among them is to receive allegiance in 
accordance with the principles of the Holy Koran and the Tradition of the Venerable 
Prophet."140  This sentence assumes that "the upright among them" is known or, at least, 
that it is easy to determine who he is, and it assumes, as well, that the means of deciding 
this is clear, whereas it is actually difficult to determine who is the most upright one or 
how to make that key decision. The Saudi Constitution's uniqueness in relation to other 
constitutions is that it states that Islamic law is the main source not only for the laws but 
also for political powers.141 
 
Today, all the sons of the founder of Saudi Arabia King Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud are old so 
it is time for the rule to pass to the younger generation of the Al-Saud family.  To avoid 
any trouble inside the Al-Saud family, King Abdullah created the Saudi Allegiance 
Council in 2007, which is a council for the royal family.  The members of this council 
are all the sons or the sons of the sons of the founder King Abd al-Aziz.  The main job 
of this Council is to choose the King.142  The King has the power of law-making and to 
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choose all the ministers, deputies and the higher ranked government jobs.  Since he has 
the power to appoint them, he also has the power to relieve them of their posts.143 
 
3.4 British Influence in the Region 
 
The Arabian Gulf has international importance from its location, as it is a necessary 
trade passage between the East and the West.  In the 19th Century, the main British need 
in the area was to protect the trade to India, so before 1947, all British policy on the 
Arabian Gulf area came from India rather than from Britain.  However, after oil was 
discovered there and it became an important element in world economics at the time of 
the First World War, the Gulf area interested the British for more than as a way to 
India.144  After the 1956 Suez Crisis, the influence in the Middle East became more 
American than European.145 
 
Hawley identifies three stages in the history of relations between Britain and the 
Arabian Gulf countries, especially the Trucial States including Bahrain and Qatar.146  
First, in the early 19th Century, British concern was to keep British shipping safe from 
piracy.  Second, in the mid-19th Century the British involvement in the area was to make 
sure that there would be no piracy between the states in the Arabian Gulf also known as 
the Pirate Coast.  Third, the British involvement increased at the end of the 19 th Century 
with the 'Exclusive Agreement' which stated that these countries should not be involved 
with any other international power except Britain.147  Some might add a fourth stage: 
British withdrawal from the area between 1961 and 1971, whilst maintaining friendship 
and trade relations.  More focus is given to the third stage of the relations between the 
UK and the Arabian Gulf countries in this thesis because the creation of the GCC is 
probably linked to this period.   
 
British influence on the Gulf countries was on different levels: the relation of Saudi 
Arabia and Oman with Britain was not like the relationship Britain had with the rest of 
the Gulf countries.  When Britain had influence in the region in the 19th Century, Saudi 
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Arabia and Oman were independent countries, while the rest of GCC member countries 
were under the protection of Britain. 148   As a result of the protection agreements 
mentioned above, these states which were to be protected by the UK had lost much of 
their sovereignty because they were administered by Britain.  However, the local tribal 
governments did not completely lose their sovereignty as they were in charge of their 
states' internal affairs and the British government recognised them as the internal 
government of their states. 149   These governments were, however, prevented from 
having full sovereignty during the time of British protection. 150  As soon as Britain 
withdrew from the Gulf, the governments of these states had their full sovereignty 
reinstated. 151   Though these countries had lost some of their sovereignty under the 
protection of the UK, their existence would have been in serious danger without this 
protection, as evidenced by Iraq's attempt to occupy Kuwait as soon as Britain had 
declared its withdrawal from Kuwait in 1961,152 and the Iranian occupation of the UAE 
islands as soon as Britain withdrew from the UAE in 1971.153 
 
To sum up, Kuwait and Bahrain became democracies mainly because of British 
influence as they were affected by Britain while under British protection while Saudi 
Arabia and Oman were more influenced by Islamic rule.  Bahrain would be just as or 
more democratic as Kuwait if the majority of its population were Sunni.  Some Kuwaitis 
argue that Kuwait cannot unite with Saudi Arabia because they have different governing 
systems.  In this context, all the Gulf countries have a good relationship with a Western 
power, mainly with the UK and later with the US. 
 
3.5 Key Events 
3.5.1 Iran and the GCC 
 
The Arabian Gulf or Persian Gulf are two terms that refer to the same Gulf, but since 
about 1969, all the Arab countries situated on the Gulf have adopted the term 'Arabian 
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Gulf' rather than 'Persian Gulf' which is internationally recognised. 154  All the Arab 
countries whether from the Gulf or not and including the GCC countries enacted laws to 
enforce the use of 'Arabian Gulf‟ in all their political communication with all 
countries. 155   Iranians have adopted the same attitude, making the use of the term 
'Persian Gulf' compulsory in their internal and external communications.156  Since this 
thesis focuses on the Arab Gulf Countries, it employs the term 'Arabian Gulf' 
throughout. 
 
After Britain withdrew from the Gulf area, Iran immediately invaded three of the 
Emirates islands: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa.157  This took place 
on 30 November 1971, just two days before the UAE‟s declaration of independence and 
only one day after the end of the Protection Agreement between the Emirates and the 
UK.158  As mentioned earlier, this was not the only Iranian threat to the Gulf countries: 
some key Iranian actors have from time to time claimed Bahrain as an Iranian island 
even though the Iranian government has reassured the Bahraini government that Iran 
recognises Bahrain as an independent country.159 
 
The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the collapse of the Shah's regime shifted the balance of 
power in the area and the Iranian revolution spread to surrounding areas.160  The Iranian 
attempt to spread the revolution to surrounding states could have been a motive to gain 
control over the Gulf area, by obtaining more supporters from among those countries.  
The threat posed by Iranian foreign policy appeared again in the issue of the American 
hostages in Tehran, which added more fears about Gulf security.161  These unpredictable 
Iranian policies led GCC countries to think about creating a form of permanent 
cooperation as a way of rebalancing the power in the area.162 
 
More events raised the level of danger in the area and threatened security.  One of them 
was the Iran-Iraq war, which started in 1980 just one year before the establishment of 
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the GCC and had a significant effect on the security of the area.163  In 1983, several GCC 
countries were driven to become partly involved in the Iran-Iraq war: in April 1983, Iraq 
increased its targeting of Iranian tankers and in May, Iran responded to this attack by 
targeting Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers. In June, Saudi Arabia organised air patrols to 
secure the oil tankers and declared that Saudi fighter jets would intercept any Iranian 
ones.164  The UN Security Council passed Resolution 598 in 1987 which helped bring an 
end to this war.165 
 
3.5.2 Iraq and the GCC 
 
Kuwait and Iraq have had a long history of dispute, even before Kuwait became 
independent. As soon as Iraq became independent in 1932, it started to claim that 
Kuwait was part of Iraq, arguing that when Kuwait was under Ottoman Suzerainty, it 
was regarded as a district of Basra and since Iraq is the successor of the Ottomans, 
Kuwait is therefore a part of Iraq.  The first Iraqi attempt to occupy Kuwait was under 
the reign of King Ghazi in 1930, when he declared his intention to unify Kuwait with 
Iraq but he died in 1939 before taking any action against Kuwait.166 
 
After the British withdrawal from Kuwait in 1961, Kuwait became an independent 
country, and immediately recognised as such by Britain. 167  In that same year, Iraqi 
President General Abdul-Karim Qasim attempted to occupy Kuwait.168  The Security 
Council had a meeting about this matter, and Iraq and Kuwait brought their dispute to 
the United Nations (UN).169 The Security Council failed to pass any resolution because 
the Soviet Union used its veto.  The Soviet Union agreed with Iraq that the UN should 
try to ensure the withdrawal of British troops from Kuwait since even after Kuwaiti 
independence, Britain kept some of its military forces in Kuwait170  Then British Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, sent the largest mobilisation force to the area since the 
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Suez crisis to stop Iraq‟s attempts to occupy Kuwait.171  The Arab League declared that 
they recognised Kuwait as an independent country and therefore it had to be protected 
from any external threat.172  However, Iraq never recognised Kuwait as an independent 
country,173 and in 1990 it successfully managed a complete occupation, which led to the 
Second Gulf War.174 
 
3.5.3 War in Afghanistan 
 
Another event that threatened security in the Gulf was the Soviet Union's invasion of 
Afghanistan, which raised the need for security solutions.  This invasion has been 
regarded by some political analysts as the Soviet reply to rising American interest in the 
Gulf and a part of the Cold War.175  The Soviet Union did not deny the link between the 
invasion of Afghanistan and their interest in the Gulf area, as a response to the 
American claim of a 'vital interest' in the Gulf. 176   As a result, a NATO meeting 
discussed establishing rapid deployment forces in the Gulf, which would require NATO 
to send a large number of military forces to the Gulf and to have some military bases 
there.  This claimed 'vital interest' in the Gulf made the Gulf countries look ahead to find 
a local alternative solution.  People and governments in the Gulf were looking to the 
Gulf countries to take control of their own security matters, thereby taking the Gulf 
away from international conflicts and establishing a kind of institutionalised 
cooperation.  The more international conflicts around the Gulf increased, the more 
people's demands for institutionalised cooperation increased too.177 
 
3.6 Moving Towards the GCC 
 
Having explored the lack of security in the Gulf and the historical reasons behind that, it 
is time to address and analyse the views of the creators of the GCC: what they were 
planning, what their goals were and how they wanted to achieve their goals.  They were 
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mainly divided between two main views: to focus mainly on security, as proposed by 
Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, while Kuwait proposed to create comprehensive 
cooperation focused mainly on economics.  
 
The first attempt at cooperation between all the countries in the Gulf, which contained 
an implied proposal, was by the head of Oman, Sultan Qaboos, when he called for a 
meeting in Muscat in 1976.  It seems that Sultan Qaboos had a wider idea for the 
membership of this cooperation in the Arabian Gulf which included Iraq and Iran along 
with the rest of the Gulf countries.  His idea was to create a harmonised regional 
security and to define a strategy for the Gulf, but the countries at this meeting were not 
able to agree and the meeting ended without any result.178  That same year, there was a 
better received proposal by Kuwaiti leader Sheikh Jaber Al Subaha, who proposed the 
creation of an institution for cooperation among Gulf countries excluding Iran and Iraq 
in politics, economics and security, in order to face the challenges in all these fields and 
to protect the region. 179   After that, more discussions took place between the six 
countries, pushing towards the creation of an institution for cooperation.  From the 
beginning, they agreed to keep the membership closed to only those six countries, but 
they had different opinions on what to focus on, with some preferring to focus on 
economic cooperation and others on security cooperation.180  Four proposals were put 
forward for consideration by the leaders of the Gulf countries before the GCC was 
established. 
 
3.6.1The Bahraini Proposal 
 
The Bahrain proposal was to create a rapid deployment force in the Gulf, which would 
be a mobile force that could effectively and quickly respond to any threat that might 
face the GCC countries.  The leadership of this force would alternate and the force 
would be provided with the most modern weapons.181  In other words, the Bahraini 
proposal meant creating a military alliance, rather than an international organisation.  
The reason behind this proposal is clear: that the member countries should rely on 
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themselves in defending their countries and not on Western powers, mainly the UK and 
US. Some might suggest that at that time, Bahrain was not interested in other kinds of 
cooperation because they needed to protect themselves from the threat posed by Iran 
first and foremost, while economic cooperation was left as a long term goal since the 
member countries were already in a good degree of economic cooperation even before 
the establishment of the GCC.182 
 
3.6.2 The Omani Proposal 
 
Oman proposed that the GCC countries should establish naval forces to defend the Strait 
of Hormuz, as an important route for importing and exporting.183  The Omani proposal 
was similar to the Bahraini one: to create a military alliance, but the focus was on the 
Strait of Hormuz which is the only path for exporting Gulf oil beside the Saudi pipeline 
spanning from the Gulf to Jeddah on the Red Sea to use in case of war in the Gulf.  The 
Omani worry about the Strait was reasonable considering Iran – which borders the Strait 
from the west side – had declared many times that it commands the Strait and that it 
may close it if it is faced with any threat.184 
 
The leaders of the member countries did not base the GCC on the Bahraini proposal or 
on the Omani one because these proposals were about creating a military alliance while 
the rest of the leaders wanted it to be an organisation for a more comprehensive 
cooperation.  However, the Bahraini proposal was not completely ignored.   
 
In 2006, 24 years after its creation, the GCC responded to the Bahraini proposal, in 
developing the Peninsula Shield Force and in 2009 this force became stronger by adding 
the Gulf Rapid Deployment Forces Brigade.185  Creating this GCC military force should 
satisfy the Bahrainis as that was what their proposal was about.186  The Omani proposal 
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has still not been met to date, as there is no sign that the GCC is heading towards 
creating a joint naval force only to protect the Strait of Hormuz.  
 
3.6.3 The Saudi Proposal 
 
Saudi Arabia proposed unifying a weapons source by facilitating training on new 
weapons and establishing a wide cooperation between internal security forces instead of 
making a military alliance. They wanted to avoid any military alliance with any external 
country and encourage the national military force in each country to support sovereignty 
and internal affairs and systems, to ensure that their independence was on their own 
terms.187 
 
It is worth noting that the Saudi proposal did not divert much from other proposals: its 
focus was still on military cooperation but rather than making a direct alliance, the 
proposal tried to express it as a kind of international cooperation.  Saudi Arabia knew 
that creating a military alliance at the time of the Iran-Iraq war would be seen as an 
alliance against Iran and while the Gulf countries were keen not to overtly support either 
country, they were asking both Iraq and Iran to stop the war immediately.188 
 
3.6.4 The Kuwaiti Proposal 
 
Instead of focusing on military cooperation, the Kuwaiti proposal focused on economic 
and cultural cooperation (oil, factories, culture, etc…) to achieve greater and stronger 
unity.  Kuwait was not interested in security cooperation,189 even though its existence 
was facing a close and serious danger.  As mentioned above, Iraq has never recognised 
Kuwait as an independent country but claimed Kuwait as a part of Iraq which needed to 
be re-conquered.  It is not clear why Kuwait was not interested in military and security 
cooperation as the Kuwaiti Government gave no explanations; however, this thesis 
suggests that Kuwait was not interested in security cooperation because it was relying 
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on the UN and international powers.190  Kuwait certainly recognised the importance of 
security and the danger facing the Gulf countries though Kuwait might have believed 
that economic cooperation was more likely to succeed and that the security matter 
should be one focus of the GCC but not the main one.   
 
Finally, at the Islamic Summit in Al-Ta'if, in Saudi Arabia in 1980, the leaders of the 
Gulf countries met on the sidelines of the Summit.  The Kuwaiti proposal was ready to 
be announced to the rest of the Gulf countries and when the Prince of Kuwait 
announced the idea of establishing the GCC, all the Gulf countries were happy with this 
idea of institutionalised cooperation. 191   This thesis argues that, perhaps Kuwait 
recognised the fact that the GCC states were weak in terms of their military forces and 
that a union between weak states does not make them strong militarily.  Many politics 
scholars agree that an alliance between small states does not really help them define 
themselves as a strong military union.192  For a richer discussion about these different 
proposals, this chapter draws on the international relations concepts of 'small states'193 
and of 'the balance of power.'194 
 
3.7 The Issue of Small States 
 
Apart from Saudi Arabia, all the GCC countries are small.  E. Spence believes that small 
countries cannot govern their own foreign policies and instead have to be governed by 
other stronger powers.195  It is argued that small countries cannot ensure the status of 
their existence without the help of a greater power.  Although Saudi Arabia is a very 
large country in terms of its size, it is weak in terms of its military capability when 
compared to Iran or Iraq (before the Third Gulf War of 2003).196  Some argue that states 
should be judged not only by their size or military capability but also by their power in 
the international system.197 
 
                                                             
190 The second Gulf War proved that international powers, especially the US and the UK did the main job 
of liberating Kuwait through the UN.  
191 See the speech of the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence in Algabas Newspaper (4 Apr 1981). 
192 Handel (1981), p. 120.  
193 See Ingebritsen, Neumann et Al. (2006). 
194 See Bull (1995).   
195 Spence, J. E. (1967), p. 6.  
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However, many IR scholars emphasise that the crucial condition for a state to be 
regarded as a small or great state is its military capability, thus a small country is one 
which cannot defend itself.198  Some maintain that a small country is one that cannot 
achieve its security through only its own power and consequently has to rely on other 
states or institutions.199  Keohane defines a small or middle power state as "a state whose 
leaders consider that it cannot act effectively by itself, but may have a systemic impact 
in a small group or through an international institution." 200   Some may argue that 
Keohane's definition of a small state is applicable to any of the GCC members. 
 
3.8 The Concept of the Balance of Power 
 
For a better explanation of the motive behind the existence of the GCC, especially 
considering member states were more interested in security cooperation, it is helpful to 
analyse it in light of the concept of  'the balance of power' used primarily by realist 
international relations scholars.  Waltz, a neorealist scholar, states that "if there is any 
distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it."201 
International relations scholars believe that the principle of the balance of power is one 
of the oldest and most important concepts.202  This concept guides the European Union, 
and many scholars have used it to explain key aspects of states' behaviour. 203  The 
literature on the concept of the balance of power has accepted that this concept consists 
of key central features.  Firstly, the concept explains that the main interest of states is to 
have their safety and to be secure.  Secondly, the aim of self-defence leads states to 
equilibrium, and to achieve this equilibrium, states are keen to prevent the supremacy of 
a single awkward state.  If one state is gathering too much power compared to other 
states, those other states will join their powers until they achieve equilibrium with the 
greater power state.204 
 
Lawyers view this equilibrium between international powers, which shapes the 'family 
of nations,' as very important to the creation of international law in this world of 
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anarchy.  In international law, sanction is based on the competence of powers to stand 
over each other, but if this balance collapses, nothing will stop powerful states from 
ignoring international law and only acting in their own interest and to their own benefit.  
International law scholars view the just equilibrium between international actors as a 
reflection of the doctrine of historical international demands not to allow a single 
powerful state to be free from being challenged by other powers, in order to prevent it 
from solely being able to enforce its will upon the rest of the world.  Some argue that 
the status of equilibrium is established when states follow the provision of the concept 
of the balance of power, and that states do so by adopting particular rational rules in 
their actions towards each other; in other words, by following international law.205 
 
International relations scholars view the concept of balance of power as a tool that 
"describes a state of affairs in the international system and explains the behaviour of 
states in that system."206  Balance of power emerges, according to international relations 
scholars, when there is equal stability between two or more powerful actors challenging 
each other.  These scholars believe that states, within the balance of power system, 
choose to enter an existing balancing block or to be a central actor.  It is a vital decision 
a state may take, whether to balance or to be a central actor, especially in times of war, 
when such a decision may direct the future of its existence.207 
 
Some argue that the balance does not mean that there are two equal actors which have a 
similar level of power; rather, it is international actors working for more dominance and 
in response, other actors will do the same.208  States in a certain situation are driven to 
raise their capability to somewhat achieve a balance of power, which leads to a certain 
degree of equilibrium. 209  When states formulate their political and military policies, 
they take into account the capability of other states, and although states have different 
perceptions about capability, the capability of a union of states represents the capability 
of its member states.210 
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Chatterjee explains that if there is a capability gap between two nations, they have two 
ways to achieve equilibrium and to balance power.  Firstly, the weaker nation can raise 
its power by increasing its national capability, which includes military power, 
armaments, etc…  If armament is raised on one side, it will be increased on the other, 
and there will be an arms race as a result.  Secondly, the other way of achieving balance 
is through alliances.  So the other option for the weaker side to balance the power is to 
form a union with another state or group of states, raising the sum capability of the 
union members. Chatterjee goes on to say that the main goal that drives a nation to 
balance the power with another nation is the security of their national territories and 
their sovereignty.  What is needed to achieve such an aim, he explains, is sufficient 
ability for securing territories against the other nation.211  Some believe that the security 
of nations is granted according to the rule of the balance of power and that this rule has 
been the cause of many wars.212 IR scholars state that although this rule exists, it is up to 
governments “to act in accordance with this rule in order to preserve the balance.”213 
 
3.9 GCC Countries and the Balance of Power 
 
It is commonly believed that achieving a balance of power in the Gulf is the key to 
guarantee the Gulf‟s continued security and stability.  This belief is widely accepted by 
Western powers, especially by the US, as well as in the Arab world.214  According to 
Bull, the balance of power functions in two areas: the general balance of power which 
prevents a single international actor from being the only supreme international power, 
and the local balance of power which protects the sovereignty of countries from any 
external aggression.215  In other words, the general balance of power takes place between 
the world's most powerful actors while the local balance of power functions in any 
region between the countries in that region, for example the balance in the Gulf between 
the GCC members and Iran.  Some may apply these two kinds of balance of power to 
the different views of the member countries about the extent to which Western powers 
should be permitted to become involved in helping the GCC countries secure the Gulf.  
While some GCC countries are interested in security cooperation view the balance of 
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power locally in the Gulf area, between the GCC countries and Iran and Iraq, others, 
mainly Kuwait, view the balance of power as a universal matter in which the GCC 
countries have no direct role and it is instead left to powerful international actors.  
 
This chapter suggests that some leaders of GCC countries were focused on the 
importance of balancing the power in the Gulf and it proposes that one reason why there 
was such a variety in the proposals was perhaps because they had different perspectives 
on the principle of the balance of power.  The countries interested in military 
cooperation possibly believed that the balance of power between GCC members and 
non-member countries in the area, namely Iran and Iraq, would maintain stability and 
safety in the Gulf.  In other words, there was a balance between the GCC countries as a 
block and Iran, as well as a balance between the GCC countries as a block and Iraq.  
Iran and Iraq (before the 2003 Third Gulf War) were powerful countries in the region in 
terms of their military forces.  The Iranian and Iraqi avidity for having sovereignty over 
some of the GCC countries and the comparative individual weakness of GCC countries 
has already been mentioned, but according to the concept of the balance of power, there 
needed to be a balance between these powers as this imbalance led the Gulf region on 
the verge of war. 
 
As seen in the proposals, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman were focused on security and 
military cooperation. Moreover, the first statement of the Supreme Council pronounced 
that the security and stability of the area was the responsibility of their own people and 
governments.  It declared that the GCC represented the sum of the will of the member 
countries and they expressed their right to define their sovereignty and independence.216  
The GCC leaders declared their refusal to allow any foreign intervention in the area and 
their willingness to keep the Gulf out of international disputes and also to keep it clear 
of any foreign military fleets and bases.217  This declaration by GCC leaders shows that 
they recognised Western worries about the security of the Gulf, mainly due to power 
imbalance in the Gulf, which could lead Western powers to build arms bases in the area.  
The Gulf is a key area for the international economy generally and for Western 
countries specifically, as more than half of the world's oil comes from the Gulf.  The 
                                                             
216 The Supreme Council, Session 1, (1981). 
217 Ibid 
 
 
110 
 
GCC leaders recognised that if they did not resolve this matter, some Western countries 
would have to send their military forces to secure the Gulf. 
 
This thesis argues that Kuwait seems to have a different perspective about the concept 
of the balance of power than the rest of the member countries, as evidenced by the more 
economics-focused Kuwaiti proposal and by Kuwait‟s continuing unwillingness to 
adopt security cooperation. 218   While the majority of the member countries were 
interested in balancing the military power in the Gulf (as discussed earlier), Kuwait had 
been interested in the economic balance of power, not between the member countries 
and non-member countries in the Gulf, but rather between the GCC and international 
economic powers in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  For this reason, some may 
argue that GCC countries can create a powerful economic block.  
 
The reason for this Kuwaiti position is perhaps because security and military 
cooperation between GCC countries is unlikely to be beneficial.  Some political scholars 
such as Cobban argue that if some weak countries make an alliance, they would not 
necessarily have a stronger status than before the alliance.219  Many political scholars 
believe that if small states form an alliance aiming to face a major threat posed by a 
powerful actor, they are likely to be unable to face this challenge.220  However, some 
may argue that the GCC countries were not aiming for balance with a powerful state 
such as the US; instead, they could be aiming for a balance with countries in the Gulf 
like Iran and Iraq which is an achievable aim.  Nevertheless, some may argue that 
history has shown that the GCC cannot prevent a Western presence in Gulf, since the 
US has built several permanent US military bases in some of the GCC countries since 
the Third Gulf War.221 
 
The assumption made by some GCC members, which was clear in the first meeting of 
the Supreme Council, was that one aim of establishing the GCC was to show that GCC 
countries were able to keep the power in the Gulf balanced in order to keep the Gulf 
secure and stable.  It has been mentioned that the Supreme Council asked all the foreign 
powers to keep their military bases out of the Gulf, yet the Second Gulf War (1990) 
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proved that the GCC did not achieve any balance of power in the Gulf, as evidenced by 
the fact that Kuwait was occupied in one day and that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the 
GCC had to ask for international help.222  The GCC attempt to balance the power had 
failed, as they could not create a force that could stand up to Iraq, and surely they were 
not able to stand up against any expected Iranian attack because Iran was a competing 
power to Iraq.  This weak situation of the GCC countries revealed that the Gulf is not 
secure or stable and that it would not be secure without balancing the power between the 
GCC countries on the one hand and Iraq and Iran on the other hand.  As the GCC failed 
to balance the power, Western powers, mainly the US, as well as some GCC countries 
had come to the conclusion that there had to be some international military bases in 
some GCC countries.  Therefore, the US created some military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait 
and Qatar.223 
 
3.10 The Iranian Perspective 
 
The above has explored the GCC perspective that Iran posed a threat to GCC countries, 
but this section examines the Iranian perspective about the balance of power in the Gulf.  
The balance of the power in the Gulf has proved to be a permanent issue.  Some Iranians 
believe that the balance of power in the Gulf is a balance between the US and Iran, and 
that these are now the only two powers that are able to carry out armed operations in the 
Gulf.224  Especially after the Third Gulf War, Iran has become the supreme military 
power in the Gulf because Iraq's military power has been destroyed.  Iran stood up to 
Iraq for eight years while Kuwait could not resist for more than 24 hours when Iraq 
occupied Kuwait in 1990.225  It is therefore not surprising that they view the balance of 
power in the Gulf as a matter between Iran and the US.  Surely, what is meant here is 
not the balance of power between Iran and the US as a country but it is the balance of 
power between Iran and the US forces based in the Gulf.  This is not only the Iranian 
view as even some of the GCC countries have come to see the balance of power in the 
Gulf as a matter between Iran and the US, especially after the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990.  It 
has been mentioned that some GCC countries have agreed for the US to build military 
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bases on their land such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.226 These GCC countries would 
not allow the US to build military bases on their land if they believed that the GCC were 
capable of balancing the power in the area. 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has set the background to the establishment of the GCC.  Many crucial 
points have been explored, highlighted and analysed.  The history of the member 
countries is worth addressing as it explores many things.  There is a significant 
similarity between these countries as they are all governed by royal families that used to 
be tribal leaders.  All the member countries have a good relationship with Western 
powers, particularly with the UK and later with the US.  They do not have the same bad 
perception of colonialism that other Arab countries may have as they had fully agreed to 
the protection treaties with the UK.  Also, at the time of these protection treaties, these 
countries were governing their internal affairs independently without any British 
intervention.  Some of these countries are more affected by Islamic rules than others, 
namely Saudi Arabia and Oman.  This chapter reveals the reasons behind the 
establishment of the GCC in the first place.  Tracing this history helps outline the factors 
leading to the division in political systems between GCC members and the rest of the 
Arab words.  This history also reveals the background of the GCC membership system 
which is more open to Arab royal systems.  The last chapter of this thesis will discuss 
these points further.  
This chapter discusses several key historical events that raised the threats these countries 
were facing, including the British withdrawal from the Gulf (1961-1971) and increasing 
threats from Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. Nowadays, Iraq and Afghanistan do not pose 
serious threats to GCC countries, but Iran still does.  The most recent expression of an 
Iranian threat was a statement by the former Iranian Ambassador to France, Sadeq 
Kharazy, who stated on 18 June 2012 that Iranian military forces need only a few hours 
to occupy Bahrain.
227
  These events affected the balance of power between opposing 
countries in the Gulf which raised the threat facing the region.  This led the West to 
worry about the safety of the Gulf because there was not a stable balance of power in 
the region.  Conversely, GCC leaders, concerned about the safety of their countries, 
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debated the potential of creating a very strong economic block.  Although Kuwait was 
quick to suggest economic cooperation, the rest of the members soon agreed on its 
importance.  Thus, it appears that instead of focusing on military cooperation, the GCC 
members focused on economic and cultural cooperation (oil, factories, culture, etc) to 
create a body of institutionalised cooperation.  Having provided the background of the 
GCC and the history of its member countries, it is now time to move on to the 
establishment of the GCC in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four - The Establishment of the GCC 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Having discussed and analysed the history of the member countries, the importance of 
the area as the main oil producer, the international worries about the security of the area, 
the dangers facing Gulf countries and the different proposals, this chapter now discusses 
the establishment of the GCC.  This part explores and analyses the establishment of the 
GCC, the view of the rest of the Arab countries, the misunderstanding about the nature 
of the GCC natural, the GCC objectives, principles and structure.  The resource material 
on the establishment of the GCC as well as the views and misunderstandings of other 
countries about the GCC relies on GCC publications, statements made by leaders of 
member countries and on media publications from that time.  The discussion on GCC 
objectives, principles and structure also relies on these resources as well as the resource 
material written about international institution law. 
 
In all these circumstances there was a common understanding that urgent action was 
needed in order to form a unified, systematic Gulf position.  Saudi Arabia took the lead 
and Minister of the Interior Prince Naif was the Saudi envoy to the rest of the Gulf 
countries.  In November 1980, he went to Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain to 
discuss Saudi ideas about Gulf security.  This action came as a result of the meeting of 
the Arab Interior Ministers in Alta'yf, Saudi Arabia in August 1980 in which they 
agreed to work towards more cooperation among the Arab security institutions.  In 
Kuwait, Prince Naif declared that an agreement on security cooperation had been signed 
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which would be followed by the same agreement 
with the rest of the Gulf countries.1  In order to continue these good efforts, the Saudi 
Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al-faisal, went to the five Gulf countries, as well as then 
Undersecretary of the Saudi Foreign Ministry, Abd-Allateef Al-Thniyan, to discuss the 
Saudi ideas for the cooperation between the Gulf countries.2 
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Kuwait made the same effort to encourage Gulf countries to establish the GCC.  The 
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister made a similar journey to the other five countries to give their 
leaders a letter from Kuwait‟s Prince Jaber Al-Sobah. These letters from the Prince of 
Kuwait to the Gulf countries were, according to the Kuwaiti Crown Prince, to introduce 
a Kuwaiti proposal for creating an organisation for cooperation among the Gulf 
countries.  This Kuwaiti proposal had been prepared for a long time but was kept secret 
from the public.  Kuwait declared its proposal for the first time when the Kuwaiti Prince 
proposed it to the leaders of the Gulf countries at the Omani meeting in 1976.3 
 
Following these preliminary steps, the leaders of the member states signed the GCC 
Charter on 25 May 1981.  There is not much information recorded about the drafters‟ 
debate before the GCC Fundamental Statute (FS) was declared.4  However, there were 
some meetings with experts from member countries before the announcement of the 
GCC FS.  One of these meetings was held in Muscat between the 6th and 10th March 
1981 where experts dealt with, inter alia, what the title of the GCC Constitution should 
be: Qatar and Kuwait suggested „treaty,‟ as was more common in other international 
organisations, Oman chose „charter,‟ and Saudi Arabia preferred „the fundamental 
statute.‟  Saudi Arabia chose this title to avoid the speculation that the GCC was created 
to replace the Arab League.5  The experts' discussion resulted in the choice of the Saudi 
proposal. Then, in the United Arab Emirates on 25 May 1981, the leaders of the member 
countries ratified the GCC Fundamental Statute.6  The next chapter will discuss the FS 
in greater detail. 
 
At the time of the GCC‟s establishment in 1981, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar had been 
independent for less than ten years.  Kuwait was a little older, with 20 years since its 
independence and for Saudi Arabia, 49 years had gone since it had been founded in 
1932.  Examining these periods of independence of the five young Gulf countries, 
Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar, can explain a possible motive why these countries 
moved smoothly towards forming the GCC.  The five young countries were under the 
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protection of the UK for about 50 years and after the British withdrawal, the tribal 
governments of these countries were left weak compared to surrounding countries such 
as Iran and Iraq.7  After being independent for nearly 10 years or more, the idea of 
creating an institutionalised cooperation among the six countries emerged.  Saudi Arabia 
is the biggest country among the Gulf countries and has a much larger population and a 
stronger army, but the GCC was not a protection agreement between the five Gulf 
countries and Saudi Arabia replacing the protection agreement between them and 
Britain.8  However, the GCC certainly involved a commitment of common security that 
might fulfil the protection gap that the five Gulf countries found themselves in after the 
British withdrawal from the region.9  Sandwick states that it is understood that the GCC 
enabled the crucial cooperation and integration between member states to secure their 
countries from any external threat.10  While Western countries have different opinions 
about the source of the threat facing Gulf countries,11  the obvious threat facing the GCC 
at the time of its establishment was the Iran-Iraq war, as discussed earlier.        
 
4.2 - The GCC Structure 
 
The Fundamental Statute outlines the structure of the three main GCC bodies: the 
Supreme Council, to which the Commission of the Settlement of Disputes is linked, the 
Council of Ministers and the Secretariat General.12  The Fundamental Statute gives the 
right to each one of these bodies to create any subsidiary bodies when needed, but the 
power given to these bodies in the Fundamental Statute is not precise.  Schermers 
explains that when the capability of an international organisation is only to give 
recommendations without having much power, it will not precisely define the 
competence of its organs.  However, when an international organisation is powerful, it 
will specify precisely the power given to each of its bodies.13  Some may argue that the 
GCC has not precisely identified the competence of its bodies because there is not 
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actually much power given to them.  On the other hand, the EU is an example of an 
international organisation that identifies the power given to each of its organs.14 
 
4.2.1 The Supreme Council 
 
The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the GCC, composed of the heads of 
state of the member countries.15  Its leadership is rotated in alphabetical order of member 
states‟ names,16 unlike the European Council president who is elected by a competent 
majority.17  Some argue that this is one criterion that an international organisation has to 
meet, that the leadership of an international organisation cannot be subjugated to a 
single country. 18   The body in the EU that resembles the Supreme Council is the 
European Council as it is composed of the leaders of member countries.  The leadership 
of the Supreme Council switches every year, and the annual Supreme Council meeting 
is held in the country of the President while leadership in the Europe Council switches 
every two and a half years and it can be renewed for one term.19 
 
The Supreme Councils' ordinary meetings are held twice a year, but an extraordinary 
meeting can be held in response to a request by any member state,20 while the European 
Council meets four times a year.21  The Supreme Council meetings are held in any of the 
member countries, and the Secretary-General determines the start and end time of these 
meetings.22  The meetings of the Supreme Council are regarded as completed only when 
two thirds of the membership attend, meaning four out of six countries.23 
 
                                                             
14 It has been mentioned that the EU is a supra-national organisation while the GCC is a non-supra-
national organisation.  Also, that the aim of the EU leaders is to take steps towards the union of its 
member states, therefore they give the EU the power and independence it needs to function as a supra-
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19 Available on www.european-council.europa.eu 
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The Supreme Council decisions on substantive matters are passed by a unanimous vote 
and by a majority vote in procedural matters.24  If one member has waived their vote this 
has to be recorded, so the objector is not bound by this decision's obligations.25  The 
European Council decisions are passed by consensus vote and sometimes by unanimous 
vote or by a competent majority; the European Council decides whether a decision 
needs a consensus or unanimous vote with regard to the provision of the Treaty.26 
 
4.2.1.1 Supreme Council Power 
 
The most powerful body in the GCC is the Supreme Council.  According to Article 8 of 
the GCC FS, the power of this Council includes reviewing the common interest of the 
governments of member countries, identifying the top policy of the GCC and the 
methods for achieving this policy.  The European Council‟s role is to help the Union 
with the needed movement for its progress and another role is to recognise the main 
concerns according to the broad political guidelines.27  Its power is also to review the 
work submitted by the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat General or any other GCC 
body.  The Council nominates the Secretary-General and the members of the 
Commission for the Settlement of Dispute.  It is also the Council‟s job to adopt the 
internal rules and procedures of the GCC and of the Commission for the Settlement of 
Disputes.  This Council is the only authority capable to amend the Fundamental Statute 
and to adopt the GCC budget,28 while the European Council has no legislative role.29  
Lastly, the Supreme Council controls the policy of the GCC in relation to non-member 
countries and organisations.30 
 
According to Article 8 of the Fundamental Statute, explained above, the Supreme 
Council is the highest authority on the internal and external affairs of the GCC.  In other 
words, the Supreme Council controls the GCC in governing itself and controls the GCC 
in dealing with member states.  Internally, the executive, legislative and judicial role of 
the GCC are led by the Supreme Council as well as external affairs, such as 
                                                             
24More discussion about the GCC voting system in the GCC Principles section of this thesi. 
25 Article 9, Fundamental Statute. 
26 Available on www.european-council.europa.eu [access on 10 Feb 2011]. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Article 8, Fundamental Statute.  
29 Available on www.european-council.europa.eu 
30 Article 8, Fundamental Statute. 
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pronouncing GCC positions and statements, making decisions on common policy and 
agreeing on treaties between member countries or between the GCC and other countries 
or organisations.  
 
4.2.1.2 Voting 
 
Each member state has one vote in the Supreme Council regardless of the huge 
difference between some of the member countries in economics, geographical areas or 
population size.31  This system is a reflection of the principle that independent states 
have equal sovereignty, which emerged at the time of the League of Nations and then 
became a recognised principle in the UN.32  Bowett critiques this principle, stating that 
giving unequal states equal power in terms of voting within an international institution 
is too idealistic.  According to him, the problems of this principle appear in the way that 
international organisations make decisions.  Each member country within a given 
international organisation seeks to be better able to affect the decision-making of the 
organisation; some of these members could be powerful states if such states could not 
affect the decision-making of the organisation while a powerless country can do so, 
which means that there is a distorted refection of the real world in that organisation.  
The decision that such an idealistic organisation may make is unlikely to be 
implemented if it is rejected by powerful member states because they are the ones who 
have the power to apply it.33 
 
Some international organisations do not give equal power to all its member states in 
terms of voting.34  There are different systems for applying unequal voting in order to 
reflect the real power of the member states in organisations such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction Development. The 
unanimous voting system may prevent a fluid decision-making process and may cause 
too long discussions for any decision to pass.  Yet, states usually prefer the unanimous 
system because it gives them the confidence that their interests would not be ignored, 
and also, a decision is easier to apply when it is unanimous.35 
                                                             
31 Article 9, Fundamental Statute. 
32 Williams (1965), p. 475.  
33 Bowett (1984), p.44.  
34 Schermers (2004), p.395 
35 Ibid 
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Article 9 of the Fundamental Statute states that a “resolution of the Supreme Council in 
substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous approval of the member states 
participating in the voting.” 36   This article means that the decision of the Supreme 
Council is valid even if not all member countries agree or if a member is absent, that 
results in its vote not being counted.  Article 5 (2) of the rules of procedure of the 
Supreme Council states that: "a meeting shall be considered valid if attended by heads 
of states of two-thirds of the member states."37  This means that four out of six member 
states can make a valid decision.  Some may argue that the GCC rules, already approved 
by the member countries,38 state that voting in the GCC is according to a unanimous 
system, but at the same time GCC rules state that the vote of two-thirds of the members 
participating in the voting is unanimous because all six countries are member in the 
GCC so they are bound by what the GCC states as binding law.  Still, absent members 
can argue that according to the GCC unanimous voting system, member states which 
were absent are not bound by the GCC decision as they did not vote for it, as evidenced 
by Article 5 of the rules of procedure of the Supreme Council which state that "any 
member abstaining shall record that he is not bound by the resolution." 39   So, if a 
member country does not agree with a decision, it has the right to vote against it but as 
long as it keeps silent, it is still bound by the decision.  
 
While Article 9 of the FS distinguishes between substantive matters and procedural 
matters, Article 5 of the rules of procedures of the Supreme Council does not.  
Similarly, in the experience of the UN even with the abstention of some members, 
unanimity would not be prevented. 40   In some cases the UN Charter states that 
permanent members of the Security Council have to have concurring votes, but the 
abstention of some members still does not prevent unanimity.41 
 
                                                             
36 Article 9, Fundamental Statute. 
37 Article 5 (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council.  
38 Such as the GCC Fundamental Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council. 
39Article 5 of the Rules of procedure of the Supreme Council.  
40 Schermers (2004), p. 460.    
41 Ibid.  
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3.2.1.3 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes
42
 
 
Since the establishment of the UN, international organisations have tried to act in 
response to the UN Charter43 which urges member states to solve their "international 
dispute by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered."44  The heads of the GCC countries have been keen to form 
a practical mechanism for resolving any kind of disagreement that may arise between 
member states which is why they set up the Commission.45 
 
By tracing the Commission‟s functions, it is clear that it has never played an important 
role.  Some argue that this commission is attached to the Supreme Council, as a sign of 
its importance,46 while others claim that its attachment to the Council is evidence of its 
weakness and dependence on the Council. 47  Its function is to look into matters of 
disputes that have been submitted by the Supreme Council, which could be about any 
dispute that may have arisen between member states or about the interpretation or 
application of the Charter in a given case.  The Supreme Council could transfer such a 
dispute, which has not been resolved by the Supreme Council nor by the Council of 
Ministers to the Commission.  It makes a recommendation to the Supreme Council, 
which will then produce an appropriate decision based on the Commission's 
recommendation. At this point, the role of the Commission is finished. 48 
 
This Commission has its seat in Riyadh although its meetings can be held anywhere.  It 
has no regular members; instead the Supreme Council sets up the Commission and 
appoints its members for each case separately, according to the nature of the dispute.49  
Its members have to be no fewer than three and all of them have to be a resident of any 
member state which is not part of the dispute.  The Commission can counsel those who 
require it when needed.50 
                                                             
42 The order of these subjects here, with this Commission after the Supreme Council, is because this 
Commission is linked to the Council, it is not because this Commission is the second most important body. 
The second most  important body is the Council of Ministers which comes after.    
43Schermers (2004) p. 403.  
44 Article 2 (3), UN Charter. 
45 Alashal (1983), p. 53.    
46 Ibid.   
47More critic on this Commission is in Chapter three of this thesis. 
48 Article 10, Fundamental Statute. 
49 Article 8, Ibid. 
50 Alashal (1983), p. 53.    
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Such a commission should have a mechanism for creating, explaining and developing 
the laws of the GCC but it has not been doing any of these roles.  Alvarez illuminates 
the importance of such a commission for creating laws, stating “in some cases 
[international organisations] have used other power conferred on them, including the 
residual power to establish subsidiary organs, to create forms for international 
adjudication of some dispute … such institutionalized dispute settlement makes law in 
the course of settling such dispute.”51  More discussion about this Commission can be 
found in the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
4.2.2 The Council of Ministers52 
 
The Council of Ministers consists of the Foreign Ministers of member countries or those 
who represent them.  Its leadership rotates in alphabetical order of the member 
countries‟ names and leadership is replaced every six months.  Its regular meetings take 
place every three months, but an extraordinary meeting can be held in response to a 
request of one member that is agreed to by another member.  The Council has a right to 
decide where its meetings will be held and these meetings are not valid unless two thirds 
of the members attend, which means four out of six.53  Each member has one vote, and 
their resolutions are produced by unanimous votes of the attendants in substantive 
matters and by majority votes in procedural matters.54  This resembles the mechanisms 
for voting in the Supreme Council, except that in the Supreme Council a state which has 
not voted for a resolution in a procedural matter is not bound by that resolution.  In 
contrast, such resolutions in the Council of Ministers seem to be binding upon all 
member states, even those who did not vote in favour.  As evidence of this, the GCC 
Charter asserts that a member that does not accept a resolution in a procedural matter is 
not bound by its obligations, on condition that this objection is declared at the time of 
pronouncing the resolution.  Nevertheless, such exemption has not been mentioned for 
                                                             
51Alvarez (2006), p. 8-9. 
52In the GCC literatures this Council termed whether the Ministerial Council or the Council of Ministers, 
this thesis adopt the latter term.     
53 Article 11, the Fundamental Statute.  
54 Ibid Article 13 
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the Council of Ministers, which means that all the members in the Council of Ministers 
are bound by its resolutions in procedural matters, even objectors.55 
 
4.2.2.1 Specialisation of the Council of Ministers 
 
The Council of Ministers proposes policies and puts forward recommendations, designs 
and projects that aim to develop the cooperation and coordination between member 
states in various fields, and to produce decisions and recommendations required for the 
achievement of these aims.  Also, the Council of Ministers works in encouraging and 
developing the existing activity between member states on various grounds and then 
brings its conclusions to the Supreme Council to make the appropriate decision. 56  
Another function of the Council of Ministers is to present comments to the Ministers in 
charge in order to put GCC decisions into action.57  According to Article 12 of the 
Fundamental Statute, the main role of the Council of Ministers is execution.       
 
 
4.2.3 The Secretariat General 
 
The Secretariat General consists of the Secretary-General, who has to be a citizen of one 
of the member countries and who is nominated by the Supreme Council. 58  It also 
consists of the Assistants to the Secretary-General, who should be appointed by the 
Council of Ministers, based on a recommendation by the Secretariat General.59  In this 
role, the Secretary-General is directly in charge of all the Secretariat General work and 
he represents the GCC to other countries and organisations.  He, his Assistants and 
employees are completely independent from any authority of all members.60  They are 
all recognised as international employees, under the authority of only the GCC.61 
                                                             
55 Abo-Alwafa (1996), p. 87. 
56 Article 12, the Fundamental Statute. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Article 14, Ibid. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Article 16, Ibid. 
61 On 22 Dec 2010, in a meeting between the author and Abd-Almajeed Al-Sadi the representative of  the 
Legal Affairs Department in the Secretariat General in Riyadh, the author asked him about the retirement 
system for the employees in the Security-General. He answered that the Secretariat General does not has 
its own retirement system therefore, the Saudi King had to make a decree that all Saudi employees in the 
Secretariat General came under the Saudi retirement system.  Some of the other employees from the rest 
of the member countries, he continued, are still not sure under which retirement system they will be. 
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According to Article 14 of the FS, the Secretary-General remains in his job for a period 
of three years and his term can be renewed for another three years only.62  The GCC has 
failed to comply with this Article as shown by the fact that some Secretary-Generals 
have stayed in their position for more than six years.  The first Secretary-General Abd-
Alla Bsharah remained in his position for 12 years (1981-1993) and Abd-Alrahman Al-
Atiyah for nine years (2002-2010).  In these cases, the Supreme Council found a 
loophole to Article 14 of the FS: rather than renewing the Secretary-General's 
employment at the end of his sixth year, the Supreme Council instructed him to continue 
in his position.  The explicit meaning of the article is that the Secretary-General should 
not stay in his job more than six years, but the Supreme Council just ignored the GCC 
laws or assumed that instructing is something different than renewing.  Whether it was 
renewing or instructing, the end result is the same: that the Secretary-General stayed in 
his position.  It is not the first time that the political leaders of the GCC ignored GCC 
laws without excuse, as will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis.  
 
4.2.3.1 The Independence of the Secretariat General 
 
Article 16 of the Fundamental Statute states that the Secretary-General and all the 
employees of the Secretariat General, who are citizens of the member states, must not be 
affected by their own nationality but have to work as independent international 
employees; their focus has to be on the general interest of all the members of Gulf 
countries. They “shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the joint 
benefit of the member states.”63 Alashal assumes that member states have given the 
Secretariat General the required level of independence to allow it to focus on the 
interests of the GCC as an international organisation and not on the interests of the 
member countries.64  However, this thesis criticises this as an artificial independence.  
Alvarez, having criticised many of the suggested criteria that an international 
organisation should meet, establishes that the majority of lawyers agree that three 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
However, the Bahraini Government did the same by a decree, stating that all Bahraini employees in the 
Secretariat General are under the provision of the Bahraini retirement system. See Legal Bulletin (1992), 
41 Riyadh, GCC Secretariat Publications. pp. 117-119. 
62 Article 14, Fundamental Statute. 
63 Article 16, Ibid. 
64 Alashal (1983), p. 103.    
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elements are crucial.65  One of these crucial criteria is “requiring a legally autonomous 
entity... ensures that treaty parties have entrusted somebody other than themselves with 
developing and maintaining their common will.”66  This body, which should be distinct 
from the government of member countries cannot be the Supreme Council nor the 
Council of Ministers because these Councils represent the governments of member 
countries.  The Secretariat General is the only body which claims to be independent 
from the governments of member countries.  By underlining the power and provisions 
given to the Secretariat General, it is revealed that the claimed independence is not real: 
as shown above in relation to the GCC structure, the Supreme Council has not being 
given room to function independently.     
 
4.2.3.2 The Power of the Secretariat General 
 
First of all, the Secretary-General is nominated by the Supreme Council and the budget 
of the Secretariat General is approved by the Council. 67  All the roles given to the 
Secretariat General is to do the secretarial work of the Councils.  Its role is mostly to 
prepare the work that the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers need, such as 
studies, programmes and reports on the development of cooperation whether by request 
from the Councils or without. Its role is also to evaluate the efforts of member countries 
to apply the Councils' resolutions.  The Councils can ask the Secretariat General to do 
any other task.68  It can be noted, from the list of functions that Article 15 of the 
Fundamental Statute has limited the Secretariat General from within, that the only role 
the Secretariat General can do independently is to recommend the president of the 
Council of Ministers to hold an extraordinary meeting of the Council, only when 
needed.  
 
4.2.4 The Proposed GCC Parliament 
 
There is not yet a GCC Parliament so there is no body to represent the people.  Through 
its bodies, the GCC always mentioned that the GCC is working for the interest of the 
                                                             
65 The GCC met the other two elements which are to be between states by international agreement and to 
be under international law.  
66 Alvarez (2006), p.6.  
67 Article 8, Fundamental Statute.  
68 See Article 15, Fundamental Statute.  
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people.  The Fundamental Statute refers to the interests of the people and their “hopes 
for a better future on the path to unity of their states.” 69   The Supreme Council 
mentioned that the GCC was a respond to the will and hope of the people for more 
cooperation and a better future.70  The Secretary-General states that the GCC is now 
tighter than ever before because there are now inter-interests between people and 
governments and the links between people and government have become stronger, 
which has brought the GCC news to become the daily focus of people and 
governments.71  Though the GCC leaders propose that they are working to achieve the 
hopes and interests of the governments and the people, the GCC has not created a body 
to represent the people.  
 
4.2.4.1 The Consultation Committee 
 
The Consultation Committee has taken the role of a GCC parliament and the mission of 
this committee it to represent the people‟s interest.  The idea of creating this committee 
was from a Kuwaiti proposal from 1996 to create a consultation body from the people of 
member countries; in 1997 the Supreme Council declared its satisfaction with the 
Kuwaiti proposal and established it the following year.72  The role of this committee is 
to provide consultation to the Supreme Council and to help the Council face future 
challenges.73  This Committee consists of 30 members, five from each member country.  
This Committee is not allowed to discuss any subject except what has been submitted by 
the Supreme Council.74 
 
Alnoimi argues that this Committee is not an active body: it has no power to be able to 
actively function in a way that would benefit the GCC and that there should be a 
parliament instead of this Committee.75  He sees this Committee as just a superficial 
body and believes that the leaders of the GCC should, instead, take steps towards 
establishing an elected Gulf parliament that has the power to reflect the interests of the 
                                                             
69 The the preamble of the Fundamental Statute.  
70 The Supreme Council, First Session (1981). 
71 Alatiyah, the Secretary-General (July 2010), p. 4.  
72 The Secretariat-General. The Consultation Committee.   
73 Ibid.   
74 Ibid.    
75 Alnoaimi (3 Feb 2004) Alwasat Newspapers, 515  
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people similar to the European Parliament.76  Some argue that the Committee has done 
nothing valuable since it was established until now and the people in the Gulf have not 
even noticed the existence of this Committee which is supposed to represent them.77  On 
the other hand, the Saudi leader Prince Sultan commends the excellent job the 
Committee is in helping the leaders of the member countries.78 
 
 
4.3 The Objectives of the GCC 
 
According to Al-Attiyah (2010) the GCC aims to achieve "the objectives set forth in the 
Charter,"79 and that it is the normal function of any international organisation to aim to 
achieve the goals set up in its charter.  Therefore, focus is given here to analyse the 
GCC objectives mentioned in the Charter, which is important as it indicates the 
direction in which the organisation has to move forward.  In the scope of an 
international organisation, the goals that an organisation seeks to achieve are significant 
because they help identify the reasons behind creating such an organisation and show its 
direction.  It is also a way of presenting its obligations, limitations and scope.80  It can 
play an important role in explaining its laws and its acts as it is bound not to go outside 
its goals and it can use any legitimate act that leads to its goals even if this act is not 
mentioned in its laws. An example is when Judge Spiropoulos justifies the General 
Assembly resolution that approved establishing UN actions in the Congo and the Middle 
East based on, inter alia, that this resolution fulfilled UN purposes.81 
 
According to its Charter, the GCC objectives are first to achieve coordination, 
integration, complementarity and interrelations between all state members in all fields 
moving towards unity.  Second, they are to deepen and strengthen the attachment, the 
commerce and existing aspects of corporation between the people of member countries 
                                                             
76 Alnoaimi (3 Feb 2004) Alwasat Newspapers, 515. 
77 Able (3 Feb 2004) Alwasat Newspapers, 515 
78Asharq Al-Awsat, Newspaper (30 Apr 2007)    
79The GCC Secretary General (2002-2010). 
80Abo-Alwafa (1996), p. 28 
81 Judge Spiropoulos , Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962 : I.C. J . Reports 1962, p. I~I." 
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in all extent and third, to create similar rules in all fields, to encourage joint scientific 
research, technical development and joint enterprises.82 
 
According to Article 5 of the GCC Charter, the main reason why the GCC exists is to 
lead member countries to 'unity' in all fields.  Abdullah Bsharah, the first GCC leader, 
explains what the word 'unity' mentioned in the GCC charter is refereeing to.83  He states 
that the GCC exists to facilitate cooperation between member countries so it is neither 
an alliance, nor a block.  It is a very wide idea about cooperation that has the end goal of 
achieving unity among member countries. He believes member countries should avoid 
theorising their cooperation and should avoid the traditional political measures that 
prevent the flexibility of cooperation.  It is neither a federal nor a confederation system, 
but is rather a very flexible way of cooperating which interacts with the on-going 
development and dynamic achievements, a way of cooperation which has no strict rules 
and no limitations.      
 
Bsharah‟s explanation of 'unity' was very vague.  He may mean that the cooperation the 
GCC is adopting is a natural cooperation in the sense that the GCC is an organisation 
that creates the right environment for natural cooperation to grow and strengthen.  That 
appears from the way that the GCC has been trying to create model laws and then 
asking member countries to keep these laws in mind whenever they develop their own 
rules.  These model laws are not enforced by the GCC but any member country has the 
right to implement them in their national law or not to.  The GCC then asks member 
countries to report whenever they adopt these model laws into their national laws.  
Every three years, the GCC measures the popularity of these model laws based on 
whether member countries adopt them.  According to this process, the GCC can 
determine which laws are more accepted by member countries to become a more 
effective lawmaker.84  In other words, Bsharah believes that there are laws out there 
suitable for all member countries which have yet to be discovered, and the role of the 
GCC is to discover these laws.  When these laws will have been discovered, member 
countries would adopt them without any enforcement from the GCC, as will be analysed 
in chapter four. 
                                                             
82 Article 5, the GCC Charter.  
83 Bsharah (1985)    
84 More discussion about GCC model laws are found in the next chapter.   
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But in the same way that the GCC has objective for its member countries, it has 
objectives beyond its members.  The GCC, Bsharah claims, will not only serve the Gulf 
countries but will end up serving the wider goals of all Arab nations.  He was referring 
to the introduction of the GCC Charter which states that the GCC will assist in the goals 
of the Arab Nation.   Until the beginning of 2011, anyone reading this opinion would 
likely think that Bsharah was only attempting to satisfy the leaders of the GCC countries 
by saying some complimentary words.  However, 2011 revealed that the GCC has 
contributed to solving vital Arab issues, more so than the Arab League.  The last chapter 
of this thesis is about the GCC‟s role in the Arab revolutions of 2011, but for the time 
being, this discussion about GCC objectives would not be complete without discussing 
its principles. 
 
4.4 The GCC Principles 
 
International organisations (IO) tend to share characteristics that make legal 
generalisation possible. 85  While each IO has its own legal order and faces distinct 
problems, IOs share a certain "unity in diversity" including common principles (and 
unresolved difficulties) within a speciality of public international law, namely, 
"international institutional law," as well as “common law-making techniques."86 
 
4.4.1 The Significance of Studying the GCC Principles 
 
Principles are directives that provide instructions that an organisation should concede 
and respect while working towards its goals.87  In other words, the principles are the 
rules of decorum that create the appropriate environment for achieving goals. 
Sometimes, principles temporarily blend with the goals, making it difficult to recognise 
the distinction between them.88  In the Masqat Declaration during its 10th cycle, the GCC 
declared its principles that should be followed by all the member states in their relations 
with each other and with the world.  These principles have also been mentioned in the 
                                                             
85 Alvarez (2006), p. 3. 
86 Ibid, p. 4. 
87 Abo-Alwafa (1996), p. 31. 
88 Ibid. 
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final statement of the GCC‟s 11th cycle and the Council of Ministers‟ declaration in 
Riyadh in 1982 (its 3rd cycle ) mentioned the contention between Qatar and Bahrain, 
indicating that what had happened between the two countries was not in line with the 
principles embodied by the GCC. 
 
There is no clear indication as to what the GCC principles are but these could be 
indirectly found in the rules that govern the GCC, especially its charter.  Firstly, the 
principle of cooperation, that can be identified from the very name of the GCC, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, from the preamble of its charter and from Article 8.5. Secondly, 
one can identify the principle of solving disputes between the member countries in 
peaceful ways in the functions of the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes which 
are set out in Article 10 of the Charter, stating that the use of violence is not an 
acceptable way for solving disputes.  Thirdly, there is an idealist principle that the 
sovereignty of every member has to be equal.  Every single member is given a single 
vote and unanimous approval is needed to vote in the Supreme and Council of 
Ministers.  Equal amounts are contributed to the Secretariat General Budget.89 
 
This thesis argues that this third principle hinders the effectiveness of the GCC as it 
does not reflect the different capacity of the member countries.  It would be more 
realistic if the GCC gave each member countries a number of votes according to some 
characteristics such as its population number, its economic strength and so on.  For 
example, the member states in the EU have a different number of votes according to 
each country‟s population and economy.90 
 
4.5 Membership 
 
Right from the beginning, the GCC appeared to be a closed membership organisation. 
As Article 5 states, "The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that 
participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Riyadh on 4 February 1981."91  
The name of this organisation starts with the word „Gulf‟ which means that the 
geographical location of the member countries has been considered, as all member 
                                                             
89 Article 15, the GCC Charter. 
90 See the EU official website, available on www.europa.eu. [Accessed on 13 Aug 2011]. 
91 Article 5, the Fundamental Statute.  
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countries are Gulf littoral states.  It was mentioned earlier that the first proposal about 
creating a system of cooperation in the Arabian Gulf was at an Omani conference in 
1976 and included GCC members as well as Iran and Iraq, but this conference did not 
come to any result.  Three neighbouring countries share some elements with the member 
countries: Iraq is an Arab state and a Gulf littoral country, Iran is a Gulf littoral state but 
not an Arab country and Yemen is an Arab but not a Gulf littoral country though it is in 
the Arabian Peninsula and it shares borders with two member countries (Saudi Arabia 
and Oman).  Iran is excluded as it is not Arab and the GCC is for Arab countries.  Iraq is 
excluded because it was in a war with Iran and including Iraq would be considered by 
Iran as an alliance against Iran.92 
 
Yemen has been continuingly requesting to join the GCC and even asked the US in 
2010 to mediate between Yemen and the GCC after years of the GCC refusing to give 
Yemen full membership.93  Some believe that the main reason behind the GCC refusal 
of Yemeni membership was the Yemeni attitude at the time of the Second Gulf War 
(1990) when Yemen supported the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.94  In a December 2010 
survey with the following question: “do you think Yemen membership in the GCC will 
effects the GCC positively or negatively,” a million people responded; 71% of them 
believed that Yemen membership would badly affect the GCC while 28% of them 
believed it would have positively effects.95  Some commentators of this survey explain 
that people of the member countries worry about the instability in Yemeni politics and 
the continuing intertribal fighting within Yemen.96  This matter is still an issue since 
although the GCC has given Yemen membership in many of its organs, Yemen is still 
looking for full membership. 
 
There has to be an amendment to the GCC Fundamental Statute before adding any new 
members and as long as it has not been changed, it indicates that GCC members are not 
willing to accept any new members yet. Some argue that it is a condition for an 
international organisation not to completely close its membership to only some pointed 
countries.  Alvarez states that the membership of any international organisation must be 
                                                             
92Alssiyasa Newspaper (28 Jan 1981). 
93 See Kuwait Times Newspapers (23 Jan 2010). 
94Foreign Policy Journal  23 Jan 2010.  
95 This survey was conducted by Al Arabia News Channel (16 Dec 2010).  
96 Al Arabia News Channel (16 Dec 2010). 
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open to states appropriately qualified in the organisations „area of operating.'97  He then 
criticises this condition because it requires artificial restrictions on the right of an 
organisation to make a decision on its membership, proposing that non-member 
countries in an organisation have the right to membership regardless of what the charter 
of that organisation provides for. He gives the example that such a condition would 
mean that the Organization of American States (OAS) has no right to stop Cuba from 
being a member as it is geographically and politically similar to the member states of 
the OAS.  He explains that the reason behind this condition is to be certain that a 
particular organisation is not a smoke-screen for the 'ego of a nation state.'  Unlike the 
GCC, many other international organisations do not close their membership to only a 
specific number of members but open their membership to any country which meets 
certain criteria.  For example, the EU opens its membership to any European country if 
the European Council unanimously agrees to add a new member.98 
 
The six member countries of the GCC have strong historical links, sharing the same 
social and cultural reality even before the establishment of the GCC, and therefore the 
GCC has been created to be the institutional embodiment of these existing relations.  On 
many occasions, the GCC has asserted that member countries have similar economic 
and political systems.99  Braibanti has noted the depth in the homogeneity of the people 
of the member countries which no other group of nations shares which explains the use 
of the expression 'Arabians' to distinguish them from 'Arab.'  He also notes that the sect 
of Islam existing in the member countries is transported in varying levels from Saudi 
Arabia though there are remarkable differences in social customs in many member 
countries, and particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain.  He also noted that there is no other 
state than these in the Arab world where people and leaders proudly wear traditional 
dress in normal life.100 
 
A charter establishing an international organisation usually cites the countries that 
created it and opens the door to new members.  For instance, the League of Arab States, 
established in 22 March 1981, opens the door to new membership on the condition that 
they are Arab and independent.  The League of Arab States Council has a right to 
                                                             
97 Alvarez (2006), p. 4. 
98 See Article 237, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty.  
99 See the Supreme Council, session1 (1981).    
100 Braibanti (1987), p. 206 
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produce a consenting decision as to whether or not a new member fulfils these 
conditions when applying to become a member.  
 
4.6 The GCC in the Eyes of Arab Countries 
 
The Arab Nation is mentioned in the introduction of the Charter which means that GCC 
member countries were very keen to tell the rest of the Arab countries that GCC 
members were not turning their backs on the rest of the Arab world by creating the 
GCC.  The GCC Charter states that member countries “[have] the conviction that 
coordination, cooperation, and integration between them serve the sublime objectives of 
the Arab Nation.”101 
 
Due to a misunderstanding of the GCC, the rest of the Arab world was unhappy about 
this new institution.  In the Arab world it was interpreted as the GCC countries turning 
their backs on the Arab world, moving away from the issues that interested the Arab 
world and only focusing on regional issues. This worried some Arab commentators 
because they felt that the Gulf countries were cutting themselves off from the rest of the 
Arab world.  Since these Gulf countries are rich, exporters of capital and have a stronger 
political voice as oil exporters, the rest of the Arab world did not want to lose this 
strength.  They worried that the Gulf countries would work on the international level as 
a unit, dealing with the international community according to their own interests and not 
those of the whole Arab world.  This voice was clear in Fatema Alhababy's speech at the 
conference about the GCC, held in Riyadh in 1984.102  The Saudi Foreign Minister was 
aware of this Arab concern so he assured delegates that by creating the GCC, the Gulf 
countries would not be separating themselves from the Arab world, just as the members 
of the Arab League were not separating themselves from the Islamic world.103 
 
In the first conference on the GCC held in Amman in 1982, the first leader of the GCC 
Abdullah Bsharah stressed that the GCC had learnt a lesson from previous attempts to 
                                                             
101 GCC Charter.  
102 Alhababy (1983) p 136. 
103 Ibid, p. 137. 
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unify Egypt and Syria.104  This attempt for integration in 1958 was at the golden age of 
the Arab Nationalism movement led by Egyptian president Jamal Abdul Nasser.105  The 
two leaders: Nasser and Syrian President Hafeth al-Asad decided to unify their countries 
to become one single country.  The two countries were not ready for this unification and 
did not let things take their proper time.106  The two countries and the whole Arab world 
were excited for the unification of Egypt and Syria but this excitement did not last long, 
as the unification failed.  Nonetheless, Bsharah said that although it was a failure, it 
gave Arab leaders some experience about the kind of cooperation that could happen 
between Arab countries.   
 
There is no clear link between the Egypt-Syria unification and the creation of the GCC, 
but it seems that Abdullah Bsharah wanted to tell the Arab world that the GCC was not 
turning its back on the Arab world but that its existence is in line with other Arab 
attempts at a union. The GCC is not a new phenomenon in the Arab world as there had 
been other similar unions.107  GCC countries were not trying to divide the Arab world 
but trying to work towards greater Arab unity similar to the attempt of unifying Egypt 
and Syria. 
 
Abdullah Bsharah argued that the unification had failed because the leaders of the two 
countries had centralised all the power in their hands, without public participation.108  
This can imply that the GCC is unlike the Egypt-Syria union because the leaders of 
GCC countries were publishing their material.  He could also have implied and warned 
that if there was no public participation from member countries in GCC decision-
making, the GCC will similarly fail as a union.  
 
GCC leader Al-Attiyah (2002-2010) has mentioned that one of the GCC strategies is to 
avoid the failed cooperation attempts that previously occurred in the area, likely 
referring to the Egypt-Syria attempt. 109  Alattiyah's statement is opposed to the 
aforementioned Bsharah statement which stated that the GCC was inspired by the 
                                                             
104 Bsharah (1982), p 32.  
105 More detail about this movement can be found in the last chapter of this thesis. 
106 See Awny Farshakh (2008 March 1) Available on www.alquds.com [Accessed on 23 Feb 2012]. 
107 Bsharah (1982), p. 32.  
108 Bsharah (1982), p. 33.   
109 Abdulrahman bin Hamad Al-Attiyah the Secretary General (2009), p. 7. 
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Egypt-Syria attempt for union.110  However, while it was probably clear to GCC leaders 
what they were attempting to do by creating the GCC, it was not as clear to the rest of 
the world, which was the reason why the GCC was misunderstood.           
 
4.7 Misunderstanding the Nature of the GCC 
 
Some scholars had the right impression about the GCC from its early years. Twinam 
defines the GCC as an organisation for “political harmony through economic 
cooperation.” 111   There is, he continues, no such attempt for inter-governmental 
cooperation in the Arab World but the GCC may be inspired by the European 
Community.112  However, others misunderstood what the GCC was about, thinking that 
the GCC is a federal union or a military alliance.113 
 
4.7.1 The GCC as a Federal Union 
 
'Unity' means 'the state of being one; oneness'114 while 'union' means 'the state of being 
united.'115  Whether they have the same or a slightly different meaning, it is clear that 
these words refer to a much more developed integration than 'cooperation' does.  
McGovern explains that the concept of unity has a more powerful meaning, as used by 
the founders of the United States of America. This US unity started as a revolution and 
then faced a hard painful test with the civil war.  According to him, the US is therefore 
an example of a country in which the heart of its historical foundation is based on the 
concept of unity.  In his book on the GCC, McGovern emphasises the importance of 
unity and the possible success that could take place between the GCC countries. 116  
However, it would have been more realistic if he had started his introduction with some 
inspired words about the European Union (EU), which, as an international organisation, 
exhibits a cooperation that is closer to the GCC than the US, as a nation-state.  He is 
probably referring to some of the GCC documents such as the Preamble of the GCC 
                                                             
110 See Bsharah (1982), p 32.  
111 Twinam (1987), p. 30. 
112 Ibid., pp. 30-31 
113 See McGovern (1987), p. ix, and see Anthony, J. D. (1982), p. 4. 
114 Oxford Dictionary. 
115 Ibid. 
116 McGovern (1987), p. ix. 
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Charter which states that the people of the member countries are hoping “for a better 
future on the path to unity of their states.”117  Also, according to the Charter, one of the 
GCC objectives is achieving coordination, complementarily and interrelations between 
all member states in all areas moving towards unity.118 
 
Some GCC countries had tried to unite under a single federal country, as mentioned 
earlier, and although this federal country failed to include Bahrain and Qatar, the seven 
Trucial States succeeded in forming a federal country: the UAE.  Abdullah Bsharah 
explains that the GCC is neither a federal nor a confederation system; rather, it is a very 
flexible form of cooperation which reacts to changing developments and dynamic 
achievements, a kind of cooperation which has no strict rules and no limitations.119 
 
Although it is mentioned in the GCC Charter that member countries are working 
through the GCC to achieve unity between them, the history of the GCC reveals that 
unity is a far dream and that member countries were not willing to go that far.  In 2011, 
when several GCC member country, particularly Bahrain, realised that their governance 
system dominated by a royal family was in danger, they started discussing unity and 
federation more seriously.  This will be examined in the last chapter of the thesis. 
 
4.7.2 The GCC as an Alliance 
 
Some observers thought that the GCC was mainly a military alliance.  Iran was not 
happy with the establishment of the GCC when it was at war with Iraq, perceiving this 
cooperation as an alliance that aimed to gather more military force to support Iraq 
against Iran.  To avoid such assumptions, the leaders of the GCC made it clear in the 
first announcement of the Supreme Council that the aim of the GCC was to achieve  
comprehensive cooperation among its members, that the Iran-Iraq war was posing a 
threat to the region, and that the GCC supported efforts to put an end to this war.120 
Additionally, it did not serve Iranian interests to have a strong country or inter-country 
                                                             
117 The preamble of the GCC Charter (1982). 
118 More discussion about the GCC objectives is below. 
119 Bsharah (1985).  
120 The closing statement of the Supreme Council of the GCC, First Session (1981). 
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cooperation on the other side of the Gulf, as they wanted to have the supreme power in 
the area.121 
 
Not only Iranians were sceptical about the motivations behind the establishment of the 
GCC, believing that the GCC was more a military alliance than a means for economic 
cooperation.  Scholars like John Anthony noticed that neither the words 'union' nor 
'unity' or any similar words were mentioned in the first GCC meeting in 1981,122 but 
notes that the word 'cooperation' was stressed, ignoring the fact that the word 'unity' is 
mentioned in some GCC documents such as the Charter.123  The point he wanted to 
make was that the GCC was not an international organisation that aimed to unite the 
Gulf countries, but rather that it was a military alliance. He states: 
 
Despite the initial and ongoing emphasis on economic, social, informational, and 
educational cooperation that was envisioned and enshrined in the earliest GCC 
communiqués, it is increasingly apparent that security concerns are uppermost in the 
minds of many of those in aposition to prioritize the GCC's mandate.  The need to find a 
more credible and effective means to deal with the pressing problem of security was, 
indeed, one of the most compelling reasons for establishing the GCC.
124
 
 
He stresses that any other purpose for creating the GCC was a supplementary one but 
that the heads of the member states were focused on security matters.125 
 
It is may be right that the security issue was a major concern for some GCC leaders, as 
evidenced by member countries' proposals prior to establishing the GCC. 126  Unlike 
Anthony who assumes that the GCC is a kind of military alliance, Twinam explains how 
member countries had differing opinions about security cooperation after 1970, 
diverging on the extent to which they should rely on Western countries, especially the 
UK and the US, in relation to security of the Gulf; their cooperation in security “was 
strewn with political landmines.”127 However, although some GCC member states were 
concerned about security or military cooperation, none of the member countries, as 
mentioned earlier, wanted the GCC to appear like a military alliance.128 
                                                             
121 See Abduljaleel Marhon (2010).     
122 Anthony, J. (1982), p. 4.  
123 See the preamble of the GCC Charter.   
124 Anthony, J. (1982), p. 4. 
125 Ibid. 
126 These proposals are discussed below.  
127 Twinam (1987), p. 30. 
128 See the Supreme Council, first session. 
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4.8 The GCC - Important in the Eyes of the Media but not for 
Politicians 
 
Some have characterised the establishment of the GCC as one of the most significant 
events of the period between 1972 and 1981, emerging as a unique form of cooperation 
in the Middle East. In the first year of its establishment, Johan Anthony criticised the 
American media for not showing enough interest in the GCC. Even though its 
establishment was vital to the United States' foreign policies, American politicians were 
hardly aware of its existence.  Anthony predicted that the GCC would become much 
more important in the future than at the time of its establishment.  For Anthony, the 
GCC is like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which was not 
viewed by American politicians as a serious organisation when it was first established as 
well.  Examining the GCC today, 30 years after that prediction, Anthony would find his 
prediction to be wrong.  From its establishment until today, the GCC has largely 
remained the same organisation: although it has passed many key steps towards 
coordination, it has not taken a key international role as OPEC has done.129 
 
Organisations like OPEC were created to play an important role in international 
economics.  Therefore, its achievement is pronounced loudly while the achievement of 
the GCC remains silent.130 The silent achievement refers to the fact that the GCC has 
maintained the existing system and not formed a new system, particularly relating to the 
surrounding political environment in the Gulf area.  The general political status of the 
Arab world, from the time of the GCC‟s creation in 1981 to date, and its impact on 
different functions of the GCC will be analysed in the last chapter of this thesis.   
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the structure of the GCC, which illustrates that the main 
GCC bodies are: the Supreme Council, to which the Commission of the Settlement of 
                                                             
129 See Anthony J. (1982), p. 3 
130 This chapter is about the establishment of the GCC, whereas its achievements are assessed in the next 
chapter.  
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Disputes is linked, the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat General.
131
  It has 
revealed that the GCC leaders have given to these bodies the powers that make them 
able to facilitate the leaders‟ lead towards more cooperation among their states.  Yet, 
this chapter has argued that the powers that these bodies have do not match with some 
of the GCC‟s declared objectives.  It has explained that the objectives of the GCC can 
be categorised into two kinds.   First, the objectives that the GCC is able to achieve with 
its existing structure.  These objectives are, in particular, to facilitate cooperation 
between its member countries in many fields: security, economic, social, information, 
education etc. and to strengthen the existing forms of cooperation between the people of 
member countries.  Second, the objectives that the GCC is not able to achieve within the 
limitations of tis current structure.  These include achieving unity between its member 
countries and creating similar rules in all fields.  With regards to achieving unity, this 
thesis argues in the coming chapters, particularly in the last chapter, that that the GCC 
would not be able to achieve unity unless the GCC‟s bodies are given the power and 
independence they need to function without the full control of the states‟ leaders.  Also, 
it will be argued in the next chapter that the GCC is doing well in creating similar rules, 
however, that the GCC is not be able to create binding common rules as long as there is 
no GCC court of law.      
This chapter has also considered the GCC‟s closed membership system.  It has argued 
that the GCC‟s system is not in line with the rules mentioned by international 
institutional lawyers.  The membership of any international organisation must be open 
to states appropriately qualified in the organisation‟s „area of operations.'132  Although 
the GCC has a closed membership system, it offers its membership to those Arabic 
countries which have a monarchy.  This point will be addressed in more depth in the last 
chapter of this thesis.   
 
The chapter then considered responses of other states to the establishment of the GCC, 
which contribute to the overall impression that the aims were not clear or consistent.  It 
has addressed misunderstandings about the GCC in the Arab world and internationally.  
The Arab world was worried that the GCC would take a role which was not in line with 
the interests of the Arab world.  The response came as an article in the GCC Charter that 
                                                             
131 Article 6 of the Fundamental Statute. 
132 Alvarez (2006), p. 4. 
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the GCC is aiming to support not only the goals of its member countries but also to 
support all the common interests of the Arab world.133  The confusion about the GCC is 
because member countries have different views about the GCC.  The previous chapter 
noted that some member states were more interested in security cooperation while some 
were more interested in trade cooperation.  So, the GCC struggles to help its member 
states in all these kind of corporation.  This is a struggle  also because the GCC has not 
been given a good level of independence.  Therefore it has not formed a clear identity 
because its identity depends on what the leaders of the member countries want the GCC 
to do.  In the next chapter the achievements of the GCC will be evaluated in accordance 
with the objectives and principles explained here. 
 
  
                                                             
133 See the introduction of the GCC charter. 
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Chapter Five - The Achievements of the GCC 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter evaluates and analyses the GCC achievements in the main fields of 
political, security and economic achievements.  This chapter is crucial to this thesis as it 
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the GCC in order to evaluate the GCC as an 
international organisation.  Two kinds of source materials are reviewed in this chapter. 
Firstly, this chapter refers to primary sources, including the literature published by the 
GCC, the common laws it has created, the agreements ratified under the umbrella of the 
GCC and the statements made by GCC bodies, by GCC officers or by leaders of 
member country.  Secondly, this chapter refers to secondary sources including books, 
journal articles and newspaper articles written in Arabic or in English directly on the 
GCC, as well as to secondary sources written generally on international organisations or 
international institutional law. 
 
There is, in both the primary and secondary sources relating to the work of the GCC, 
considerable confusion over or ambiguity between the achievements of the GCC and 
those of the member countries, whereby some achievements are pushed to be considered 
under the umbrella of the GCC when they are in fact due to the efforts of one or more 
member countries.  An example of this is the mediation for solving the border dispute 
between Oman and Yemen, as will be explained further below.  Some authors 
contributed to this confusion; for example, Ali Shafiq has listed the role of Saudi Arabia 
in solving the dispute between Algeria and Morocco as a GCC achievement,1 but neither 
the Supreme Council, the Council of Ministers, nor the Secretariat General have counted 
this effort as a GCC achievement.   
 
Some authors write about GCC achievements by paraphrasing the GCC Supreme 
Council's statements,2 and therefore have a very positive view about the GCC peace 
efforts.  The GCC has been trying, according to Ali Safiq, to peacefully settle any 
dispute between member countries and to reduce tensions and resolve disputes between 
                                                             
1 Shafiq (1989), p. 253.  
2 See for instance, Shafiq (1989), pp. 121-135. 
 
 
142 
 
the countries of the region, as well as to bring about peace in the Arab world.  He argues 
that by observing the GCC functions and the role of its various bodies, it can be noted 
that one of the main goals of the GCC is to achieve stability and security for the Arabian 
Gulf and the Arab world.  He concludes that it is clear from statements made by the 
Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers, that this organisation is keen on making 
great efforts to keep peace in the area.3 
 
Twinam points towards more of a silent achievement, which is likely to be true.4  He 
states that the GCC has created a forum for the leaders where they would be confident 
enough to pronounce their opinions.  Many of the GCC members are the smaller 
countries of the Arab world and according to Twinam, the GCC members may not 
easily be able to contribute to a bigger organisation like the Arab League.  The GCC 
therefore creates the right environment for the smaller countries to learn from other 
countries that have more experience, as it allows for a closer consultation between the 
leaders.  The GCC, he believes, opens a new possibility for understanding, learning and 
problem-solving for the member countries‟ government.5 
 
There are a number of sources that show the GCC‟s own views of its achievements.  
The views held by the leaders of the member countries can be traced through the closing 
statements of the Supreme Council.6  At the end of each Supreme Council meeting, the 
leaders of member countries publish a joint statement in which they evaluate the 
achievements to date and their attitudes towards current internal and international issues.  
Another source is the statements of the Council of Ministers, which meets every three 
months.  At the end of every meeting, the Council of Ministers also declares its view 
about the GCC progress and attitudes.7  The third and most important source, for the 
purpose of this chapter, is the Secretary-General's views.  One of the roles that the 
Secretary-General is required to perform is to write regular reports about the progress of 
the GCC and to show to what extent member countries are implementing the resolutions 
of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers as well as drafting the resolutions 
                                                             
3 Shafiq (1989), p. 253.  
4 Twinam (1987), p 41. 
5 Ibid 
6  All these statements are available in Arabic and in English starting from the 18th statement on 
www.gcc-sg.org 
7 These statements are available only in Arabic on www.gcc-sg.org.   
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of the Council of Ministers.8  This chapter uses the information coming out of these 
three GCC bodies as the main resource for the GCC's view about the GCC.  After 
examining the GCC's views on itself, this chapter analyses and discusses these views in 
relation to other sources of information and from alternative opinions. 
 
This chapter examines the achievements declared by the GCC.  The general view of the 
GCC about its achievements is, according to the Secretariat General, that the GCC has 
made great achievements in all fields.9 The Secretariat General is very proud that the 
GCC is developing very well and is a practical institution.10  The achievements of the 
GCC will now be examined according to the themes of politics, security and economics. 
 
5.2 - The Political Achievements of the GCC 
 
By tracing the GCC function in external politics, it can be noted that the GCC 
sometimes functions as a discussion forum.  Many of the collective political attitudes 
adopted by the member countries are not necessarily the work of the GCC, but it is more 
the case that member countries already have similar policies.  This is supported by 
Christie who states that in external policy, the GCC sometimes has “an easier task.”11  
He points out that the GCC is usually unable to present itself as an independent 
international institution and that often, the international relations of the member 
countries are dealt with by member states individually.   
 
This section starts by highlighting the GCC's external policies, as its political 
achievements are based on these.  It then discusses how member countries have 
managed to produce a collective attitude and general consensus on all the important 
political issues. 12   This section also identifies key disputes that the GCC has been 
involved in and has had a major part in resolving.  
 
 
                                                             
8 See article 15, GCC Charter.   
9 See Secretariat-General (2009).  
10 Secretariat General (2006), p. 4.   
11 Christie (1987), p. 15. 
12 Secretariat-General (2009), p. 12. 
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5.2.1 GCC Principles for External Policy 
 
Before dealing with the achievements, it is first important to discuss the principles that 
these achievements are based on.  In covering the GCC's political achievements, the 
Secretariat General lists three political principles that are adopted by the GCC: the first 
is non-intervention in any other country‟s domestic affairs, the second is that each 
member country should respect the sovereignty of other members over their territories 
and resources and the third is that any dispute has to be settled peacefully.13  It is worth 
mentioning that these principles are also stated in the UN Charter.14  However, from 
reviewing the constitution of member countries concerning external policy and by 
tracing the statements of their leaders, it can be noted that these principles mentioned by 
the Secretariat General as GCC principles are actually those of member countries from 
before the creation of the GCC.15 
 
It is worth discussing the second and third principles in greater detail. On the second 
principle about respecting the territory of other countries it can be said that allowing 
territorial disputes to continue without being settled is not a healthy situation and does 
not result in an appropriate settlement.  For instance, the dispute between Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE over the Buraimi area between the two countries has been left without 
settlement; in fact this dispute was discussed between Britain and Saudi Arabia but 
unfortunately Britain withdrew from the UAE without the matter being settled. 16  
Negotiations continued between Saudi Arabia and the UAE afterwards, resulting in the 
Jeddah agreement of 1974.17  In this agreement Sheikh Zayed, the ruler of the UAE, 
agreed with Saudi Arabian King Faisal that the Buraimi is a Saudi land,18 but the current 
UAE Government appears unhappy with this agreement and wants to change it.  After 
the death of Sheikh Zayed, several UAE leaders argued that Sheikh Zayed had no 
choice but to agree with King Faisal because he desperately needed his help even 
though he knew that Buraimi should not be a Saudi land.19  They have expressed their 
rejection of the agreement by printing a map of the UAE that includes Buraimi on the 
                                                             
13 Al-Attiyah (2009), p. 13. 
14 Article 2, UN Charter. 1945. 
15 Al-Ashal (1983), p.179. 
16 See the report of her Britannic Majesty's Government. C. (54) 59 (16 February 1954)   
17 See ات درضم : دوعص لآ زٌزعلاذثع هت لصٍفلا ذلاخ ص ,  زٌزعلاذثع هت لصٍف كلملا جاٍح ًف ثاذحلأاو عئاقولا خٌرات , لصٍفلا خٌر1  
18 Ibid.  
19 See  زٌزعلاذثع هت لصٍف كلملا جاٍح ًف ثاذحلأاو عئاقولا خٌرات , لصٍفلا خٌرات درضم : دوعص لآ زٌزعلاذثع هت لصٍفلا ذلاخ 
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national identification cards of its citizens.  In response, Saudi Arabia has refused to 
allow UAE citizens to enter Saudi Arabia with these cards; they can only enter with 
their passports.20  In terms of the respect of territories mentioned in the GCC principles 
it is important to examine how these two countries practice 'respect' and what the role of 
the GCC has been in such matters.  This chapter argues that, the Jeddah Agreement was 
mainly reached based on the decisions of the two leaders as they both had the full power 
to decide on behalf of their countries and people.  This kind of settlement can be quick 
but it can also simply be a way of covering up the problem but not settling it as with this 
example of Buraimi land.  This chapter suggests that the role of the GCC here is to lead 
the dispute settlement in the GCC to a more developed way whether by creating a GCC 
court of law or by implementing an institutionalised way of settling problems.  This 
leads to the third principle about the mechanism of dispute settlement.  
 
Regarding the third principle about the peaceful settlement of disputes, the mechanism 
that the GCC created for this role is through the Commission for the Settlement of 
Disputes, which is neither a judicial body nor an arbitration commission but an advisory 
body.21  Therefore, its decisions are not binding even if two parties choose to bring their 
dispute to the Commission,22 which is usually the way that regional organisations deal 
with disputes.23  For example, in 1931, a Germano-Lithuanian Commission settled the 
dispute about the expulsion of five Germans from Memel, and in 1934, a Belgium-
Luxembourg Commission settled the dispute about contraband traffic.  These two 
disputes were settled by a consultation Commission.24 
 
Although the GCC Commission has established a peaceful means for dispute settlement 
in line with the UN principle25 that countries should look for peaceful ways for settling 
their disputes,26 one could argue that it is not capable of solving big issues and this is not 
only because it cannot make binding decisions but also because the Commission is not 
composed of judges.               
 
                                                             
20 See BBC Arabic (14 August 2009) 
21 More detail about this Commission can be found in the previous chapter.  
22 Shafiq (1989), p. 250.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Merrills, J. G. (2011) p. 60. 
25 See Article 52.3, UK Charter.  
26 Shafiq (1989), p. 251.  
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5.2.2 Institutional or Individual Achievements 
 
It is explained throughout this chapter that the GCC often confuses achievements of 
member countries and achievements of the GCC as an institution.  In this context the 
GCC members, as explained, did two types of work.  In the first instance, they worked 
individually to push for the passing of UN and Arab League resolutions, and in the 
second, they held Supreme Council meetings to pronounce their decision which was 
based on the previous resolutions of the UN and Arab League.  So, what is the different 
between these two kinds of work?  The answer can be that the achievement of the latter 
can only be reached through institutional work. When member countries work through 
the GCC, they are actually adding to the practice of their institutional experience; such 
experience is likely to grow and develop by such institutional practice.  In the former, 
when the leaders of the member countries work individually, there is a common 
individual initiative.  Such initiatives mainly exist between leaders that have being given 
all the power and can make key decisions without needing a green light from their 
people or from their ministers.  Initiatives like this may succeed because there is a good 
extent of understanding between leaders.  Yet, as soon as those individuals change, that 
understanding is likely to disappear so they need to build up their understanding which 
may take a long time.  If they were to work through the GCC, the institutional 
experience would not disappear with the change of one or more actors: the institutional 
experience can be passed onto the next generation, it can be built on that, and thereby 
continuing the institutional development.  As already mentioned in the case of the 
Saudi-UAE dispute over Buraimi, the leaders settled the dispute but this settlement was 
not transfered to the next generation.     
 
5.2.3 Has the GCC Changed its Goals? 
 
The aim here is to liken this discussion about the Second Gulf War to the analysis in the 
previous chapter about the principle of balancing power.  It was mentioned earlier that 
one of the main aims of GCC leaders in creating the GCC was to be independent from 
international powers in handling the security of the Gulf.  The main aim of creating the 
GCC is balancing the power in the Gulf.  In the first meeting of the Supreme Council, 
the GCC leaders had pronounced that by creating the GCC, member countries were 
showing their ability to secure the Gulf and that they do not want any foreign armed 
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forces to play a role in the Gulf.  However, the Kuwaiti crisis of 1990 has shown that 
this claimed capability and balance of power are not true.  The GCC countries that were 
asking international powers not to have military bases in the Gulf have changed their 
opinion and asked international powers, namely the US, to have some military bases in 
the Gulf.  For example, as mentioned earlier, Qatar, has agreed to pay 60% of the cost of 
the US military bases on its land. This is a crisis for the GCC, especially for those 
members who thought the GCC would balance the power in the Gulf and it shows that 
the Kuwaiti proposal which focuses more on economic cooperation and leaves security 
matters to international powers was closer to reality.   
 
The political achievements discussed above have been listed in chronological order 
while the political achievements that follow did not necessarily start in this century.  
They are continuing issues which have lasted many centuries and which continue to 
occur throughout the GCC's existence. 
 
5.3 An Overview of the GCC's Political Achievements 
 
5.3.1 The Iraq-Iran War and the Stability of the GCC 
 
According to the Secretariat General, the main political focus of the GCC was the 
stability and security of the GCC during the first decade of the GCC‟s existence in the 
1980s.27  The main threat facing the GCC was caused by the Iraq-Iran war.  In June 
1986, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister said “There has never been a meeting at which the 
Iran-Iraq war has not figured on the agenda.”28  Considering that Iran was posing a 
threat to the area even before the Iraq-Iran war started, McGovern states that when the 
Iranian revolution started, many observers thought that this revolution would extend to 
the entire Middle East.29  The threat of the war, according to the Secretariat General, 
required 'collective action' to avoid any extension of the war and to find solutions to end 
the war.30  This statement by the Secretariat General further explains what the previous 
chapter has already argued, that one purpose of establishing the GCC was to maintain 
the status quo, more than to change things.  It could be argued that many scenarios could 
                                                             
27 Al-Attiyah (2009), p. 13. 
28 Christie (1987), p. 17. 
29 McGovern (1987), p. ix. 
30 Secretariat General (2009), p. 13 
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have taken place if the GCC did not exist.  One scenario, some may argue, is that each 
of the fighting countries in the Gulf – namely, Iran and Iraq – would try to have some of 
the GCC countries on their side which could divide the area into two alliances.   
Another scenario is that several Gulf Countries could feel threatened and ask for 
international protection, which would bring a large number of international forces to the 
area.   
 
When the GCC was established, the Iraq-Iran war had already started.31  Starting from 
the first meeting of the GCC Supreme Council, this war was the main concern, and the 
GCC States made a great effort to end this war peacefully.32  In a conference of the Non-
Aligned States in 1983, GCC member states proposed a joint initiative that Iraq and Iran 
should call a cease-fire and the GCC countries would pay for both parties' compensation 
for the cost of the war,33  both parties would go back to their borders, and a UN peace-
keeping force would create a free area between the two countries.  Iraq agreed to this 
initiative but Iran refused it.34 
 
The Security Council issued Resolution 598 in 1987 which required the two parties to 
call a cease-fire.35 This resolution is under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which gives 
the Security Council the power to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace” 
and “to decide what measures shall be taken.”36  Resolution 598 required Iran and Iraq 
to discontinue their war, requested the Security-General to send a group of UN 
observers to oversee the cease-fire, and stated that the Security Council “recognizes the 
magnitude of the damage inflicted during the conflict and the need for reconstruction 
efforts, with appropriate international assistance.”37 
 
Alashal mentions that the GCC and its member countries put pressure on the Security 
Council to reach this solution, 38 but there is no direct evidence to support Alashal's 
                                                             
31 In the previous chapter, it was established that one motive behind establishing the GCC was the threat 
that this war posed to the area.  
32 Secretariat General (2009), p. 14. 
33 This point about GCC countries paying the cost of the war is raised by Alashal (1983) p. 202, but he 
has not specified his source. No other sources reviewed for this thesis have mentioned such a thing.  
34 Alashal (1983), p. 202. The Fourth Session of the Supreme Council (1983). 
35 Resolution 598, Security Council.   
36 Article 39, UN Charter.  
37 Point Number 7 of Security Council Resolution 598 (1987). 
38 Safiq, p. 254. 
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statement that the GCC was behind Security Council Resolution 598.  The UN states 
that Resolution 598 was adopted after extensive consultations, but does not specify with 
whom these consultations took place.  The GCC could have played a crucial role in 
pushing the Security Council to pass this resolution.  He could also be referring to the 
Supreme Council urging the Security Council to take responsibility in implementing its 
resolutions to stop the Iran-Iraq war – since Iran delayed in obeying the Security 
Council's Resolution – and any military aggression in the Gulf.39 
 
This thesis agrees with the Secretariat General and other commentators that the GCC 
did well in this issue, 40 perhaps because the member states had the same interest in 
avoiding the damaging consequences if the war continued and because member 
countries knew that they would not be able to achieve an effective response if they 
worked individually.  It can be noted that the GCC helped member countries to produce 
some vital initiatives on this issue and put effective pressure on the Security Council, 
because when individual action fails to achieve the desired outcome, international 
institutions could play a crucial role even in an anarchic world. 41  International 
institutions can exercise important power at least under specific circumstances,42  and it 
is demonstrated here in the way that the GCC dealt with the Iraq-Iran war, that this is 
one circumstance when an international institution can become powerful. 
 
5.3.2 The Settlement of the Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute 
 
Some GCC political achievements relate to wars that happened in the region such as the 
First and Second Gulf Wars while other political achievements refer to the prevention of 
wars or conflicts such as the Bahrain-Qatar dispute and Omani-Yemen dispute.  One of 
the biggest disputes between member countries was the border dispute between Bahrain 
and Qatar, especially about Hawar Island.  The dispute reached a point where Bahraini 
gunboats opened fire and some Bahrainis were taken prisoners for a short time by Qatari 
forces.43  The Council of Ministers expressed its regret over this dispute and its worry 
about the effect this dispute might have on the Gulf area; it also noted that this dispute 
                                                             
39 See the Supreme Council, Session 8 (1987). 
40 See Secretariat General (2009), p. 14; See for example, Shafiq, p. 255, and Alashal (1983), p 202.   
41 Krasner (1996), p.167.   
42 Robert, J. et al. (1996), p.166.  
43 The Estimate (2010) available on www.theestimate.com [Accessed on 25-11-2010]. 
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was not in accordance with the principles established in the GCC Charter. 44   The 
Council of Ministers stressed that the GCC has created the constitutional means for 
dispute settlement by creating the GCC Commission for the Settlement of Disputes.45  
However, this case shows that neither the Saudi mediation nor the Commission could 
resolve the problem; instead Bahrain and Qatar had to settle their dispute at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1991.  This case was too complicated to be settled 
by the Commission; as the ICJ mentioned, the case was the longest in the Court's history 
and the decision in Qatar v. Bahrain was very complex.46 
 
In 1991, Qatar raised the dispute against Bahrain in front of the International Court of 
Justice.  The dispute was mainly about “sovereignty over the Hawar islands, sovereign 
rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit‟ at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime 
areas of the two States.”47  Although the dispute was about many different lands, the 
main dispute was about the biggest island, namely Hawar.48  The ICJ gave Hawar Island 
to Bahrain, based on the 1939 report of Mr. H. Weightman, written as a response to 
Qatari claims over Hawar Island. After examining the parties‟ arguments and evidence, 
he reported:  
 
The Shaikh of Qatar has produced no evidence whatsoever. He relies solely on an 
uncorroborated assertion of sovereignty, on geographical propinquity and on the alleged 
statements of certain unidentified persons. On the Bahrain side there is evidence that the 
original occupation of Hawar by the Dawasir was effected under the authority of the Al 
Khalifah, that the Zellaq Dawasir have frequented these islands for a great number of 
years, that the courts established by the Shaikhs of Bahrain have promulgated decisions 
in regard to disputes over property there, that questions of ownership of fish tram have 
been submitted to the decision of the Bahrain Sharia Court, that seven years ago Bahrain 
processes were served in Hawar, that the boats owned by the Dawasir of Hawar are 
registered in Bahrain and that gypsum or juss is excavated from Hawar under licence 
from the Bahrain Government.  I am not able to stated definitely that these Dawasir 
have for the past 150 years occupied Hawar at all seasons of the year, though those now 
in residence there claim that this is so. On the other hand the cemeteries, the water 
cisterns, the ruins of the old fort which 1 have myself seen and the type of house in use 
all provide evidence of consistent occupation for at least the greater part of the year. 
And finally in the absence of any indication of occupation or of the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Shaikh of Qatar, the construction of a police post by the Bahrain 
Government there some 18 months ago, the building of a mosque in the northern village 
                                                             
44 The Ministers Council, 3, (1982). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma, ICJ, the Hague (2001) Qatar v. 
Bahrain.  Available on www.icj-cij.org, p. 114, Paragraph 8.   
47 See the introduction of the judgment ICJ, (16 March 2001), report of judgments, advisory opinion and 
orders case concerning maritime delimitation between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), p. 8. 
48 See Guo, (2007) p. 135. 
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under the orders of His Highness the Shaikh of Bahrain and the efforts made to drive an 
artesian well constitute, in the light of older history, a valid and proper assumption of 
constitutional authority on the part of the Bahrain Government. The small barren and 
uninhabited islands and rocky islets which form the complete Hawar group presumably 
fall to the authority of the Ruler establishing himself in the Hawar main island, 
particularly since marks have been erected on al1 of them by the Bahrain Government.49 
 
Although the GCC Secretariat General has not recorded the GCC's efforts in this case as 
a GCC achievement,50 this thesis agrees with the view that the GCC did well in ensuring 
that the dispute was resolved in a peaceful manner when seeking solutions. 51   For 
instance, in 1982, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution requesting Saudi Arabia 
to continue its mediation between Bahrain and Qatar. The resolution requested that the 
two countries register their agreement with the Secretariat General, that they freeze the 
dispute without taking any further aggressive action and that they stop media campaigns 
between the two countries and not increase the dispute, stressing the brotherhood 
between the two countries. 52  Also, military observers from the other four countries 
supervised Qatari and Bahraini activity in the disputed area.53 
 
However, the GCC's failure in this case was due to the fact that the Council of Ministers 
showed that it did not make the right assessment of the Commission for the Settlement 
of Disputes. They thought they had created the required body that would be able to 
resolve such a dispute by creating this commission, but even the ICJ itself found this 
case to be very complicated.54  If the judges in the ICJ, with all their experience in 
international dispute settlement, found this case difficult, surely the GCC Commission 
would find it impossible because the Commission members are not judges and have no 
experience.     
 
5.3.3 The Settlement of the Oman-Yemen Border Dispute 
 
There is little information about the 1975 border dispute between Oman and Yemen, 
perhaps because it was not very complicated.  There was a dispute because each country 
                                                             
49 ICJ, (16 March 2001), (Qatar v. Bahrain), Paragraph 128.  
50 See Secretariat General (2009). 
51 See, for example, Shafiq (1989), p. 251 and Alashal (1983), p 202.  
52 The Council of Ministers, 3 (1982). 
53 Peterson (1987), p. 194. 
54 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma, ICJ, the Hague (2001) Qatar v. 
Bahrain.  Available on www.icj-cij.org, p. 114, Paragraph 8.   
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claimed the sovereignty over lands located between the two countries.  It is, however, 
important as it is regarded by some as a GCC political achievement.55  Kuwait and the 
UAE were mediating between Oman and Yemen prior to the establishment of the GCC, 
and continued to do so afterwards, but as members of the GCC.56  The Supreme Council, 
though it does not deny that the effort was largely a Kuwaiti-Emirati one, states that the 
success of these efforts is practical proof that the GCC is very successful in maintaining 
peace in the area and supporting the brotherhood relations between all the countries in 
the Gulf. 57   The Supreme Council and others consider this effort to be a GCC 
achievement while the Secretariat General does not list this effort as a GCC 
achievement.58  It can be argued that in this case, it was clearly Kuwait and the UAE's 
efforts that resulted in solving the dispute as they started these efforts before the GCC 
came into existence and continued after becoming members of the GCC.  In fact, 
Kuwait and the UAE spent two years on this negotiation until the two countries agreed 
on settlement,59 it is therefore accurate as some may argue, to attribute this achievement 
to Kuwait and the UAE and not to the GCC.  
 
5.3.4 The Occupation of Kuwait 
 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was, according to the Secretariat 
General, the most serious and dangerous challenge that had ever faced the GCC since its 
establishment and Kuwait‟s freedom was the GCC‟s main focus during that period.60  
However, the occupation of Kuwait was not the only danger, as the Iraqi regime 
gathered its forces on the border of Saudi Arabia, posing more danger to the rest of the 
Gulf Countries.61  On the same day that the occupation happened, the UN Security 
Council declared Resolution 660, which states that, inter alia, the invasion of Kuwait 
was a breach of international peace and condemned the invasion, demanding that Iraq 
withdraw from Kuwait.  Four days later, on 6 August 1990, the Security Council 
declared Resolution 661, reaffirming the previous Resolution, determined to bring the 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait to an end.  On 9 August 1990, the Security Council declared 
                                                             
55 See the Supreme Council, 3 (1982).   
56 Shafiq (1986), p. 253.  
57 The Supreme Council, 3 (1982).   
58 See Algarni (1996), p. 145 and Shafiq (1986), p 252. 
59 Christie (1987), p. 14.  
60 Secretariat General (2009), pp. 13-14. 
61 See Resolution 195, the Arab League, (2010). 
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its third Resolution (662) reaffirming, inter alia, its two previous resolutions.62  On 9-10 
August, the Arab League held an extraordinary meeting – all the GCC member 
countries were present, including Kuwait – and declared Resolution 195 in which, inter 
alia, they condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.63 
 
 
GCC member countries turned to other international organisations, first to the Arab 
League in Cairo, then to the UN, while the GCC, as an institution, was ignored by its 
member states.  The GCC headquarters in Riyadh was left empty while GCC ministers 
were meeting in other international organisations.  After all these resolutions made by 
other international organisations, the Council of Ministers of the GCC held its regular 
meeting on 6 September 1990 in Jeddah and declared, inter alia, its support for the 
liberation of Kuwait and its condemnation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.64  It was 
not until 22-25 December 1990, when the Supreme Council held its regular meeting in 
Doha, that it declared, inter alia, that all GCC member countries had discussed the 
dangerous situation in the area caused by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait which posed a 
direct threat to member countries and which was causing the killing and displacement of 
Kuwaiti people.65  Moreover, the Supreme Council reiterated its strong condemnation of 
the Iraqi regime for its blatant aggression and brutal attack on Kuwait and its continued 
refusal to comply with the principles of the Charter of the Arab League, the decision of 
the Arab Summit Conference (No. 195), and the UN Charter and Security Council 
resolutions concerning its aggression against Kuwait.  The Supreme Council affirmed 
and supported absolute and full solidarity with the Kuwaiti Government and people in 
fighting until full liberation.  The Supreme Council then issued a statement demanding 
that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait before 15 January to avoid war, 66  referring to the 
Security Council Resolution 668 deadline.67 
 
                                                             
62 Resolutions 660-661-662, Security Council.  
63 Resolution 195 the Arab League. 
64 The Council of Ministers, 36, (1990) 
65 The Supreme Council,11 (1990)    
66 Ibid 
67 It was not the first time that GCC members ranked the GCC last as an organisation able to handle the 
regional issues that directly affect the member states.  For issues like the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) the 
GCC always based its statements on the decisions of other international organisations, mainly the Arab 
League and the UN.  See the closing statements of the Supreme Council (1984-1988). 
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That statement by the GCC Supreme Council, also confirmed that member countries 
were determined to stand up against Iraq‟s aggression and resist it on the basis that any 
attack against any member state is an attack on all member states, that the security of the 
GCC countries is indivisible and that the aggression on Kuwait was therefore regarded 
as an attack on all GCC countries.68  The UN addresses this type of pronouncement, 
where a group of states declare that any attack on one of them is regarded as an attack 
on all of them: according to the UN Charter, countries have a right, both individually 
and collectively, to self-defence.69 There is nothing in the UN Charter to prevent any 
region from making an agreement to keep the peace and secure the region.70 
 
The Secretariat General explains the achievement of the GCC in this way, stressing that 
member countries started to respond to the Iraqi occupation within a few hours.71  The 
GCC Secretariat General also explains that GCC members successfully held the Arab 
League Leaders Summit on 10 August 1990 and member countries significantly 
contributed to the efforts to pass all the Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq‟s 
occupation of Kuwait. 72   The Secretariat General proudly extols its success in 
responding to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait while the GCC response actually failed.  
Member countries responded quickly, but the GCC did not.  Neither council used its 
right to convene an extraordinary session; 73 instead they waited until their regularly 
scheduled session.74  Even if the GCC response had been acceptable, other international 
organisations were able to respond more quickly.  
 
The question arises as to who should be blamed for this slow response by the GCC to 
one of the most dangerous situations facing member countries.  The GCC‟s slow 
response reveals the important standard provided by international institution lawyers 
such as Avarez who states, as mentioned earlier, that one criterion which an 
international organisation must meet, is that it must prove that it can survive 
independently.75  However, the GCC‟s failure to respond in the right time is proof that it 
                                                             
68 The Supreme Council, 11 (1990)    
69 Article 51, UN Charter.  
70 Ibid, Article 52.  
71 Secretariat General (2009), pp.13-14.  
72 Ibid. 
73 For more details about extraordinary sessions, see Articles 7 & 11 of the GCC Charter.  
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is unable to exist independently.  It has been addressed throughout this thesis that the 
GCC has completely been controlled by the leaders of the member states and that the 
GCC is not given an acceptable level of independence in terms of making binding 
decisions, limited to being able take position on issues that directly affect GCC 
members.  
 
The other question is why GCC member countries rely on other organisations to pass 
their resolutions first, which they support and then ask the UN or the US to implement 
them, rather than holding a GCC meeting to loudly pronounce itself.  Even when the 
GCC was trying to threaten Iraq of the consequences of not withdrawing from Kuwait, 
the GCC based this order to Iraq on the UN resolution.  It is not clear why the GCC 
members would make all these efforts to pass resolutions from the Arab League and the 
UN before pronouncing the GCC decision on the matter.  Why would the member 
countries work hard, but let the GCC decision be minimised, following the decision of 
other international organisations, especially in matters that directly affect its member 
countries?  The answer could be that they were perhaps not worried about the GCC 
decision since they already knew what it was while they were not sure what other key 
international organisations would decide.  Or maybe they sought to move from the 
bigger circle to the more local one, starting from the UN as it is global, to the Arab 
League, which covers the Arab world.  The GCC would be at the inner most circle, as it 
covers only the six Gulf countries.  However, if member countries minimise the 
importance of the GCC, others will likely do so as well.76 
 
5.3.5 The UAE's Islands 
 
The Secretariat General states that one of the GCC's political achievements is its support 
for the UAE in trying to regain its right over its islands: Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb 
and Abu Musa.77  This thesis provides some facts to assess the support that the GCC has 
provided to the UAE in this regard.  The Emirati islands have been occupied by Iran 
since 1971,78 but it was not until the 13th Supreme Council regular meeting in 1992 that 
                                                             
 
77 Charney, J. (1985), pp. 35-37. 
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the GCC pronounced its support for the Emirati right over its occupied islands.79  The 
GCC remained silent over this occupation for about 10 years, but since 1992, the 
Supreme Council has regularly stated its support for the UAE's rights over its islands.  
The Secretariat General states that the Iranian occupation of the UAE islands since 1971 
has been a major factor that has hindered the improvement of GCC-Iran relations.80  It 
states, as well, that starting from 1992 the GCC has regularly pronounced its support for 
the Emirati right over its islands.81 Nevertheless, the Secretariat General has not given 
any reason why the GCC kept silent about this issue from its establishment in 1981 until 
1992.82  People in the Gulf have no right of access to any unpublished information, 
unlike the EU which gives the right to EU citizens to have access to the European 
Parliament, Council and Commission.83  Therefore, it is not clear why the GCC kept 
silent for the first ten years.  
 
The other question is why the GCC has kept declaring its support for the UAE's right 
over the islands.  Some may argue that the answer is that the Iranians are creating a 
situation whereby the islands are under their sovereignty.  If the GCC were not a 
persistent objector to this existing situation it could be regarded as implicitly being in 
agreement with the current situation.84  However, pronouncing support is not the only 
role the GCC has played.  The Secretariat General includes among the crucial steps that 
the GCC took over this matter the Council of Ministers Resolution of 3 July 1999 that 
formed a Ministers‟ Committee, including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and the 
Secretary-General of the GCC, to start negotiations with the Iranians.  However, Iran 
refused to receive that committee.85 
 
                                                             
79The Supreme Council, 13 (1992). 
80 See Secretariat General (2009), p. 18. 
81 Ibid, p. 17. 
82 In a meeting between the head of the Saudi Cultural Bureau in London and the author, his advice to the 
author was that one can access information that is already published, but there is no access to unpublished 
information until 30 years have passed.    
83 Article 42, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01)  
84 For more detail about the role of persistent objector see Charney, J. (1985), pp. 35-37. 
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5.3.6 Supporting Iraq 
 
Iraq‟s issues are discussed many times throughout this thesis: the First Gulf War (Iran-
Iraq), the Second Gulf War (International Forces - Iraq), the Third Gulf War (US & UK 
- Iraq).  However, in this part the discussion is about the GCC support to Iraq 
throughout these periods.  The GCC‟s role in supporting Iraq has gone through many 
stages.  First, at the time of the Iraq-Iran war, the GCC saw this war as a threat to the 
whole region and believed that if it did not stop, it would likely lead to international 
intervention in the region.86  From the onset, the GCC pushed and called for more efforts 
to stop this war, such as those by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and 
the UN.87  During the Iran-Iraq war, the GCC never claimed that any of its member 
countries faced any direct attack from Iraq but there was an attack from Iran.88  This was 
one of the reasons that the GCC countries were secretly supporting Iraq against Iran.  
Another reason was that Iraq has a closer relationship with the GCC countries because it 
is an Arab country governed by a Sunni government.89 However, the GCC countries did 
not declare their support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war but kept it secret until Iraq 
occupied Kuwait in 1990.  
 
The second stage was during the Second Gulf War, when the ally became an enemy, 
and the GCC supported Kuwait against Iraq.  All the GCC countries participated with 
forces in this war against Iraq and after the liberation of Kuwait, the GCC kept 
demanding that Iraq obey the UN resolution. 90  The GCC urged Iraq to effectively 
cooperate with the UN Commission on Kuwaiti Prisoners of War (POWs).91  The GCC 
insisted Iraq respect Kuwait‟s territory, security and independence and to demonstrate 
that Iraq had no intention of launching any other attacks on Kuwait.92 
 
                                                             
86 The closing statement of the first meeting of the Supreme Council (26 May 1981). 
87Ibid. 
88 See Security Council Resolution 552, 1 Jun 1984.   
89 The main two Muslim sects are Sunni and Shi‟ah.  
90 The Supreme Council, 21 (2000). 
91 Ibid. 
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The third stage was the Third Gulf War: in the few years before the Third Gulf War 
started, the GCC was very keen to prevent such a war and to prevent any suffering of 
the Iraqi people.93  The Supreme Council also called on the international community to 
work and do what they could to help both Iraq and UN inspectors finish the task as soon 
as possible to ensure the lifting of the embargo on Iraq, to end the suffering of its people 
and to return Iraq to the international community.94 When there were more signs that the 
war would be happening soon, the GCC explicitly pronounced its disagreement with the 
US led intervention in Iraq and its subsequent occupation.  The GCC stressed the 
importance of respecting Iraqi independence which meant that no international power 
should be allowed to intervene in Iraqi internal affairs.95  Kuwait pronounced its help to 
the US/UK occupation of Iraq in order to destroy Saddam Hussein‟s regime, while the 
rest of the GCC countries outwardly expressed support of Iraq, although many argue 
that they were also secretly supporting the US/UK forces.96 
 
After the war ended, the Secretariat General stated that GCC member countries 
expressed their support to the Iraqi people for the hard situation they were facing and it 
urged the Iraqi parties to form a united government.97 This government should represent 
Iraqi people and be stable enough to become an active member of the Arab and 
international communities.98  The GCC states participated in the conference of donor 
countries to help the Iraqi economy. 99  Moreover, the GCC expressed its worry and 
rejected all kinds of violence and terrorist activities that had been happening in Iraq.100  
The GCC respects Iraqi sovereignty and independence and rejects any attempt at 
division.101 
 
                                                             
93Ibid, 23 (2002). 
94 The Supreme Council, 23 (2002). 
95 Ibid, 22 (2001). 
96 See the speech of the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affair, Sheikh Hamad bin Jasem. (12 Jan 2007). 
Aljazeera TV.  
97 See Secretariat General (2009), p. 16. 
98 The Council of Ministers, 94, (13 March 2005). 
99 See Secretariat General (2009), p. 16. 
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5.3.7 The Palestinian Issue 
 
Since the first session of the Supreme Council in 1981 to its most recent session in 
2010, the Palestinian issue has always been mentioned. The GCC has, according to the 
Secretariat General, an obvious position on the Palestinian issue,102 which is that the 
stability in the Gulf requires an enforced peace process in Palestine and that there has to 
be a fair solution.  This fair solution, according to the Supreme Council, is to give 
Palestinian people their rights, especially their right to return to Palestine and to 
establish their country; and that Israel has to withdraw from all occupied Palestinian 
lands.103  This idea originated from Saudi Arabia, which proposed two initiatives to 
resolve the problem, one in 1981 and another in 2002.104 The GCC adopted the Saudi 
initiatives, 105  but they are nevertheless still known as the Saudi initiative, some 
specifying that it was the idea of King Fahad, the previous Saudi King.106 
 
Although there appears to be nothing written comparing the GCC to the Arab League, 
by tracing the function of the two organisations, it can be noted that with regards to the 
Palestinian issue, the Arab League is more active and effective than the GCC.  The Arab 
League has held many sessions simply to discuss the Palestinian issue,107 while in GCC 
sessions, the Palestinian issue is raised among other issues but there has been no session 
held specifically on the Palestinian matter apart from the Council of Ministers session 
No. 110 on 1 March 2009.108  This session of the Council of Ministers was about the 
reconstruction of Gaza after the significant Israeli attack on Gaza, during which member 
countries declared their donation to the people in Gaza of $1,646,000 USD.  It can be 
argued that this is because Palestine is a Member in the Arab League but not a member 
of the GCC and so the Palestinian issue is in the interest of all Arab countries and 
because GCC member countries do not want to appear as if they are separating 
themselves from the broader Arab world.  The last point is evidenced by the fact that 
Saudi King Abdullah declared a Saudi Arabian donation of $1 billion USD to rebuild 
                                                             
102 See Secretariat General (2009), p. 19. 
103 The Supreme Council,1 (May 1981).  
104 See Secretariat General (2009), p. 19. 
105 Shafiq, p. 253.  
106 See Christie (1987), p. 40. 
107 See, for instance, the Arab League session on 8 October 2009 and decision No.547.  
108 See the list of all the GCC sessions, on www.gcc-sg.org. 
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Gaza at the Arab Economic Summit on 19 January 2009.109  King Abdullah could have 
declared this Saudi donation at the GCC session, so it would have been considered a 
GCC matter, but instead he decided to declare it at the Arab Summit, under the umbrella 
of the Arab League.   
 
5.3.8 Supporting Syria 
 
Since it was established in 1981 the GCC has asserted its support for Syria's rights on its 
occupied land Golan and has called on Israel to withdraw from Golan back to the 1967 
line in accordance with the Madrid Conference that outlined the basic "land for peace" 
principle.110 Furthermore, the GCC has called on Israel to implement Security Council 
Resolution 242 which states that Israel should withdraw from the occupied land. 111  
More discussion about Syria is found in the last chapter of this thesis, in relation to the 
GCC response to the 2011 Syrian revolution.  
 
5.3.9 Supporting Lebanon 
 
Lebanon has been of concern to the GCC since its creation in 1981. 112   The GCC 
declared its members' concern over the sovereignty, independence and stability of 
Lebanon,113 has continued to support Lebanon politically and economically, and has 
condemned the Israeli attack on Lebanon.114  One of the main attacks against Lebanon 
was by Israel in July 2006, whereupon the Security Council issued its Resolution No. 
1701 calling for an immediate end to the Israeli military intervention in Lebanon.115  The 
GCC expressed its deep concern over and rejection of that war and welcomed this 
resolution.  Security Council Resolution No. 425 (1978) called on Israel to withdraw 
from Sheb'aa farms,116 and the GCC called on Israel to implement the Security Council 
resolution and withdraw from Sheb'aa farms.117 
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In May 2008, Lebanon's political parties could not form a government and Qatar called 
all Lebanese political parties to a dialogue conference in Doha.  The conference resulted 
in an agreement between the Lebanese parties, known as the "Doha Agreement."118  The 
Secretariat General agreed that this agreement was brought about by the effort of Sheikh 
Hamad Al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar.  This time the Secretariat General did claim this 
agreement as a GCC achievement, but only by stressing that Sheikh Hamad was the 
chairman of the GCC Supreme Council.119 
 
5.3.10 Conclusion 
 
This section has shown a range of what is regarded as the GCC's best political 
achievements.  It has highlighted the fact that some of these achievements are pushed to 
be covered by the GCC umbrella while they are not really GCC achievements but 
achievements of the member countries.  The section has also shown that the best GCC 
political functions have come when the matter has required a joint action.  In addition, 
when individual action is likely to succeed, the member countries will delegate the 
matter to one or more of the members.  It also underlines the fact that when member 
countries need to legitimise a matter, they will seek another international organisation, 
namely the UN.  Although the GCC has been trying to cooperate with Arab issues, it has 
been trying, as well, not to resonate more loudly than the Arab League.       
 
5.4 The Security Achievements of the GCC 
 
It is not surprising that the one crucial priority of the GCC has been the matter of 
security.120   This section aims to show that trying to achieve unity between countries is a 
remarkable undertaking and that it requires a long time of continued efforts.  McGovern 
states that trying to achieve close cooperation between countries is a huge and difficult 
project as the problems are usually undefeatable. 121   Peterson notes that there is a 
possibility of national security threats inside GCC member countries,122 but that since 
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such a threat is not obvious, it is very challenging as it is very tricky to defend against it.  
He believes that the internal society of the member countries does not support stability 
and that public order is endangered by a remarkable division in the internal society and 
the large immigrant populations.123 Early in 1987, Peterson noted that while the GCC 
mainly focused on external threats in its early years the threat was mainly internal.  
According to Peterson, two kinds of internal threats exist: divisions in the national 
society and the large immigration population.  The GCC countries do not face serious 
security trouble from the latter but from the former.  While he did specify what he 
meant by national division, his statement came true in February 2011 when Bahrain 
faced a serious intensification of threats because of the ideological division between 
Sunni and Shi‟ah.  The GCC responded in accordance with the GCC security agreement 
and sent some of the GCC forces (the Peninsula Shield Forces) to help the Bahraini 
Government keep Bahrain secure after the huge demonstrations by Bahraini people.124 
 
In the first year of the GCC's establishment, the security of member countries was a 
major concern of GCC leaders.  The Interior Ministers of member countries met in 
Riyadh (23-24 Feb 1982), the first of other similar meetings to follow.125  This meeting 
stated the aims and principles of security cooperation, and that the member countries 
aimed to sign a binding security agreement. 126   This meeting stated that "the GCC 
security is an integral whole, and any attack on any Member State means an attack on 
all other states, and the responsibility for confronting an attack on any Member State is a 
collective one" and that "the interference by any entity whatsoever in the internal affairs 
of any Member State means an interference in the internal affairs of all Member 
States."127  On 9 March 1982, the Interior Ministers held their third regular meeting in 
which they recommended that the member countries should sign a security agreement 
and that the Secretariat General should start drafting this agreement.  Another meeting 
was held in Riyadh on 17 Oct 1982 at which the Interior Ministers had requested the 
Supreme Council to continue studying a GCC security agreement. 128  The meetings 
regarding GCC security continued, with an annual meeting for the Interior Ministers as 
well as meetings of a committee including one for the Deputy Interior Ministers.  The 
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role of this committee was to prepare for the Interior Ministers' meetings.  The Security 
Agreement continued to be inactive until 2004 until some of the member countries 
ratified it.  More details are found below about further developments of this Security 
Agreement.129 
 
It can be noted that from the first years of the GCC's establishment, Saudi Arabia was 
interested in a security agreement while Kuwait was not.  There was an attempt to force 
an inclusive internal security agreement in 1982 but this agreement was not approved by 
the member countries.  Instead, bilateral security agreements were signed between Saudi 
Arabia and all the other member states apart from Kuwait.  Some argue that Kuwait did 
not sign a bilateral security agreement with Saudi Arabia so as to avoid Saudi influence 
in this respect.130  This section analyses the reason behind the Kuwaiti rejections of the 
Agreement. 
 
5.4.1 The Comprehensive Security Strategy 
 
The Supreme Council approved the Comprehensive Security Strategy in 1987, and this 
was adopted by the Interior Ministers at their meeting in Muscat on 15 Feb 1987.131  
This strategy is a broad structure for inclusive security cooperation; it summarises the 
main goals and the way for implementing them.132  It was updated in 2008 due to the 
Secretariat General‟s concern over growing transnational crime.133  In December 2008, 
the Supreme Council approved the proposal by the Interior Ministers for the amendment 
of the Comprehensive Security Strategy.134  It can be noted that the process of signing 
this strategy was a smooth one, perhaps because it was a general outline of security in 
member countries and not a binding agreement like the Security Agreement. 
 
                                                             
129 See the full text of this Agreement in Annex 1.  
130  Peterson (1987), p. 194.  
131 Supreme Council, 8 (1987). 
132 Secretariat General (2009), p. 33.  
133 Ibid. 
134 Supreme Council, 29 (2008). 
 
 
164 
 
 
5.4.2 The Security Agreement
135
 
 
According to its articles, this Agreement is a binding on any country that has signed and 
ratified it.  As mentioned earlier, the discussion about this agreement started from the 
first year of the GCC's establishment and perhaps member countries took a while before 
ratifying it because this agreement is binding.  It was not until 2004, in the Interior 
Ministers' 13th meeting, that the Interior Ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
and Oman signed the agreement.  The Supreme Council appreciated this achievement 
and stated that this agreement would strengthen existing cooperation and would achieve 
what the people of the member countries were looking for: to facilitate the movement of 
people and goods between member countries.136  In the next year (1995), the Supreme 
Council stressed the importance of security cooperation and the importance of bringing 
the Security Agreement into effect after it had been ratified by all the member 
countries.137  The Supreme Council was referring to Kuwait, as it was the one member 
country which had not ratified the Agreement. 
 
On 5 May 2010, in a regular meeting of the Interior Ministers, the Kuwaiti government 
stated that the Security Agreement, which Kuwait had not yet ratified, needed some 
amendments. The rest of the member countries did not reject the Kuwaiti proposal,138 
but there is no information yet as to what the Kuwaiti proposal was.  In this context, the 
GCC does not appear to be an influential institution in this matter.  It has been 
mentioned that the main purpose of establishing international institutions is to facilitate 
the process of making agreements between member countries.139  This thesis critiques 
the role of the GCC in facilitating agreements made between the member countries, 
taking into account that the security issue is one of the major concerns of the member 
countries.  The core issue regarding the GCC having an effective role relates to the 
nature of the ruling system of member countries.  These absolute monarchies are not 
willing to move quickly towards changing their ruling systems especially if that requires 
them to sacrifice some of their sovereignty.  This agreement was likely a huge pressure 
                                                             
135 This agreement can be found in the Annex.  
136 See Ibid,15, (1994).  
137 Supreme Council, 16 (1995). 
138Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, 11482 (6 May 2010). 
139 Beck, Arend, & Vander Lugt, Eds. (1996), p.166. 
 
 
165 
 
on Kuwait, as the GCC were pushing Kuwait to sign this Security Agreement but 
Kuwait refused for many years until the GCC accepted to make some amendments.   
 
In the same context, the member countries did better with regards to counter-terrorism 
cooperation.  In 2002, member countries adopted a security strategy for fighting 
terrorism-related radicalism and in 2004, member countries signed the GCC Counter-
Terrorism Agreement. 140   In addition, the GCC formed a Permanent Anti-Terrorism 
Committee in 2006,141 while the Supreme Council urged international cooperation in this 
regard.142  However, the Security Agreement was more controversial than this counter-
terrorism agreement. 
 
5.4.2.1 - Kuwait’s objections 
 
This chapter analyses that an implicit reason behind the Security Agreement was to 
protect the ruling systems in member countries to be strong enough to face internal and 
external challenges.  The preamble of this agreement states that the aim is "to defend the 
Islamic faith and idealistic views from destructive views and party activities."143  The 
first part of this article refers to a specific Islamic doctrine namely Al-Salafiyah.  The 
political Islamic view, according to the Al-Salafiyah perspective, advises that people 
have to obey their king or ruler and not challenge him by demonstrating.  Instead, any 
public rejections of the ruler‟s policy have to be presented to him directly.  One of the 
main leaders of this school in the Islamic world is the Saudi Council of Senior Islamic 
Scholars, declaring that demonstrations are prohibited in Saudi Arabia and warning that 
such political activities are likely to be linked to intellectual deviance influenced from a 
foreign political party.144 
 
The GCC Security Agreement requires member countries to take all the necessary 
actions in order to "prevent its citizens from interfering in the internal affairs of other 
member countries."145 In the Saudi official perspective, this means that every member 
                                                             
140 Secretariat General (2009),p. 35. 
141 Ibid p. 36. 
142 Supreme Council, 30 (2009). 
143 The GCC Security Agreement (1982). 
144 See AsharqAl-awsat Newspaper, 11787, 7 March 2011.  
145 Article 3, the GCC Security Agreement.  
 
 
166 
 
country has to prevent its citizen from doing any political activities such as 
demonstrating against any of the ruling regimes in other member countries.    
 
It has been mentioned in the Gulf media that Kuwait is rejecting some aspects of the 
GCC Security Agreement,146 but no specific information has been released about what 
these rejections are.147  Therefore, this part analyse the articles of the GCC Security 
Agreement in light of Kuwaiti Constitutional law in order to understand the Kuwaiti 
rejections. 
 
The Saudi position mentioned above limiting the public freedom to engage in political 
activities is not in line with the Kuwaiti Constitution.  The Kuwaiti Constitution gives 
people the right to initiate “private assembly without permission or prior notification, 
and the police may not attend such private meetings.” 148  Kuwaiti constitutional law 
states more precisely that “Public meetings, demonstrations, and gatherings are 
permitted in accordance with the conditions and manner specified by law, provided that 
their purpose and means are peaceful and not contrary to morals.”149 
 
However, Article Two of the Security Agreement states more specifically, "Abstaining 
from allowing the circulation or transfer of pamphlets, printed material or posters that 
are antagonistic to the Islamic faith or that harm morality, or those directed against the 
ruling regimes of the GCC member Countries." 150   It is worth mentioning that this 
agreement does not protect the rulers of the member countries personally but rather it 
protects the regimes in these countries, meaning that it is not legal to criticise the 
political system of these countries.  It has been mentioned that Kuwait is the most liberal 
country of the area and therefore the freedom in Kuwait can be regarded as the top level 
of freedom in the area, as evidenced by the Kuwaiti Constitution which gives more 
freedom to the Kuwaiti citizens than that given to the rest of the GCC countries.  
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Article 54 of the Kuwaiti Constitution states that the Amir is the head of Kuwait, and 
"his person is immune and inviolable,"151 which means that it is legal to criticise the 
government but not the Amir, while even other key members of the ruling family, such 
as the head of the Council of Ministers, do not have immunity against criticism.  The 
head of the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers Prince Nasser Al-Sobah has faced hard 
criticism during the last few years to his mismanagement of the government by the 
Kuwaiti press. 152   Some members of the Kuwaiti Parliament have criticised Prince 
Nasser for his unprofessional conduct in his position and asked the Government to 
withdraw trust.  The Amir then dissolved the government and, surprisingly, asked 
Prince Nasser himself to instruct the government again while all the criticism that the 
government had faced was about the work of Prince Nasser personally and not the 
government.153 
 
The Kuwaiti Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression as well as the 
freedom of press: Article 36 states that "Freedom of opinion and of scientific research is 
guaranteed. Every person has the right to express and propagate his opinion verbally, in 
writing, or otherwise, in accordance with the conditions and procedures specified by 
law."154  Also, Article 37 States that "Freedom of the press, printing, and publishing is 
guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and manner specified by law.”155  The 
GCC Security Agreement means that the people and the press in Kuwait who are free to 
publish their objections on the work of their own government are not free to publicly 
criticise the government of other GCC countries.  If the Kuwaiti Government signed up 
to the GCC Security Agreement as is, that would lead to a legal conflict between the 
Kuwaiti Constitution and the GCC Security Agreement. 
 
5.4.3 Facilitating the Movement of People and Goods 
 
This thesis argues that one of the practical and significant achievements of the GCC is 
facilitating the movement of people and goods between member countries.  This was 
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one of the main goals of the Interior Minister from when the GCC was first 
established,156 and now citizens can move between member countries without a passport, 
although they still have to carry their I.D. cards to cross the borders.157  In this respect 
the Interior Ministers have adopted several resolutions, as follows:158 allowing citizens 
to drive using their national driving licence in all member countries, allowing citizens to 
cross into any member countries in their own car or in a hired car, allowing taxis to pass 
into any member countries just to drop passengers but not to work in another member 
country and allowing freight cars to pass through any member country. 
 
Who is responsible for this achievement? One has to admit that the GCC has played a 
key role in achieving this.  However, the study of other GCC achievements reveals that 
the GCC is not that effective in facilitating cooperation among its member countries.  
With respect to the role of the GCC, this thesis argues that the similarity between 
member countries in economic, culture and even populations, are the same as many 
families and tribes are divided among these countries.  This plays a significant role in 
simplifying cooperation in this particular matter.  So, the GCC has actually not had 
much to do as the people and governments in these countries were willing to go ahead 
on these matters.   
 
5.4.4 Conclusion on security achievements 
 
This section shows that the different opinions about what the GCC should be, from the 
outset in 1981, may still be affecting decision-making in the GCC today.  There is more 
cooperation among member countries in other fields, though it is not the aim of this 
section to highlight every single one.  Rather, this section is an attempt to give a sense 
of what the GCC has been doing with regards to security cooperation.  
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5.5 GCC Economic Cooperation 
 
In 2011, the Secretary-General, Abd Al-Rahman Al-Atiyah proudly pronounced that the 
GCC is a key international economic block and that it survived the international 
economic recession.  He continues to state that in less than 30 years, the GCC became 
one of the most important economic blocks in the area and the world and is now able to 
control several key international markets especially the international oil market. 159  
Examining and analysing these achievements, this chapter supports this view that the 
GCC did well in terms of economic cooperation.  
 
The GCC Common Market is the best achievement of the GCC, as it is a quantum leap 
in the integration work of the GCC. 160   Economic cooperation started with the 
establishment of the GCC, then developed in four stages: the free trade area (1983), the 
customs union (2003), the common market (2007) and now, the development of a single 
currency.  Nowadays, there are many common markets in the world, such as the 
European Union (EU), 161  the Common Market of South American Countries 
(MERCOSUR), 162  the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), 163  the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) 164  and the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA).165  The GCC Common Market is less developed than the 
EU‟s but more developed than the rest of the world's common markets.166  The GCC 
Fundamental Statute set forth the basic economic goal, which is to achieve coordination, 
integration and harmonisation among member countries in order to achieve unity,167  but 
it did not set forth stages for achieving the desired unity.  In contrast, the European 
Economic Community (EEC)168 defined 12 years as the period of time for the common 
market to be set up.169 
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In the first session of the Supreme Council in 1981, the leaders of member countries 
declared that they recognised the inevitability of economic integration between their 
countries and the incorporation of their people in other member countries.170 The first 
action that the GCC took to set up economic cooperation was to create several 
committees: the Committee for Economic Planning, the Committee for Finance 
Cooperation, the Committee for Industrial Cooperation and the Oil Committee.171  These 
are consultation committees, composed of experienced ministers.  All the power these 
committees have is to give recommendations, which the Supreme Council has the power 
to adopt or to ignore.  If the Supreme Council decides to ignore the committees' 
recommendations, the Council is not legally required to give reasons as to why these 
recommendations are rejected;172 in other words, these committees are not effective, 
unlike the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).  
 
Although the EESC is a consultative committee, it represents 'civil society' at every 
level, and is the link between the people and the Union.173  Though each member of this 
committee is selected by their national government, they work in the committee 
independently from their national governments.174  In contrast to this, members of these 
GCC committees represent their own country, not the citizens, and have no 
independence from their national government.175  The head of the Federation of GCC 
Chambers of Commerce, Essam Phakhro, states that the Chambers have been trying to 
participate in the GCC committees for a long time, which would allow the private 
businesses in the GCC countries to share their opinions with these committees.176 
 
The EESC plays a compulsory role in the EU decision-making process and no 
legislation in the field of economics and social affairs can be adopted by the EU without 
being approved by the EESC.177  Moreover, it not only gives opinions at the request of 
EU bodies but can also initiate matters.178  The role of GCC committees, on the other 
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hand, is restricted to making non-binding recommendations and only at the request of 
the Supreme or Ministers Councils.179 
 
5.5.1 The 1981 Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) and the 2001 Economic 
Agreement (EA) 
 
There are two main economic agreements: the UEA, established in 1981 and the EA, 
established in 2001.  As might be expected, the EA is a development of the UEA.  In 
this section there is an unavoidable overlap in the discussion of these two agreements, as 
they overlap in their provisions.  First, on 11 November 1981, in the first year of the 
GCC's existence, the Supreme Council adopted the first economic agreement.  This 
section will show how the GCC had no clear view about where it should contribute to 
the existing cooperation among the member countries.  This section answers the 
question about whether it is a binding agreement and then traces the development of this 
GCC economic cooperation, including the Free Trade Area and the Customs Union 
Common Market. 
 
5.5.1.1 Are the Economic Agreements Binding Agreements? 
 
At the time of ratifying the first agreement, the GCC was in its first year.  As a new 
institution, there was no clear expectation of its ability to lead its member countries to 
adopt a comprehensive economic agreement.  This agreement was based on the thought 
that the member countries would sacrifice some of their sovereignty to the GCC.  
Article 26 of this agreement states, “This agreement enters into force four months after 
its approval by the Supreme Council.”180  Clearly, this Article means that the agreement 
is binding by reason of its adoption by the Supreme Council, without mentioning that 
there is a need for ratification from the member countries, which each country does 
according to its internal laws.  
 
There was only about six months between the establishment of the GCC and the first 
economic agreement, therefore, it is possible that the leaders of the member countries 
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did not accurately evaluate the power of the Supreme Council, thinking that its adoption 
of the agreement would be enough to render an agreement enforceable without 
ratification by each member country.  However, tracing all the agreements that member 
countries have ratified under the umbrella of the GCC reveals that no other agreement 
states that its power of enforcement is based only on its adoption by the Supreme 
Council.  Even the second economic agreement based its enforcement on its adoption by 
all the member countries, and not on that of the Supreme Council alone.181  The Second 
Economic Agreement mentions in its preamble that it does not come into force until all 
member countries have ratified it and that the member countries should do what is 
necessary in order to ratify it.182 
 
5.5.1.2 Free Trade Area (1983) 
 
There are three stages for achieving complete economic cooperation and the free trade 
area is the first step followed by the Customs Union then by the Common Market.183  
The Free Trade Area set up by the UEA (1981) was initiated by the Ministers of Finance 
and Economy of the member countries in Riyadh, on 8 June 1981. 184   Then on 1 
November 1981 in Taif, Saudi Arabia, the Council of Ministers ratified the Economic 
Agreement and decided to report it to the Supreme Council.185  On 10 November 1981, 
the Supreme Council adopted the Unified Economic Agreement in Riyadh. 186   This 
agreement allows all member countries to import and export all national products from 
each other, treating those from other member countries as their own products.  Products 
to be regarded as national have to have no less than 40% national value added of their 
final value.  In addition, the ownership of these factories or the companies producing 
these products has to be shared by citizens from member states who make up no less 
than 51% of its ownership.  The member countries should apply a uniform customs 
tariff to all products from non-member countries, with the aim of protecting national 
products.  As this uniformity in a customs tariff needed some time to be agreed and 
applied by member countries, this agreement allowed member countries to implement 
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the uniform customs tariff within five years, provided that all member countries allow 
the passing of any product from one member country to another member country 
(transit) without any charges or taxes.  It also called for member countries to coordinate 
their policies and relationship with other countries and economic groups in order to 
form a single voice so as to have a comparable strength to other economic groups.  In 
order to achieve this, members countries should, as the agreement states, coordinate 
their import and export polices, building strategic food stocks.  When the member 
countries have done that, they will be able to create joint economic agreements with 
non-member countries when there are joint benefits. The agreement adds that member 
countries should work to create a bargaining power to be able to face challenges from 
foreign parties.187 
 
Furthermore, it states that each member country should gradually work to grant citizens 
from other member countries the right to be treated the same as their own citizens.  This 
equal treatment of citizens should be in four fields: freedom of movement, working and 
living, freedom of ownership, freedom of trading and freedom of capital movement.  
The member countries should encourage private businesses to establish joint businesses.  
Member countries should coordinate their oil policies and form a unified attitude vis-à-
vis non-member countries and international organisations.  Moreover, they should 
coordinate their industrial activities and allocate their manufacturing in integral ways.  
They should also focus on establishing joint projects.188 
 
Though this agreement was ratified in 1981, it did not come into force until 1983.189  In 
1985 the Supreme Council discussed extending the economic activities that citizens 
from all member countries could perform.190  In 1986, the Supreme Council decided to 
allow citizen investors in the Gulf countries to have equal rights in receiving loans from 
the Industrial Development Banks in all member countries that give loans without any 
interest.  In addition, it decided to allow GCC citizens to practice retail and wholesale 
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trades in any member states on an equal basis with national citizens,191 and in 1988, the 
GCC allowed citizens to own shares in joint stock companies.192 
 
5.5.1.3 Customs Union (2003) 
 
The UEA (1981) allows the national products of member countries to move between 
these countries without any customs,193 but that was not enough to create a customs 
union.  Therefore, the EA (2001) regulates the Customs Union, stating that trade 
exchange between member countries is subject to a unified customs union.  This 
agreement gives the member countries two years to prepare what is required to 
implement the customs union.  The member countries did not meet the deadline set forth 
by the UEA (1981) which was five years from the date of the agreement; in other words, 
1986.  Therefore, the EA (2001) set a new deadline for applying the customs union, 
which was 1 January 2003.194  The Saudi Finance Minister stated that GCC member 
states spent 10 years negotiating a uniform customs tariff. 195  The Supreme Council 
believed that the GCC countries had taken a long time to adopt the Customs Union.196  
Clearly, this delay in adopting the customs union reveals the divisions between member 
countries' views about economic cooperation.  
 
After this long process, on 1 January 2003, GCC members states adopted a common 
external customs tariff, which was agreed to be 5%, with a single entry point and a 
uniform single procedure for importing and exporting; in other words, the geographical 
territory of the six member States was to be treated as a single customs territory. 197  I 
have observed the territorial borders between the GCC States and those between the EU 
States, and noticed that those between GCC states vary in their procedures, like those 
between some of the EU states where people are stopped to have their passports checked 
before they are allowed to pass, unlike other territories between other EU states where 
people pass without having their passports being checked if they were EU citizens or 
Shengen visa holders. 
                                                             
191 The Supreme Council, Session seven (5 Nov 1986).  
192 Ibid, Session nine (22 Dec 1988). 
193 Article 3, the UEA (1981).  
194 Article 1, the EA (2001).  
195 Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Saudi Minister of Finance, Alaswag Alarbiah (3 Jan 2005). 
196 The Supreme Council (2001), Session 22.   
197 See GCC Process and Achievements (2009), p 65.  
 
 
175 
 
 
A single entry point, where customs duties are collected, is a crucial element of creating 
a customs union.198  A single entry point means that any land or maritime port of any 
GCC country is regarded as a port for the whole area of the customs union.199  In other 
words, any products entering through any port of all the GCC countries has the right to 
move anywhere within the GCC countries without paying customs duty other than at the 
first port.  The GCC Unified Custom collects all the customs and then distributes them 
to the member countries according to the final destination of the products.200 
 
5.5.1.4 Common Market (2008) 
 
In 2002, the Supreme Council decided that GCC member countries would establish the 
Common Market on 1 Jan 2008,201 and on 4 December 2007, the GCC declared the 
establishment of the Common Market on 1 January 2008, known as the Al-Doha 
Declaration.202  According to this declaration, each member country grants the citizens 
of the other member countries the same treatment as they give to their national citizens 
in the following fields: practicing all kinds of businesses and investments, working in 
governmental and non-governmental jobs, working in all professions and crafts, access 
to all social services, education, health, etc…, owning stock and real estate, capital 
movement and tax treatment.203 
 
The application of this agreement is the individual duty of each member state according 
to its internal laws.204  All member countries nominate a coordinator to help citizens 
from the member countries by providing them with all the information they may need 
about their rights in the Common Market.205 
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5.5.1.5 Single Currency 
 
Four GCC member states have signed the Single Currency Agreement (2009): Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  The GCC member countries are now about to 
establish the GCC Central Bank.  For the first time, they are about to sacrifice some of 
their sovereignty.   The creation of a single currency requires the creation of a central 
bank, which needs some independence in order to be able to function.  The GCC Single 
Currency Agreement states that governments are prohibited from instructing either the 
GCC Central Bank or their National Central Banks.206  It is clear that the reason behind 
this order is to keep the GCC Central Bank independent from the government of 
member countries, which is why some may argue that this is the reason why the UAE 
and Oman refused to join the single currency.  According to media reports, it is said that 
the UAE refused to join the single currency because some member countries refused to 
allow the Central Bank to have its headquarters in Abu-Dhabi but did allow it to be in 
Riyadh.207  Hamzah states that the UAE should not join the single currency because it 
has different financial agendas and does not want to lose its complete sovereignty over 
its own currency.  He believes that it is better for the rest of the member countries that 
the UAE refuses to join, because the UAE has huge international loans, which mean its 
economy is in danger of collapsing.208 
 
5.5.1.6 Strengthening the Negotiation Power 
 
Pascal Lamy, the Director General of the World Trade Organization, recommends that 
the GCC countries should move away from internal disagreements about the single 
currency and the headquarters of their Central Bank, though these are important issues, 
and focus on working together in a unified and collective effort to appear as a single 
body in international forums like the WTO.209  He believes that GCC member countries 
cannot yet unite under the GCC as a single body.  However, GCC member countries are 
recognising the importance of uniform collective positions in dealing with the outside 
world but have taken no effective means to reach this goal.  
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GCC leaders stress that strengthening their negotiating power is actually an important 
goal that led to the creating of the GCC.210  The 1981 UEA asserts that member states 
should create a joint negotiation power for their negotiation powers to have a stronger 
position in relation to other countries or organisations in the field of importing and 
exporting basic needs.211  Regarding oil policy, the UEA asserts that member countries 
should try to establish a united policy and to formulate their position so that they have a 
single position vis-à-vis third countries or organisations in all oil-related decisions, 
marketing, prices, etc…212  Regarding the transfer of technology, the UEA stresses that 
member states should try to unify their agreements with third countries or organisations 
as much as possible.213  The 2001 EA confirms that member states need to achieve more 
integration in order to have a stronger negotiation power which will make them more 
able to compete in international markets.214 The EA states that member countries will 
not gain a better position with foreign international powers until they join and unify 
their economic international relations in dealing with third countries or international 
bodies.215  The EA confirms that the UEA in laying down key actions that member 
countries should take: to strengthen their negotiation position through collective 
negotiation, for their economic agreements with foreign partners to be collective 
agreements, and to have a joint trade policy with foreign economic powers.216 
 
Having traced the GCC perspective on negotiation power, it is clear that this matter is a 
crucial goal that member countries are working to achieve through the GCC.  It is a goal 
of the European Union (UE) as well, but their perspective and, as a result, the process to 
achieve this “stronger negotiation power,” at the international level is different.  As the 
previous paragraph shows, the GCC's methods for achieving a stronger negotiation 
power is through urging and instructing member countries to act collectively with the 
outside world.  It can be noted that the GCC has been working to create a norm that 
states that “the GCC member countries should work collectively” among its each other. 
Tracing GCC activities shows that the GCC means to create this norm through gathering 
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member countries in regular meetings at all levels, such as the meetings of the Supreme 
Council, the Councils of Ministers, and the Commissions.  It can be observed that these 
GCC bodies are searching for the best mutually acceptable way for cooperation, 
integration and coordination but without encroaching on the sovereignty of the member 
countries.  These bodies are collectively producing decisions, recommendations and 
statements, and creating laws and agreements.  It seems that all the GCC bodies have 
mechanisms for producing collective work.  Through such processes, it seems that the 
GCC is working to create a norm by which “GCC members are unified when they deal 
with the outside world.”217 
 
Having highlighted what the GCC is doing, it is now time to focus on what the GCC is 
not doing. The GCC leaders are preventing any chances of GCC bodies becoming 
independent.  The government of member countries dominate all GCC bodies so, in 
other words, any law or agreement produced within any GCC body is not valid even if 
the heads of the member countries have ratified it, until it has been ratified by every 
single member country according to its internal laws.  The EU has a different 
perspective on the strengthening of negotiation power; namely, that it can be achieved 
by giving the Union more independence and by each EU country giving up more of its 
sovereignty for the Union to create a stronger legal personality.  A single legal 
personality for the Union will strengthen the Union's negotiating power, making it more 
effective on the world stage and a more visible partner for third countries and 
international organisations.218 
 
This difference in perspective explains the halt in economic negotiations between the EU 
and the GCC.219  While EU members gave the EU a high level of independence, the GCC 
does not enjoy this privilege, which makes the EU a better organisation.  Also, this GCC 
perspective of collective negotiation explains why the US refused to have economic 
negotiations with the GCC but preferred to deal with each member state individually, as 
they did with Bahrain in 2004, which led Bahrain to breach the second GCC Economic 
Agreement.  
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5.5.1.7 Bilateral Agreements 
 
According to Article 28 of the UEA (1981), the UEA has priority in application over all 
bilateral agreements existing between member countries.  The EA (2001) has the same 
priority over the UEA and any bilateral agreement between member states. 220   This 
means that any bilateral treaty is still valid as long as it does not conflict with this 
agreement.  This provision is in line with Article 30-3 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties which states that "When all parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to 
the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended ..., the earlier treaty 
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later 
treaty."221 
 
5.5.1.8 Treaties with Third Countries 
 
It is possible that a dispute may arise about the GCC economic agreements with regards 
to bilateral treaties between any GCC member states and a third country.  The UEA 
states that member countries should not grant any bigger privilege to any country or 
blocs than that granted in this agreement to the member countries.222  Moreover, the EA 
(2001) states that member states should not grant any non-member body or country any 
better treatment than that agreed by member states to have between themselves.  
Furthermore, no member states should conclude an agreement that breaches the 
provision of this one.223  Both agreements prevent the member states from concluding 
agreements outside the GCC that are not in line with the UEA and EA, however, if a 
member country signs a bilateral agreement with a third country, it would have priority 
over the EA.  When the parties to the latter treaty do not include all the parties to the 
earlier one – as between a state party to both treaties and a state party to only one of the 
treaties – the treaty to which both states are party to governs their mutual rights and 
obligations. 224  Therefore the Bahrain-US agreement, analysed below, has priority in 
application over the GCC Economic Agreement. 
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5.5.1.9 The Bahraini Brokering of the Gulf Economic Agreement 
 
In 2004, Bahrain broke the EA by signing a bilateral economic agreement with the US 
which imposed a customs tariff of less than 5%, ignoring the GCC economic agreement 
which states that the customs tariff on products from outside GCC countries is 5% and 
that no single member can sign a bilateral economic agreement without having 
permission from the rest of the member states. 225  Tracing the Secretariat General's 
statements shows that it is the only time that it has declared that a member country has 
breached a GCC law.  The Secretariat General has declared that the Bahrain-US 
agreement to be an obvious breach of the EA and it will badly affect the ongoing 
economic integration among the member countries.226 
 
According to the Secretariat General, the Bahrain-US agreement gives US products 
better customs exemptions that those set forth in the GCC Common Customs Tariff.  
The Secretariat General highlights that the Bahrain-US agreement is inconsistent with 
the requirements of the customs union established by the Supreme Council, especially 
the Common Customs Tariff and the single entry point, and obstructs the flow of goods 
in the Customs Union.  In addition, the Bahrain-US agreement is incompatible with the 
negotiating strategy adopted by the Supreme Council, which affirms the need for 
collective negotiation with non-member countries. 227 
 
This statement by the Secretariat General was the main reaction to this Bahraini breach.  
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has declared, through the Saudi Minister of Finance that the 
rejection of the Bahrain-US agreement is not a Saudi-Bahraini dispute; rather, the 
Bahrain-US agreement is a clash with the EA and GCC decisions.  This declaration by 
the Saudi Minister came as a response to what was referred to in the media as the Saudi-
Bahraini dispute. 228   However, tracing the newspapers at that time reveals that the 
rejection came only from Saudi Arabia which is not surprising as Saudi Arabia is the 
only country that shares a land border with Bahrain through the Sea Bridge, making it 
very easy to import and export goods between the two countries.  Some Saudi officers 
have declared that Saudi Arabia may take legal action in response to any member 
                                                             
225 Article 31, the EA (2001).  
226Asharq Al-Awsat Newspapers, 9534, 4 January 2005. 
227 See the GCC news, 12 June 2005. Available on www.gcc. 
228 Ibid 
 
 
181 
 
country that signs a bilateral agreement. 229   Another Saudi response was by 
Abdurrahman Alzamil, the Head of the Saudi Export Development Centre, who 
suggested that Saudi Arabia should impose customs on products coming from any GCC 
member country that signs a bilateral agreement with a non-member country.  He added 
that any bilateral agreement with a non-member country would in fact be valid if it 
agreed to impose no less than a 5% customs tariff.230 
 
The Saudi Finance Minister asserted that Saudi Arabia has not asked Bahrain to cancel 
its agreement with the US or with any other country; instead, Saudi Arabia encourages 
GCC countries to create free trade agreements with the US and others but in a joint 
agreement with all the member countries, not through a bilateral agreement.  It is one of 
the basic rules of a customs union, he continues, that there has to be a single customs 
tariff on products from any foreign country.  The GCC member states spent 10 years 
negotiating a uniform customs tariff, and if signing a bilateral agreement with foreign 
countries involving customs exemption does not conflict with the GCC uniform customs 
tariff, there would not have been any need for these ten years of negotiation between the 
GCC member countries231.   
 
The Bahraini Manager of Economic Planning declared that Bahrain had not faced 
pressure neither from member countries nor from the GCC regarding the matter of the 
Bahrain-US agreement.232  In addition, in response to the Secretariat General statement, a 
Bahraini official declared that five of the member countries regard the Bahrain-US 
agreement as an exemption, as the US refused to negotiate with the GCC member 
countries collectively.233  The Bahrain News Agency (BNA) states that the Bahrain-US 
agreement serves GCC-US relationships as it forms a good step towards signing a GCC-
US free trade agreement.234  The GCC countries were collectively trying to sign a free 
trade agreement with the US since 1985 but they did not succeed, which led the US to 
reject collective negotiation and to attempt to negotiate with each country individually.  
The GCC countries agreed and the BNA continued to negotiate with the US 
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individually.  Oman was the second country to sign an economic agreement with the US, 
in 2006.235  The BNA states that all GCC member countries are members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and as a result, they adhere to the requirements of 
international free trade.  The BNA goes on to say that Bahrain was the first country to 
apply the GCC Customs Union before the due date of its application in 2003.236 
 
This Bahraini action and the following response reveal that there is division between 
GCC members on the principle of “collective work,” whether it is a goal itself or a 
means for achieving goals.  It seems that, from the Saudi Arabian point of view, 
“collective work” is a goal itself as evidenced by the previously mentioned speech of the 
Saudi Finance Minster.  He states that Saudi Arabia encouraged signing a free trade 
agreement with the US but in a collective way between all member countries, not 
individually.237  On the other hand, Bahrain seems to view the principle of “collective 
work” as a means to achieving goals but not a goal in and of itself.  As long as it is the 
goal of the GCC to achieve a free trade agreement with the US, it is fairly the same to 
achieve that individually if member countries cannot achieve it jointly.  So, when 
Bahrain signed the agreement with the US, it was not turning its back on the rest of the 
GCC member countries; rather, it viewed the agreement with the US as not just a 
Bahraini goal but also a GCC goal.238 
 
5.5.1.10  The EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement 
 
The GCC is the EU‟s fifth chief export market while the EU is the first trade associate 
for the GCC countries.239  The relationship between the EU and the GCC first started in 
1988 when the two organisations signed a Cooperation Agreement.240  The general aims 
of this agreement were “to contribute towards strengthening stability in a region of 
strategic importance and to facilitate political, trade and economic relations.”241  This 
agreement included commitment from the two organisations to enter into negotiation to 
pave the path for ratifying a suggested free trade agreement.  So, the main goal for the 
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1988 Agreement was to set the ground for negotiation between the two blocks in order 
to conclude a free trade agreement.   
After the ratification of the 1988 Agreement, the two blocs began negotiations but these 
were suspended in 1990 and restarted in 2002, but then suspended again, by the GCC, in 
2010.242  The EU and the GCC have not yet succeeded in agreeing the Free Trade 
Agreement even though they have been negotiating for more than 20 years.  The 
obstacles to authorisation of the suggested Free Trade Agreement are of two kinds.  
First, some elements related to systemising the trade between the two blocks.  One main 
issue was that the EU asked the GCC members to have custom union.243  The GCC 
members achieved the custom union in 2003, an achievement that push the negotiation 
between the two blocks many steps ahead.244  Yet, some issues related to the exports 
duties are still subject to debates.245      
Second, the EU have some concerns about the human right situations in the GCC 
countries, whilst on the other hand, from the GCC‟s perspective, the proposed 
Agreement contains elements which interfere with the internal affairs of GCC countries 
and go against their sovereignty.246  The main example is an article in the suggested Free 
Trade Agreement which states that if human right violations occur in a member country 
signatory to the Agreement, it is permissible for other member countries to raise the 
issue before the Security Council.247 
Recently, it seems that the GCC countries have been paying more attention to human 
rights issues, as evidenced by the recent announcements by the EU which revels some 
satisfaction with human rights developments in the GCC countries.  For example, the 
Joint Declaration in 2011 mentioned that the EU and the GCC “agreed to identify 
possible ways to forge cooperation in [the area of human rights]”.248  Although the Free 
Trade Agreement has not yet been ratified, the Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sheikh Khalid Al-Khalifah, in a joint press conference with Catherine Ashton High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-president of the 
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EU, stated that he believes the two blocks have agreed on 99% of the suggested 
agreement and that very soon the agreement will be ratified.249   
                   
5.5.2 Conclusion on economic cooperation 
Although there were many reasons that delayed the GCC push for economic cooperation 
from the time  it was established until now, the GCC has now achieved a high level of 
economic cooperation.  The Bahrain-US trade agreement (2004), in the view of Saudi 
Arabia, was a breach of the GCC‟s EA which negatively affected economic 
cooperation, 250  while the Bahraini view was much more positive. 251   However, this 
chapter has argued that the real problem here is that there is no independent authority to 
decide whether the Bahrain-US agreement is good or bad for the GCC.     
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has evaluated the achievements in the main fields of politics, security and 
economics that the Secretariat General has publicly declared.  In terms of the political 
achievements, it cannot be denied that the GCC has played a key role in resolving 
several political disputes.  These include the GCC role in putting an end to the Iran-Iraq 
war, supporting many Arab countries, the issue of UAE‟s islands and helping the 
government and people of Kuwait at the time of the Iraqi occupation.  Sometimes it 
failed in solving some political disputes, mainly the Bahrain-Qatar border dispute.    
However, this chapter has revealed that the existence of the GCC has not had a massive 
influence on the political attitudes of member countries because many of these attitudes 
already existed in the member countries before the existence of the GCC. 252   This 
chapter has agreed that the GCC is a good dialogue body, which aims the attitudes of 
the member countries appear united as a single attitude, yet there does not appear to be 
any independent affection on the attitudes of the member states.    
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In term of the security achievements, particularly significant was the creation by the 
GCC of the Security Agreement.  This agreement states that the security of any GCC 
members is the common concern of all the members.  It also was the legal basisfor the 
GCC‟s military assistance to the government of Bahrain (2011), as will be highlighted 
in the last chapter of this thesis.  However, this chapter has also demonstrated that the 
GCC failed to achieve one of the main goals, that the GCC was created to achieve, 
which is to make the Gulf reign secure without the need of western military bases.253   
    
In terms of economic achievements, the GCC is now a key international economic 
block, which is a significant achievement.  The GCC has developed economic 
cooperation in four stages: the free trade area (1983), the customs union (2003), the 
common market (2007) and now, the development of a single currency,  It is fair to say 
that the GCC Common Market is less developed than the EU‟s but more developed than 
other common markets across the globe.254  This chapter has argued that, although the 
GCC has failed to conclude a free trade agreement with the EU in the last 20 years, the 
negotiations with the EU have helped the GCC towards its goal of  achieving a customs 
union and common market.   
  
This chapter has furthermore revealed that there is sometimes confusion between the 
achievements of the GCC as an international organisation and the achievements of 
member countries.  This is problematic because the leaders of the GCC have to declare 
when and why they have succeeded or failed, but with greater clarity the needed 
development and changes would be understood and the path for success should be 
brighter.  It is submitted that this is key to understanding the limits of its achievements 
to date and to speculating on its future role.  This chapterhas further argued that it is not 
beneficial to the GCC to always focus on its successes and positive achievements, and 
that there is a problem with the lack of powers given to the GCC by Member States.  
Having examined, evaluated and discussed the GCC achievements, the next chapter 
explores the GCC as law-maker, between hard and soft law. 
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Chapter six – The GCC Law-Making Process 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter argues that while the GCC is not able to create any hard, binding law, it is 
nonetheless able to create soft law, an ability that has given the GCC an important role 
in the law making system of member countries.  It affects the process of the law making 
system between member countries as well as national laws of member countries.  In the 
first case, the GCC is able to create treaties, decisions, and resolutions, and make 
announcements which are sometimes the first step in creating a new law.  In the second, 
one of the main GCC functions is to harmonise national laws of member countries to 
achieve consistent regulation in all member countries.
1
 
The GCC is a key feature in creating the majority of agreements between its member 
countries, of which the GCC Economic Agreement and the Security Agreement are 
main examples.  One of the GCC objectives mentioned in the Charter is to work towards 
creating similar laws in various fields.
2
  The GCC has helped its member states in 
drafting common laws to achieve similarity among them in the legislative coordination 
between judicial and legal bodies.
3
  Many common laws were created by the GCC and 
then adopted in the national laws of each member country with their full will and 
without any enforcement by the GCC upon them.   
The GCC has been affecting the national laws of its member countries in two main 
ways.  First, it creates model or reference laws, which are adopted by the Supreme 
Council as reference laws so the member countries keep it in mind when developing 
their laws and try as much as they can to adopt these reference laws as their own 
national laws.  Second, the GCC sometimes transforms a model law into a binding law, 
which is then adopted by the Supreme Council – not as a reference law but as a binding 
law, which the member countries are asked to adopt as part of their national laws.    
This thesis is generally about international law, which is why this chapter is crucial.  It 
explores and analyses how the GCC produces laws and the nature of these rules.  Such 
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analysis needs the theoretical ground to build on; therefore, this chapter follows from 
chapter two which exposes the legal theory that is capable of determining exactly what 
is law, namely legal positivism.  Hart developed a theory, stating that a legal system has 
to have two kinds of rules: primary rules which set what individuals have or do not have 
to do, and secondary rules which consists of three elements: rules of recognition, rules 
of change and rule of adjudication.
4
  This theory was further developed by Abbott et al.
5
  
This theory states that legal rules are measured based on three elements: obligation, 
delegation and precision, in order to classify them accordingly between hard and soft 
law.
6
  This provided a way to analyse the importance of international organisation in 
creating law.   
 
6.2 The Important Role of International Organisations in Creating 
Law 
For a better analysis of the role of the GCC as a lawmaker, this chapter provides a brief 
examination of the general role of international organisations as lawmakers.  By 
creating laws, international organisations play a significant role because they are 
creating and changing international law.
7
  As Alvarez emphasises, "A large portion of 
the rules that we have to govern nations, both those that are formally legally binding and 
those that are not, are now initiated, formulated, negotiated, interpreted and often 
implemented through the efforts of international organisations."
8
 
International organisations have changed international law in two ways: „substantially‟ 
and „structurally.‟9  Firstly, international organisations have made a substantial change 
to international law by limiting the territorial jurisdiction of states.  States are now 
handing over some issues that used to be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the states 
to international organisations.  Issues like human rights, the protection of the 
environment, international trade and so on are now not only governed by states but also 
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extremely influenced by international organisations like the UN, the EU, the World 
Trade Organization, the Human Rights Council and other international organisations.
10
 
The notion of „state sovereignty‟ clarifies the substantial difference between national 
law and international law.
11
  Max Huber has traditionally identified state sovereignty as 
“Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies independence.  Independence in 
regard to portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other state, the functions of a state.”12  However, since about 1945, the practice of 
international organisations has changed the meaning of state sovereignty, from an 
absolute, traditional meaning towards a relative meaning.
13
  Contemporary state 
sovereignty can be characterised as “basic international legal status of a state that is not 
subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental, executive, legislative or 
judicial jurisdiction of a foreign law other than public international law.”14 
International organisations have therefore helped to relax the notion of state sovereignty 
in order to strengthen the role of international law.  International organisations are 
created by states to cope with rising international interdependence and states 
increasingly structure their international cooperation within international 
organisations.
15
  International organisations carry out a significant role assisting in this 
process; in fact, modern international life cannot function without them.
16
  The question 
arises as to whether a state would be more sovereign if it did not limit its freedoms by 
international regulation.  To answer this question, J. Craig Barker analyses the 
sovereignty of the United Kingdom within the Europe Union, and explains, “The fact of 
the matter is that European legislation is passed on daily basis.  Much of that legislation 
is directly applicable in the United Kingdom, meaning that it does not have to be 
enacted separately into UK law to have effect within it.  This applies often to legislation 
to which the United Kingdom has not only not given its direct consent but which, in 
many cases, it has actually opposed.  Furthermore, such legislation is enforceable not 
only by the UK authorities but also, in many cases, directly by European institutions.”17  
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It is worth mentioning that the EU is, however, a unique organisation in its ability to 
impose on its member countries, as the Europe Commission is able not only to draft but 
also to implement EU rules.
18
  EU regulation applies just as national legislation does in 
member countries without needing to be transferred into member countries as national 
law.
19
 
Although international organisations may pose some limitations upon their member 
countries, international organisations can sometimes extend a state‟s freedom of action 
by limiting the sovereignty of other member countries.  It is obvious that the EU has 
given its member countries the ability to intervene, through the EU, in the domestic 
affairs of some member countries that may negatively affect others.  In other words, 
international organisations can extend state sovereignty to reach international interest.  
As the German Constitutional Court has stated about the Treaty on European Union, 
“The member states have established the European Union in order to exercise a part of 
their functions in common and to that extent to exercise their sovereignty in common.”20 
States are very protective of their sovereignty and do not easily give up some of their 
sovereignty to another state even if the other states want to apply international law.  
However, in the last few decades, because of the rise of international interdependence, 
states find themselves driven to give up some of their traditional sovereignty to 
international organisations for international law to be more functional.  At least, giving 
up sovereignty – in the traditional meaning of sovereignty - to international 
organisations that have collective power is less harmful then giving up sovereignty to a 
single state.  States allow some international organisations to take the lead in creating, 
enforcing and interpreting international law because they are actually a part of these 
organisations and contribute to their activities.  Yet, some scholars such as Woolf do not 
believe there is a real independent country, as he states, “it cannot carry on the work of 
internal government, legislative or administrative, which modern conditions of life 
require, without continual cooperation [...]; complete independence today is merely a 
legal fiction.”21 
                                                             
18 See the official website of the EU on www.europa.eu  [accessed on 2 Dec 2011].  
19 Available on http://europa.eu 
20 For the English translation of this judgment see CMLR 57-109 (1994), p. 90.  
21 Woolf, L. S. (1916), p. 345-346. 
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International organisations have also helped change the structure of international law.  
While lawmaking at the national level is centralised, lawmaking in international law is 
horizontal and while courts in domestic law have comprehensive and regular 
jurisdiction where the court‟s judgment is compulsory, international law jurisdiction is a 
wider concept which is not limited to time or place because there is no centralised 
structure.
22
  Nevertheless, the world is moving towards a more centralised legal 
structure as a whole and for some block of states as well, as evidenced by the 
increasingly significant role of the UN in centralising international action and the 
considerable role of the EU in giving Western Europe a centralised structure. 
International organisations embody international law in an organised structure which 
has led international law to become more uniform rather than being spread out between 
treaties, customs and principles, localised in specific regions of the world. International 
organisations bridge the gap between domestic law and international law by allowing 
international law to become more vertical rather than horizontal.
23
  In the modern 
domestic legal system, the law is well served; there is separation between three 
authorities: the legislative, administrative or executive, and judicial authorities.  Each 
one of these authorities serves the law according to their function and the collection of 
these three authorities makes a complete and structured legal system.  Though 
international law does not have to be like domestic law to be regarded as a legal system, 
some international organisations give international law the possibility to take on similar 
functions as these authorities.  For example, the UN has partially become the 
international legislative authority while the Security Council has taken on the role of the 
executive authority and the international judicial bodies have taken on the role of the 
judicial authority, e.g. the International Court of Justice, the European Court, and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
 
                                                             
22 See Decision in Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  
2 October 1995, 35 International Legal Materials 32 (1996); Schermers, H.G. &Blokker, N.M. (2004), p. 
5. 
23 See Decision in Prosecutor v. DuskoTadic. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  
2 October 1995, 35 International Legal Materials 32 (1996); Schermers, H.G. &Blokker, N.M. (2004), p. 
5. 
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6.3 The Importance of the GCC’s Role in Creating Law 
 
International issues are changing fast while public international law is not keeping up 
with this pace because creating new international rules is a slow process.  Even if the 
rules are already established, states need a consensus about the application of these rules 
on any particular matter, which is also a slow process.  On the other hand, international 
law is very flexible and provides some alternative ways through which nations can 
respond faster to international affairs.  These alternative ways of legitimate lawmaking 
are mostly through the framework of international organisations.
24
 
Generally, international organisations have the capacity to make law;
25
 however, this 
thesis questions the capacity of the GCC specifically as a lawmaker?  Does the GCC 
merely draft laws or does the GCC enact „real‟ legislation?  The GCC is one of these 
organisations that work to cope with the fast changing international challenges by 
creating the necessary rules to open the door for member countries to respond faster to 
any crisis the region may face.  The rules that the GCC is creating do not focus on 
giving the GCC, as an independent international organisation, the ability to function but, 
rather, it gives the leaders of member countries the legitimate means to respond swiftly 
to any crisis they may face as leaders of their countries.  
How does the GCC create new laws to enable its member countries to react swiftly to 
common issues?  The rules that govern the relation between the six member countries 
can be affected by international organisation.  For example, the UN Charter states that 
regional arrangement can act to maintain international peace.
26
  The GCC has played an 
important role in effectively leading to the creation of rules that govern these relations; 
these rules are interpreted and modified by the GCC and not by other international 
organisation like the UN, the Arab League or the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference.  It has been mentioned earlier that one reason for creating the GCC was to 
counter the proposed international tutelage upon the Gulf.  One can argue that such 
international legal rules governing the relations between member countries of the GCC 
                                                             
24 See Kirchner, Stefan (2010), p. 269. 
25 See Ibid. 
26 Article 52, the UN Charter. 
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is still one form of this proposed international tutelage.  However, without the GCC it 
was likely that more international rules from international organisations like the UN 
would determine the relationship between member countries.  A recent example for that 
is the GCC, mainly Saudi Arabian, military force entering Bahrain in February 2011 to 
help the Bahraini Government face the challenge posed by the demonstrating Bahraini 
people.  Without the legal rules that the GCC had created – namely the GCC Security 
Agreement – this action would face international rejection.27  Without the GCC Security 
Agreement, many countries would regard this action as a Saudi military intervention in 
Bahrain. 
 
6.4 Laws Created by the GCC 
 
As asserted in the above discussion, legalisation theory provides this thesis with a tool 
to evaluate the laws created by the GCC.  This chapter argues that in the laws created by 
the GCC, the chief missing element from those outlined in “The Concept of 
Legalization” theory is delegation.  This chapter asserts that the absence of this feature 
is the main obstacle prohibiting the GCC from achieving unity in addition to 
cooperation.
28
  In this context, one of the GCC objectives mentioned in the Charter is 
the creation of similar laws in various fields,
29
 and the GCC has indeed helped its 
member states draft common laws to achieve similarity between them in the legislative 
coordination of judicial and legal bodies.
30
  The GCC is the key feature in creating the 
majority of the agreements between its member countries; the GCC Charter, Economic 
Agreement and Security Agreement are good examples of this.  Many common laws 
were created by the GCC and then adopted in the national law of each member 
countries, with the full will of member countries and without any enforcement by the 
GCC upon them.    
 
                                                             
27 More detail on this military action by the GCC can be found in the last chapter of this thesis.  
28 More discussion will be found in the last chapter on the GCC attempt to more towards unity between its 
member states.  
29 The Introduction of the GCC Fundamental Statute. 
30 GCC Secretariat General (2009) The GCC Process and Achievements. p.195. 
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6.4.1 The GCC Fundamental Statute (FS) 
 
International organisations are established by an international agreement.  More focus is 
given to the GCC Charter because it is both an international agreement and a 
constitutional law of the GCC.
31
  A treaty that has established an international 
organisation is regarded as an international treaty,
32
 yet an IO charter differs from most 
other international treaties in that it constitutes a stable and self-governing body.
33
  To a 
certain extent, when GCC members signed the Charter, they made themselves obligated 
to the laws created by the GCC.  As explained earlier, obligations do not necessarily 
mean binding rules but that member countries recognise that they are required to be in 
line with these rules even if they are not binding.  The GCC Charter, like charters of 
other international organisation, is distinct from other international treaties in three ways: 
who has the authority to interpret charters, the way in which they are interpreted and the 
significance of that interpretation.
34
 
 
GCC constitutional law, or charter, is composed of 22 articles enclosing the background, 
the present and the prospective future of the GCC including its aims, establishment, 
objectives, membership, bodies, privileges, immunities and implementation, 
amendments and registration of the charter.  Similarly to the charters of other 
international organisations, the GCC Charter has two characteristics: its content renders 
it constitutional law and an international treaty.  It is constitutional law in that it 
constitutes an organisation with its own bodies with clearly defined functions and that it 
is the supreme law of all the authorities in the GCC.  It is also an international treaty 
because the six countries have ratified it in order to be bound by its obligations.  The 
first article of the GCC Charter states that “a council shall be establish hereby”35 and the 
fifth article of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter VCLT) states 
that a treaty establishing an international organisation is regarded as an international 
treaty.
36
 
                                                             
31See Abo Alwafa, M. (1996). 
32 Article 50, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
33 See Alvarez (2005), p. 65. 
34 The author is thankful to Alvarez for this division into three elements. 
35 Article One, the GCC FS. 
36 Article 5, VCLT. 
 
 
194 
 
 
6.4.1.1 Drafting the Fundamental Statute 
 
There is little recorded information about the drafters‟ debate before the GCC 
Fundamental Statute was declared,
37
 but knowing the details could help identify the 
intent and interests of the drafters in using some words instead of others, in clarifying 
some points while keeping others vague, and so on...  Knowing the drafters' purpose 
would make the mission of interpreting the charter easier for coming generations.  The 
GCC‟s FS has not been modified since it was first ratified in 1981, which means that it 
is more similar to charters of international organisations that are supposed to remain for 
years, decades or more without major change similarly to the constitutional law of states.  
Over the years, interests may change from what they were at the time when the charter 
was drafted, thus the drafters‟ interests may differ from the interpreters‟ interests.  
Article 32 of VCLT gives the green light to the interpreters of international treaties to 
consider preparatory work and the circumstance surrounding the establishment of a 
treaty when the application of Article 31 of VCLT leads to an ambiguous or 
unreasonable result.  It opens the gate to those who want to go beyond the profession of 
legal positivism that focuses on what the law is.  This article allows those who want to 
explain the law in more detail what the capacity of the text can provide.     
It has been mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis that there were some meetings of 
experts from GCC member countries before the announcement of the GCC‟s FS, one of 
which was held in Muscat between the 6
th
 and 10
th
 March 1981.  In this meeting the 
experts dealt with, inter alia, what the title of the GCC constitution should be: Qatar and 
Kuwait suggested „treaty,‟ since it is more common in other international organisations, 
Oman opted for „charter‟ and Saudi Arabia for „fundamental statute.‟  Saudi Arabia 
chose the latter to avoid speculation that the GCC was brought into existence in order to 
replace the Arab League.
38
  The experts' discussion resulted in the Saudi proposal being 
chosen and in the United Arab Emirates on 25 May 1981, leaders of the member 
countries ratified the GCC Fundamental Statute.  In interpreting treaties, the VCLT has 
                                                             
37 In a meeting between the author and the Director General of Legal Affairs at the GCC headquarters (20 
September 2009), the latter mentioned that their department is a place where such records should be held 
but they do not have any such recorded debate. 
38 A Report by the Head of the Qatari delegation to the experts' committee on 14 March 1981, Doha, 
Qatar. The Palace of the Amir Archives, Unpublished (in Arabic). 
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taken into account the „ordinary meaning‟ of their terms in their „context.‟  Knowing the 
drafters‟ debates helps identify the ordinary meaning.  While a treaty that has 
established an international organisation is regarded as an international treaty,
39
 an IO 
charter differs from most other international treaties in that it constitutes a stable and 
self-governing body.
40
 
 
6.4.1.2 Who Interprets the GCC Fundamental Statute? 
 
The GCC Charter does not delegate the job of interpreting its terms to a judicial body.  
The GCC has three main bodies: the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council and the 
Secretarial-General, but if a dispute arises about the meaning of the FS, the only way of 
interpreting it is either through the Supreme Council or the Council of Ministers.  The 
two Councils have all the authority for interpreting the Charter, but if they do not 
succeed in this mission, the Supreme Council has the authority to refer the dispute to the 
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes.
41
  This Commission is not independent, as 
it is attached to the Supreme Council, and only plays a consultative role.  Its decisions 
are therefore merely recommendations, which the Supreme Council has the right to 
recognise or ignore.  This Commission is a non-judicial, ad hoc arrangement, meaning 
that it is not capable of producing long-standing legal judgments that can be regarded as 
a base for a legal doctrinal source for GCC law.   
Comparing the GCC with other international organisations may provide a better 
explanation of the GCC‟s way of interpreting its Charter.  In this context, it is more 
useful to compare the GCC‟s interpretation of its charter to the UN‟s interpretation of its 
own Charter, for two reasons: firstly, the UN is the most widely known international 
organisation and comparing the GCC to it will give a better and clearer understanding of 
the GCC than comparing it to a lesser-known organisation.  Secondly, although the legal 
structure of the EU is much more advanced than that of the GCC,
42
 it is probably more 
                                                             
39 Article 50, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
40 See Alvarez, J. E. (2005). International Organisations as Law-makers. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. p 65. 
41 Article 10, GCC Charter. 
42See more information on the official website of the EU, available on www.europa.eu. [Accessed on 3 
Feb 2012]. 
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appropriate since the GCC and the UN are more similar organisations than the GCC and 
the EU.
43
 
The UN has a permanent judicial body, the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
44
 while 
the GCC has the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes.
45
  Neither the ICJ nor the 
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes have the authority to interpret the UN 
Charter or the GCC Charter, respectively.  One may argue that the ICJ can give itself the 
authority to interpret the UN Charter, however, the ICJ only has jurisdiction over 
members party to the ICJ or parties that have accepted the ICJ jurisdiction; otherwise 
the ICJ has no jurisdiction over other UN members.
46
 
In theory, a statute such as the Fundamental Statute of the GCC is regarded as law, 
made by drafters and ratified by the leaders of the member countries, but up to this point, 
it has not been regarded as law in practice.  Yet, when people apply and practice this 
law, the understanding of it becomes different from when it is only regarded as law in 
theory.  The challenges this law faces, the problems it solves, the services it meets, and 
so on, all lead to different understandings about what the law should be.  The 
mechanisms through which lawmaking is based on practice can be created by a judicial 
body, and even when such a judicial body only makes recommendations, it is still 
capable of creating legal doctrinal sources of law – as mentioned earlier – as judges 
decisions inform how the law can be understood.  The combination of law in theory and 
law in practice is a good way of developing the law on the ground.    
The absence of an interpreting authority and interpretation techniques may lead each 
member country to create its authority to interpret the GCC‟s FS, a situation which 
would function contrarily to the purpose of cooperation that the GCC strives to achieve.  
Fortunately, the GCC has its own mechanism for interpreting the FS, as mentioned 
above, but this mechanism nonetheless involves a long process.  In addition, this 
interpreting mechanism lacks any binding judicial system as well as an important 
element of legalised institutions, namely delegation.  This requires that the 
implementation, the interpretation and the application of the rules have to be under the 
examination of a third party that should carry out the duty of dispute settlement and 
                                                             
43More information about the UN Charter is available on www.un.org.  
44More information about the ICJ is available on www.icj.cij.org 
45See Article 7, the GCC Charter. 
46See article 36 of the GCC status and the ICJ  the ICJ official website, available on www.icjcij.org. 
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have the ability to make further rules.  Without delegation to a third party, an 
international institution would not be considered to be a legalised institution.
47
 
 
6.4.1.3 How to Interpret the GCC FS? 
 
As discussed earlier, the GCC is an international organisation that aims to achieve 
comprehensive cooperation in the fields of economics, security and politics and is 
constituted the GCC Fundamental Statute which provides general guidelines.
48
  This 
statute has a challenging role guiding such comprehensive aims, which surely results in 
interpretation disputes when put into practice.  For such a statute, it is out of language 
ability to be clear-cut or to be unambiguous because it always deals with generalisation 
and leaves all the details to lawyers to explore and analyse.
49
 
Respecting specific rules in interpreting charters was established by the ICJ the 
authoritative World Court's judges used the conventional international customary rules 
after they were summed up in Article 31-2 of the VCLT which states that treaties that 
constitute international organisations are included under the profession of VCLT.
50
  
Article 31-2 of VCLT states that interpreting treaties should be in “good faith” and in 
line with the “ordinary meaning,” which should be the applicable meaning of a treaty 
with regard to „context,‟ „object and purpose.‟51  The contexts of a treaty include any 
relevant agreement concluded between members linked by the core treaty.  The GCC 
members did not conclude any such agreement that gives specific rules about how to 
interpret the charter.  So as long as there is such an agreement, the practice of the GCC‟s 
FS by its member countries cannot be used as binding way of interpreting the FS, 
according to Article 31 of the VCLT.  In addition, any relevant international rules or 
specific meanings have been agreed between the parties to be attributed to a word or an 
expression.  Is it therefore best to interpret a charter through a judicial body?  
Distinguishing between institutional practice and the practice of the parties to a 
multilateral treaty, Judge Spender has disvalued the practice of interpreting through a 
                                                             
47 See Abbott (1999), p. 362. 
48 See the GCC Process and Achievement (2009), p. 5. 
49 Alvarez (2005), p. 84. 
50Alvarez (2005), p. 83. 
51 Article 31-2, the VCLT. 
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judicial body.
52
  He states “It seems natural, indeed, that the General Assembly should 
not have wished that the Court should pronounce on the validity of resolutions which 
have been applied for several years.”53 
The question is whether the intent of GCC founders was to “use institutional practice to 
determine legality”54 or whether the institutional practice was merely to embody the 
political will by combining all the political efforts for cooperation under a single 
institution rather than having scattered efforts.  It is therefore a debate on whether this 
type of institutional practice is more political work that becomes legal work or if it is 
simply more organised political work.  This relationship between international law and 
international relations has been developing over the last few decades.  
Realists and idealists both worry that, through institutional practice, a member may not 
have a mechanism for raising legal enquiries about disputes before going to the 
responsible judicial body and instead will have to raise it with the institution, thereby 
putting the matter in the hands of a majority that does not represent the common interest 
of the members.
55
  However, this concern only applies to international organs 
represented by a majority and does not apply to the GCC because it is not represented 
by a majority but by the heads of all member countries.  
Not only is there very little recorded information of the GCC FS drafting negotiations 
but there is also little on the history of FS negotiations and interpretations.  The drafters 
of such statutes usually leave many vague areas to allow further development, but it 
often makes it difficult to identify the “ordinary meaning.”56  Taking all of this into 
account increases the importance of having more information on the negotiation history 
of the interpretation of the FS. 
Alvarez‟s worries about creating international law through majority are not applicable to 
the GCC,
57
 because the laws created by the GCC are not created by a majority of 
members and instead have to be agreed by all the leaders of member countries.  In this 
respect, some could still argue that these leaders of member countries are a majority in 
                                                             
52 Judge Percy Spender. Separate Opinion. Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 
2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C. J . Reports 1962, p. 151. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Alvarez (2005), p.90 
55 Ibid p. 90-91. 
56 Alvarez (2005), p. 84. 
57 Ibid, p. 90. 
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their one country, as they are not elected by their people.  However, the answer to this 
potential argument is that, in this regard, there is no difference between GCC laws and 
national laws in member countries as the latter are also created by majority and imposed 
upon citizens.  One important distinction is that when a member does not agree on a law, 
it is not bound by that decision.  
 
6.4.1.4 Why Interpret the GCC FS? 
 
Why is interpretation a concern of other international organisations and not with the 
GCC and why does this issue require considerable discussions in other international 
organisations while there is hardly any debate about it in the GCC?  It may be because 
of the kind of organisation that the GCC is.  Similar organisations may have not given 
much concern about such interpretation.  Why is there no debate about interpreting the 
GCC FS?  Is it because everything is running perfectly and everything is clearly 
understood so there is no reason for any interpretation dispute to take place?  Or have 
the member countries not taken the GCC seriously so no one worries about this 
interpretation?  Alternatively, is it the case that there are interpretation disputes, but that 
these are kept secret?    
Regarding the last hypothesis, such silence could have a significant effect in terms of 
how that may conflict with the Vienna Convention of international treaty making which 
requires any international treaty to be registered with it because international diplomacy 
should not be kept secret, especially issues that are not supposed to be secret such as the 
function of international organisations.  This is especially important when they are 
meant to operate on an international level and cooperate with other international actors.    
 
6.5 Making Agreements in the GCC 
 
It has been mentioned that the traditional way of creating international law is through 
international agreements and one of the main sources of international law is 
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international treaties.
58
  Nowadays, the negotiation and drafting of international 
agreements is not only dominated by states but also includes international organisations 
in its process.
59
 
The GCC has two mechanisms for creating agreements; the first is making and 
implementing agreements that regulate the relationship between member countries.  
These kinds of agreements are like the main GCC treaties: the Security Agreement, the 
Economic Agreement and the FS, which have already been discussed and analysed 
above.  This next section focuses on the treaties created by the GCC to be adopted by 
the member countries into their national laws.  These agreements established under the 
umbrella of the GCC are of two types.  The first type is those ratified by the Supreme 
Council as „reference laws‟ or „model laws,‟ which member countries are to consider as 
the appropriate way of harmonising the internal laws of member countries.  The second 
type of agreements is those adopted by the Supreme Council and then by member 
countries, to become part of their national laws. 
 
6.5.1 Non-Binding Agreements 
 
Many non-binding agreements have been concluded between member countries through 
the GCC without difficulty or long debate.
60
  It is worth noting that GCC members have 
no problems ratifying non-binding agreements; all of these agreements have been 
processed smoothly without lasting debates or serious objections from some of the 
member countries.  Surely, member states would not find these agreements challenging 
even if they were not exactly in line with their national laws as there is no real need for 
objections as long as member countries are not bound to adopt them.  These agreements 
are first adopted by the Supreme Council, which then sends copies to all the member 
countries as “reference laws or model laws.”61 
Based on the elements outlined in “The Concept of Legalization,” it is clear that such 
treaties are closer to being soft law than hard law because the aspect of obligations is 
                                                             
58 Article 38, ICJ Statute. 
59 Alvarez (2005), p 273.  
60 These difficulties are discussed above several times.  
61 See the Secretariat-General (2009) The GCC in its Third Decade: Integration and Unity. p. 205. 
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missing.  Not only does the GCC not enforce these treaties upon the member countries, 
but it is also agreed that the rules outlined in these treaties do not have to be adopted by 
the member countries.     
Over time, the GCC has adopted a new method of creating soft law which sometimes 
leads to hard law.  Many model laws have been created by the GCC as it aims to 
develop similar laws in the member countries in various fields.
62
  When a model law is 
created, it is left for four years during which the GCC encourages member countries to 
adopt this model law into their national law.  After four years, the GCC evaluates the 
extent to which member countries have been able to adopt the model law and based on 
this experience, they will agree to either adopt the model law into their national laws or 
to leave it as a model law for another four.  There are some examples below of some 
model or reference laws listed by the Secretariat General.    
The GCC Common Law of Personal Status is a law that deals with matters relating to 
family, guardianship, wills and inheritance.  The Supreme Council adopted this law as a 
reference law in 1996
63
 and extended its implementation as a reference law for four 
years in 2000,
64
 to give member states more time to benefit from the law whilst 
amending their national law to be in line with the model law.  The Secretariat General 
states that some member states have considered this law while preparing their own 
laws.
65
  Some of these laws become binding law but the member countries need enough 
time testing these laws so when the time comes for the GCC to adopt them as binding 
law, member country will be confident enough to accept or reject the law.  The Supreme 
Council has adopted many other reference laws: the GCC Common Civil Law, which 
“incorporates jurisprudence rules, provisions and sources of obligations, contracts, 
ownership and the rights thereof;”66  the GCC Common Penal Law that “incorporates 
the general rules for punishments, precautions, castigation, blood money, and 
chastisements;” and the GCC Common Juvenile Law, which “deals with issues of 
corrupted or corruptible juveniles and prescribes the necessary measures for correcting 
and taking care of them.  The law also specifies the judicial entity responsible for trying 
                                                             
62 See the Secretariat-General (2009) The GCC in its Third Decade: Integration and Unity. p. 195. 
63 The Supreme Council 17th session, Muscat, December 1996 
64 Ibid, 21st session, Manama, December 2000. 
65The GCC Progress and Achievements (2012), p. 292. 
66Ibid.  
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their issues, and the punishments to be issued in the committed crimes that are different 
from those committed by adults.”67 
Other reference laws include the Attorneys' Law which “regulates the practicing of law 
at the GCC States based on convergence or unification. The Law incorporates the 
conditions for attorney registration, description of the rights and duties of attorneys, the 
relevant discipline rules and other general provisions for practicing this profession.”68  
There is also the Common Law of Civil Procedure that “incorporates the general 
provisions of procedure, prosecuting procedures in civil and commercial actions, 
including the manners for bringing a claim, attendance/absence of opponents, rules of 
the session, defence, admission and intervention, contingent claims, methods of appeal, 
arbitration and execution of court judgments.” 69  Additionally, there is the Common 
Evidence Law, which “incorporates the rules of evidence in civil claims, including 
written proof, witness testimonies, oath, inspection and expert reports.”70 Finally, there 
are agreements such as: the GCC Common Traffic Law, a guide for formulating the 
national plan to respond to nuclear radiation emergencies and the Unified Law for 
Volunteering and Volunteers.
71
 
According to Kirchner, the GCC has undertaken creation of soft law in such a way that 
“although relatively fast to create, is non-binding, raising doubts as to its effectiveness 
for regulation in times of crisis.”72  The GCC is first creating soft law, keeping it as soft 
law for a number of years until member countries develop a common understanding and 
acceptance about the law before the GCC moves on to the next step by passing the law 
to the member countries to adopt it in their national laws.   
 
6.5.2 Binding Agreements 
 
The implementation of treaties that are binding but deal with internal matters, is through 
the domestic law of each member country; in other words, each member country adopt 
                                                             
67Ibid. 
68 The GCC Progress and Achievements (2012), p. 292. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid p. 199. 
71 The full text of this agreement is available on the official website of the GCC, available on 
www.gcc.sg.org. 
72 Kirchner, Stefan (2010), p. 269.  
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such an agreement internally to include it as part of its domestic laws.
73
  The GCC has 
not faced much difficulty from member countries in ratifying these types of agreements, 
perhaps because such agreements are usually binding as long as they do not conflict 
with the domestic law of the member country.
74
  Many agreements have been developed 
through the GCC and then adopted by member countries to become part of their national 
law.  When a case has been raised in front of a court in any member country to deal with 
a matter falling under laws created by the GCC, the court mentions in its decision that it 
is under the provision of the GCC laws.  For example, the Saudi Court of the 
Ombudsman has based all of its decision on disputes relating to customs on the GCC 
Unified Custom System.
75
 
 
6.6 The Concept of Law, the Concept of Legalisation and the GCC as 
Lawmaker 
 
It has been analysed above how the GCC is moving the process of law making from soft 
law to hard law.  Without the three elements outlined in “The Concept of Legalization,” 
especially obligations, laws are easy to be implemented by the member countries.  After 
years pass during which member countries observe who responds to this model or 
reference law, they can understand what to expect from the other members and become 
closer to ratifying the agreement or the law.  In other words, the GCC is creating a 
greater equilibrium.  The main purpose of establishing international institutions is to 
facilitate the process of making agreements between member countries
76
 and one of the 
expected roles of international institutions is to help states create greater equilibrium 
which naturally results from interacting.  The next role of an international institution is 
to keep this equilibrium stable by creating common expectations and the first important 
point of cooperation for every member is to expect that the other members will apply a 
rule or agreement in their internal laws.  To create common expectations, the second 
important point is to ensure that this rule or agreement is beneficial and very precise.
77
 
                                                             
73 Such as the GCC Agreement for the Executing of Judicial Decisions (1997).  
74 See, for example, Article 2 of the GCC Agreement for the Executing of Judicial Decisions (1997). 
75 See cases: 865 (2002) and 3302 (2004), the Saudi Court of the Ombudsman.  
76 Beck, et al. (1996), p. 166. 
77 Abbott (1999), p. 361. 
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At the point where a law has passed the period of being model law and member 
countries have adopted it into their national law, these laws carry high obligations and 
high delegations (independent judicial third parties) at the national courts of law are 
authorised to deal with any dispute regarding these laws.  In terms of precision, however, 
these laws are precise in the form of national law in each member country but not as 
GCC laws.  That is because of the process whereby even if laws were vague at the first 
stage, meanings can be clarified by a national court decision.  However, if the courts of 
law in member countries give different explanations and meanings to the same law 
when applied at the national level, there is no mechanism to determine what the GCC 
means by this law.  Even if the matter was brought to the Supreme Council, the Council 
can decide to clarify the meaning in dispute, but national courts are not bound to follow 
the Council‟s explanation.  To sum up, the GCC is therefore successfully leading 
member countries to harmonise their national laws, but it remains limited in its inability 
to develop GCC laws from soft laws to hard laws.  Agreements made between member 
countries such as the Security Agreement or the economic agreements have high 
obligations as member countries have agreed to ratify them as binding laws, but if a 
dispute is raised about their meaning or implementation, no GCC court can make a 
decision about them.  Therefore, focus is now given to the application of the concept of 
delegation as this thesis believes that in the context of the GCC, by creating a GCC 
court of law is an achievable and critical step to achieve delegation, which will impact 
the development of the GCC to make member countries more able to form stronger 
union. 
 
6.6.1 Delegation 
 
 With reference to Hart‟s third defect and related remedy (inefficiency and the rule of 
adjudication) and to the third element of legalisation (delegation), this chapter shows 
how the GCC has an achievable step to become a more legalised institution which will 
support its ability to create hard laws.  The GCC leaders can delegate the authority of 
deciding the right interpretation and application of GCC rules to a specific judicial body.  
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Such a body would not affect state sovereignty as these rules are actually created by 
member countries and not by an external power.
78
 
Since the establishment of the UN, international organisations have tried to act in 
accordance with the UN Charter,
79
 which urges member states to solve their 
"international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered."
80
  The judicial aspect of international 
relations cannot be separated from the general functions of international organisations: 
international courts, tribunals and dispute settlement commissions are always organs of 
and created by international organisations.  The development of the rule of international 
law in international relations started at the end of the 19
th
 Century when international 
judicial bodies started to emerge, in an attempt to strengthen the role of international 
law.
81
  This thesis criticises the GCC for lagging behind this wider movement of 
international organisations.  Alvarez notes that “in some cases international 
organisations have used other powers conferred on them, including the residual power 
to establish subsidiary organs, to create forms for international adjudication of some 
dispute,”82 and that “such institutionalized dispute settlement makes law in the course of 
settling such dispute, International organisations  are responsible for that law as well.”83  
A crucial element of any legal system is judicial precedent, which means that GCC 
member countries have lost a great deal of legal development because they did not 
create a GCC court.  Lauterpacht stresses the significance of international judicial 
precedent: 
The Court follows its own decisions for the same reason for which all courts –
whether bound by the doctrine of precedent or not- do so, namely, because such 
decisions are a repository of legal experience to which it is convenient to adhere; 
because they embody what the Court has considered in the past to be good law; 
because respect for decisions given in the past makes for certainty and stability, 
which are of the essence of the orderly administration of justice; and (a minor 
and not invariably accurate consideration) because judge are naturally reluctant, 
                                                             
78See Nakhleh, E. A. (1986). The Gulf Cooperation Council. New York, Praeger Publishers.  
79 Alvarez (2006), p. 403. 
80 Article 2 (3), UN Charter. 
81 Barker, (2000), p. 8.  
82 Alvarez (2006), p. 8-9. 
83 Alvarez (2006), p. 8-9. 
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in the absence of compelling reason to the contrary, to admit that they were 
previously in the wrong.
84
 
 
The GCC countries have not gained any of this legal experience which would give 
them more certainty, stability and similar expectations about the GCC legal rules.  This 
would be especially relevant for such an organisation that is aiming to achieve unity 
among its member countries.    
 
6.6.2 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes 
 
The heads of the GCC countries were keen to form a practical mechanism for resolving 
any kind of disagreement that may arise between member states, which is why they 
established this Commission.
85
  This Commission is outlined in chapter four of this 
thesis in relation to the GCC structure.  Some argue that this Commission is attached to 
the supreme Council as a sign of its importance,
86
 while others see this attachment as 
evidence of its weakness and dependence on the Council.
87
  Its function is to look into 
matters of disputes that have been submitted by the Supreme Council, which could be 
about any dispute that may have arisen between member states or about the 
interpretation or application of the Charter in a given case.
88
 
 
6.6.2.1 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes on the GCC’s EA 
 
The first agreement (UEA 1981) does not point out any ways of settling any dispute 
raised about the implementation or interpretation of this agreement.  Yet the preamble of 
this agreement states that it is under the umbrella of the GCC Fundamental Statute, 
which regulates a commission for dispute settlement.  On the other hand, the second 
Economic Agreement outlines three steps for dispute settlement.  First, any dispute 
raised by any authoritative body or by any citizen in the GCC countries about the 
                                                             
84 Lauterpacht, H (1996) , p. 14. 
85 Alashal (1983), p. 53.    
86 Ibid..   
87More critic on this Commission is in Chapter three of this thesis. 
88 Article 10, the Fundamental Statute. 
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implication of this agreement should be heard by the Secretariat General, which should 
try to amicably resolve the dispute.  Second, if the Secretariat General fails to resolve 
the dispute, the disputing parties can refer to the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre.
89
  
If the two parties still cannot reach a settlement after these two steps, the dispute then 
goes to an ad hoc judicial commission which is set up as and when needed.  The 
Economic and Financial Commission should propose a charter for this judicial 
commission, however, until this charter is ratified, disputes which are not amicably 
settled through the first steps should be referred to one of the existing GCC 
commissions and preferably to one more experienced in settling the raised dispute.
90
  It 
can be noted that this judicial commission is different from the Commission for the 
Settlement of Disputes mentioned in the GCC Charter which is linked to the Supreme 
Council.  It is a commission that specify examines only disputes about the EA while the 
former commission considers any kind of dispute between the member countries.  This 
may be because what is significant about the EA is that it has a different dispute 
settlement procedure to the one mentioned in the GCC Charter.
91
 
It is clear that the GCC Commission for the Settlement of Disputes is not a court of law.  
It cannot make important judicial precedents, it has not made any important settlements 
and its members are not even judges.  The question here is whether the member 
countries realise that they will not be able to develop cooperation to achieve unity 
without a GCC court of law.    
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
Despite its limits in creating hard law, this chapter has argued that the ability of the 
GCC to create soft law has given it an important role in the law-making systems of 
member countries and in relation to the regulating of legal relations between member 
countries.  This chapter has demonstrated how the GCC is able to create treaties, laws, 
decisions, and resolutions.  The GCC Fundamental Status then the GCC Economic 
Agreement and the Security Agreement are the main examples.   
                                                             
89 Article 27, GCC, EA. 
90 Ibid.  
91 See Article 10, the GCC Charter (1981). 
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This chapter has explored and analysed how the GCC produces laws and the nature of 
these rules by applying Hart theory, which states that a legal system has to have two 
kinds of rules: primary rules which set what individuals have or do not have to do, and 
secondary rules which consists of three elements: rules of recognition, rules of change 
and rule of adjudication.
92
  As well as Abbott et al‟s theory which states that legal rules 
are measured based on three elements: obligation, delegation and precision, in order to 
classify them accordingly between hard and soft law.
93
   
This chapter has demonstrated the important of creating a GCC court of law.  It has 
been analysed that without the three elements outlined in Abbott et al‟s theory 
especially obligations, the GCC work in harmonising the member states laws would not 
work in the long term.  Because if the courts of law in member countries give different 
explanations and meanings to the same law when applied at the national level, there is 
no mechanism to determine what the GCC means by this law.   With regard to the EA, 
this chapter has also argued that it is not the solution for the dispute system in the GCC 
to create a separate commission of settlement for the EA rather it would be by creating a 
GCC court of law.   
This chapter has discussed the GCC Charter and has criticised the GCC because there is 
only little record about the drafters‟ debate and there is no recorded debate about 
interpreting dispute of the Charter.  Such record would be very helpful for research such 
as this thesis.  Also, it has criticised that there is no independent authority to interpret 
the Charter.  This chapter suggest that if there was a GCC court of law authorised to 
interpret the Charter, that should strength the role of the GCC as an international 
organisation.     
One of the GCC‟s main roles is to harmonise national laws of member countries to 
achieve reliable common regulation.
94
  The GCC has been affecting the national law-
making of its member countries in two chief ways.  First, through model or reference 
laws, which are ratified by the Supreme Council as reference laws which member 
countries keep in mind when developing their national laws and try to implement them 
                                                             
92 Hart, Herbert L. (1961) The Concept of Law. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
93 See ibid p. 19. 
94 See the GCC Charter, Article 4.  
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as their own national laws.  Second, the GCC sometimes transforms a model law into a 
binding law, which is then adopted by the Supreme Council – not as a reference law but 
as a binding law, which the member countries are asked to implement as part of their 
national laws.  For example, the GCC Common Law of Personal Status which was 
adopted by the Supreme Council as a reference law from 1996
95
 until 2004.  The 
Secretariat General states that some member states have considered this law while 
preparing their own laws.
96
  The Supreme Council has adopted many other reference 
laws: the GCC Common Civil Law,
97
 the GCC Common Penal Law and the GCC 
Common Juvenile Law.
98
  This chapter has shown how GCC has helped its member 
states in drafting common laws to achieve similarity among them in the legislative 
coordination between judicial and legal bodies.
99
  This chapter has argued that these 
common laws are likely to be interpreted and explained differently by national courts in 
each member countries.  Therefore, the GCC should create a GCC court of law which 
can be responsible for explaining common laws. 
Having covered the theories of international law and international relations in the 
second chapter, the historical context of member countries and the establishment of the 
GCC in the third and fourth chapters, its achievements in the fifth and its legal work in 
this chapter, it is now time to analyse the GCC in relation to several key international 
relations theories in the next chapter to revel its identity and its real goals.   
 
                                                             
95 The Supreme Council 17th session, Muscat, December 1996 
96The GCC Progress and Achievements (2012), p. 292. 
97Ibid.  
98Ibid. 
99 GCC Secretariat General (2009) The GCC Process and Achievement. Riyadh, Secretariat General 
Publishing,  p. 195. 
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Chapter Seven – Pressures and Identity: The 
Future of the GCC 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Having examined key theoretical international relations theories in the second chapter of 
this thesis, this section will now examine some of the GCC outputs and actions in order 
to ascertain its identity and interests as an international institution.  This section presents 
three blocks which are built on each other to bring forward a better image of the GCC's 
identity.  Taking a neorealist approach,
1
 this section argues that a major goal of the 
leaders of GCC member countries is to create a mechanism that supports the survival of 
their royal political systems.  This argument will be developed according to three key 
issues, relating to three different kinds of pressures facing these governments the 
establishment of the GCC to date.  In a first instance, there is an older pressure – the 
Arab revolution known as Nasserism
2
 – which was a serious influential political 
movement in the Arab World leading to the collapse of several Arab monarchies that 
emerged in 1980. Secondly, the influence of democracy continues to apply pressure on 
GCC member countries.  This part explores how the GCC helps its member countries 
stand up against the international push towards democratisation.  The third, more recent 
pressure is brought about by the new Arab revolution (the Arab Spring).
3
  The GCC‟s 
2011 decision to extend its membership to two more countries and its unique decision to 
intervene militarily in Bahrain were a direct result of the Arab Spring.  Throughout, the 
GCC reaction to all these kinds of pressures has been fuelled by a chief concern for the 
survival of the royal political system of GCC member countries. 
 
                                                             
1 This theory argues that states do cooperate in order to ensure their survival.  See detailed analyses of this 
theory in the previous chapter.  
2 As discussed below, Nasserism is an Arabic nationalism and anti-western political movement.  
3 Below is more analysis of the Arab Spring. 
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7.2 Old Pressures: Nasserism 
 
7.2.1 Introduction 
 
While the first chapter of this thesis contextualised the GCC within key historical 
developments which cover the era of Nasserism, this chapter conducts a more in depth 
analysis of the former Arab revolution in order to juxtapose it with the more recent 
developments in the Middle East which have resulted in the 2011 Arab Spring.  This 
enables a more precise examination and comparison of their impact on the GCC. For the 
purpose of this study, greater attention is given to Arab countries that used to have 
monarchical system because there were revolutionary movements in the Arab World 
that led to the switch from monarchies to republics.  Apart from GCC member 
countries, there were six monarchies in the Middle East, four of which have already 
collapsed (Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Iraq) and two still surviving (Jordan and Morocco).  
Particular focus is given to the Egyptian context because the collapse of the Egyptian 
Monarchy was followed by Nasserism, a political movement that spread around the 
Arab World.
4
 
 
7.2.2- The Kingdom of Egypt 
 
In the 1940s, Egypt was not yet completely independent so the British ambassador 
directly intervened in Egyptian domestic affairs. There was partial political participation 
as the Egyptian King – King Farouk at the time – appointed the head of Wafd, the most 
popular party, to be Prime Minister.
5
  In 1936, the Egyptian Government ratified a treaty 
with the British Government, granting full independence to Egypt.  However, even after 
independence, the Egyptian political system was shaped around the struggle of three 
powers: the King, the Wafd party and the British Government.
6
 
 
                                                             
4 See Mansfield (1973).  
5 Choueiri (2000),p. 180.   
6 Ibid. 
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7.2.3 Nasserism 
 
In 1952, a military coup in Egypt signalled the end of the Egyptian Monarchy.  This 
military coup was led by the founder of the Free Officers Movement: Gamal Abdul 
Nasser.  Nasser became the Egyptian President from 1952 until 1970 with complete 
control over Egyptian internal and external affairs.
7
  According to Mahgoub, Nasser‟s 
main achievement was to end the monarchy and shift sovereignty from King Farouk to 
the Egyptian people.
8
  It would be more precise to say that power actually shifted from 
the monarchy to the Egyptian army rather than to the Egyptian people, however, Nasser 
was hailed by Egyptians and many people in the Arab World for fighting for the 
complete independence of Egypt.
9
 
 
When Nasser led the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy, it was not merely a military 
coup but part of a larger political movement that was about to impact the Middle East.
10
  
Nasserism had no clear political ideology although it was influenced by Marxism as 
well as by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood Party.
11
  Throughout Nasser‟s 
leadership, Arab Socialism grew out of a series of inspirations from European Socialists 
as well as from various practices.
12
  Nasser led a revolutionary movement against 
Western intervention in the Arab world and encouraged the collapse of all Arab 
monarchies; it was this revolutionary movement that came to be known as Nasserism.   
The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 affected not only Egypt but the entire Arab world, as 
well as many other states in the Third World.
13
  Nasserism was the main reason for the 
collapse of many other Arab monarchies such as in Libya, Yemen and Iraq.  Even after 
Nasser‟s death in 1970, his movement continued to be seen as a popular political 
movement in the Arab world.  After the death of Gamal Abdul Nasser, Algathafy, the 
former Libyan president, took the lead in supporting Nasserism.
14
 
 
                                                             
7 Ibid. 
8 Mahgoub (1974), p66. 
9  Ibid. 
10 Choueiri (2000),p. 180.  
11 Mansfield (1973), p. 113.   
12 Ibid p. 114.    
13 Ibid 
14 Algathafy was called by Libyan revolutionists in 20 October 2011, see Alriyadh newspapers, 15823, 20 
October 2011.   
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The Nasserist dream was to free the Arab world from any foreign intervention, 
especially Western influenced interventions and to unite the Arab World.
15
  Nasserism 
strived to unite the entire Arab world under a one single state, under the belief that 
unity, liberty and socialism were three interdependent and crucial elements to building a 
new Arab World.
16
 
 
7.2.4 The Influence of Nasserism on Libya 
 
Libya became an independent country in 1951 when it was a Kingdom under the rule of 
the Al-Adrisy Royal Family.  The Free Officers movement in Egypt had an impact on 
the Libyan army, which led a pressure group from within the army to prepare a military 
coup from 1961. In 1969, Moammar Algathafy (Gaddafi) successfully led this military 
coup, thereby bringing an end to the Al-Adrisy royal government.  Algathafy was highly 
influenced by Nasserism and regarded himself as one of the main leaders of the 
Nasserist movement and the successor to Gamal Abdul Nasser.
17
 
 
Coming from this political perspective, Algathafy condemned and humiliated the 
leaders of GCC countries, claiming that these countries were under the control of 
Western powers and that they are not truly independent countries. One of his last 
statements on this issue was at the Arab Leaders Summit in Qatar on 30 March 2009 
when Algathafy started talking without the permission of the head of Qatar who was 
chairing the meeting.  Even though the Chairman tried to stop Algathafy, stressing that 
it was not his turn to speak, Algathafy continued to attack Saudi King Abdullah, stating 
that Saudi Arabia is a country created by the UK and now protected by the US.
18
  This 
demonstrates how the pressures of Nasserism did not end with the death of Abdul 
Nasser in 1970, but continued to directly affect the leaders of the GCC at least until the 
death of Algathafy on 20 October 2011 after the Arab Spring revolution in Libya.  
 
                                                             
15 See Sicker (2001), p. 205.  
16 See Ibid.  
17 Husain, Zohair (2003) Global Islamic politics. Longman, p. 203.  
18 BBC Arabic, (30 March 2009).   
 
 
214 
 
 
7.2.5 The Influence of Nasserism on Yemen 
 
Between 1962 and 1970, there was a war in the north of Yemen between supporters of 
the Yemeni Monarchy and supporters of a new republic.  During this war, Saudi Arabia 
was supporting the Royal Yemeni Government while Egypt sent the Egyptian army to 
support the republicans. At the end of the war the republicans won the war and the 
Royal Yemeni Government escaped to Saudi Arabia.
19
  Said Saif states that when the 
Yemeni people were victorious in managing to bring down the royal government and 
starting the first republic in the Arabian Peninsula on 26 September 1962, it was such a 
dramatic political change that it even threatened the royal family in Saudi Arabia.
20
  
This is obvious evidence that Nasser‟s commitment to political change was so important 
and that he supported the republican push throughout the Arabic world, so much so that 
he was ready to send military support.  
 
7.2.6 The Influence of Nasserism on Iraq 
 
After the First World War, Iraq came under British control.
21
  In 1930, British 
Commissioner Francis Humphrys and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Said agreed on a 
Britain-Iraq alliance treaty setting the independence of Iraq to 1932.
22
  Following in the 
steps of the Egyptian Free Officers movement, the Iraqi Free Officers movement was 
determined to lead to the collapse of the Iraqi monarchy.
23
  Some civilian opposition, 
also inspired by Nasserism, was acting against King Faisal of Iraq and Prime Minister 
Nuri as-Said, strongly rejecting the pro-Western policy of the Iraqi Government.
24
  On 
14 July 1958, the Iraqi army led a successful coup under the command of Colonel Abd 
al-Karim Qasim, putting an end to monarchy in Iraq and killing both King Faisal and the 
Prime Minister.
25
 
 
                                                             
19 Chatterji (1973) p. 262 
20 Said Saif (1987), p10. 
21 See Sicker (2001), p. 82.    
22 See Ibid. 
23 Ibid, p. 207. 
24 Sicker (2001), p. 107. 
25 See Ibid.  
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7.2.7 Nasserism: a Root of Division in Arab Countries 
 
The rise of Nasserism's popularity worried Arab monarchies including in GCC countries 
which were regarded as pro-Western by supporters of this movement.  What added to 
the power of Nasserism was Egypt‟s strong media, as Cairo's radio and press were very 
influential and powerful.  That increased under the power of Nasserism and was seen as 
a serious threat to Arab Royal governments.
26
  In 1957, the US encouraged countries 
opposed to Nasserism: just as the Cold War divided the World into two blocks, the 
Middle East was also divided, with Nasserism leaning more towards the Soviet Union.  
As Nasserism was becoming more powerful and gaining more followers, the US and the 
UK were pushing to create and support pro-Western countries in the Middle East.
27
 
 
These Arab revolutions overthrew monarchies to create republican countries that 
eventually became worse than the monarchical systems themselves, in terms of what 
they provide their own citizens.
28
  The main failure of the governments of Arab 
republican countries is that through these transitions from monarchies to republics, the 
result was to transfer their countries to systems that remained similar to monarchies, in 
terms of creating an inheritance-based political system. In other words, not only does a 
president remain president for his entire life, but his son is also likely to inherit the 
presidency after him.
29
  The Arab republican countries could not eschew the problems 
of the monarchy system whereby an incapable person, incapable of ruling a country, 
might become the head of said country due to his position in his royal family or party.  
Also, a king and his surrounding consultants may use the government to serve their 
personal ends which may be not compatible with the interests of their country.
30
  The 
republican Arab countries could not get rid of these monarchical problems, which this 
chapter predicts was because their focus was only on the collapsing of the monarchy 
without being prepared to form better governments.       
 
                                                             
26 Mansfield (1973), p. 123. 
27 Ibid. p. 127 
28 Albiyati (2007). 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid. 
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7.2.8 Anti-Nasserism 
 
Some Arab monarchies were perhaps pro-Western because they were created under the 
protection of Western countries.  As was explained in Chapter One, without the 
protection of Britain, some GCC countries would perhaps not have survived.  Nasser 
challenged all the Arab monarchies by leading the anti-Western movement calling for 
Arab nationalism.  Nasserism relied on the belief that being a pro-Western government 
implied being a non-nationalist government, which does not care about Arab rights and 
the independence of their countries.
31
  Based on this, a pro-Western country would also 
be perceived as supporting Israel as a country created and supported by Western 
countries and a country that perhaps would not exist without these Western powers.
32
  
Said Saif, like other Nasserists, asserts that the US is happy with the political system in 
GCC countries and that it prefers to maintain these systems rather than to change them 
into republics or democracies.
33
  Like many Arabs, he was influenced by Nasserist 
notions that GCC countries prefer to support Western powers rather than support Arab 
interests.  Arab monarchical countries were challenged by the fact that even their own 
citizens were beginning to perceive them as non-nationalist, with all the associated 
negative connotations.  As a result, the governance systems of GCC countries faced two 
opposing challenges.  On the one hand, there was the Nasserist push towards 
nationalism in order to replace monarchy governments by republics.  And on the other, 
there was the Western push towards democracy that wanted to see a large part of power 
given to the people.  At the end of the day, both challenges are pushing for the collapse 
of the style of monarchy governments of GCC countries.  Before examining why GCC 
countries do not want to move towards democracy, this next section will first address 
the GCC response to Nasserism.  
 
                                                             
31 See Owen (1992), p 21. 
32 See Ibid. 
33See Saif (1987), p5-6. 
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7.2.9 The Creation of the GCC as a Response to Nasserism 
 
 
It is a kind of natural reaction, for these six countries to come together in order to be 
more capable of protecting their political systems since they were surrounded by 
republican countries that were built on the ruins of collapsed kingdoms.  Through 
Nasserism emerged the notion that the Arab world should be moving towards greater 
unity under the framework of nationalism by which Arabs should be united and 
powerful enough to stand up to Western avidity and intervention.  The previously 
mentioned example of the attempt to unify Egypt and Syria in 1958 is a prime example 
of this: at the time, the two countries and the whole Arab world were excited about this 
unification.  Nasserism spread the idea that monarchies were restraining the Nasserist 
movement towards Arab unity and freedom throughout the Arab world.  A counter 
argument to this could be brought forward in a discourse explaining how the GCC was 
supporting Arab unity by bringing together six Arab countries under the umbrella of one 
organisation which should lead to their complete unity.
34
  Also, the GCC has been 
taking the lead for the independence of the Arab Gulf from Western powers by taking 
on the responsibility of Gulf security.
35
  The creation of the GCC was a practical 
response to the claim that monarchies were obstructing any kind of Arab unity and 
freedom.  First, the GCC created a union between six Arab countries and, second, the 
GCC was an attempt to undertake the security of the Arabic Gulf in order to free the 
Gulf from any international powers.   
 
In their first meeting, GCC leaders declared that the region's security and stability is the 
responsibility of their people and their states,
36
  and that the creation of the GCC 
expressed the will of these countries and their right to defend their security and maintain 
their independence.
37
  Also, they confirmed their total refusal of any foreign 
interventions in the region, no matter where from, and emphasised the importance of 
keeping the entire region out of any international conflicts and preventing the presence 
                                                             
34 See the introduction of the GCC Fundamental Statute.  
35 See the Supreme Council, first statement (1981).  
36Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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of any foreign military fleets or military bases.  Such independence of the region is for 
the interest of the GCC and the interest of the world.
38
  This voice of the GCC was very 
much in line with the strong voice of Arab nationalism as expressed through Nasserism, 
a voice that talks about working towards Arab unity and calls for the freedom of the 
region from Western powers.  However, it has nonetheless been shown how GCC 
countries are also pro-Western as there has always been a Western military presence in 
all or several of the GCC countries.
39
  That suggests that when anti-Western sentiment is 
expressed by the GCC, it is probably just to satisfy Nasserists. 
 
7.2.10 The Effect of Nasserism on the GCC 
 
This part argues that while more than one reason led to the creation of the GCC, the 
GCC‟s strict decision to restrict its membership to the six countries was mainly in 
response to Nasserism.  The closed membership system of the GCC is enshrined in 
Article 5 of the GCC Fundamental Statute, referred to by GCC leaders as a hard law that 
they have to obey.
40
  As this thesis remains first and foremost a law thesis, this next 
section therefore examines how the political context affects law.  Specifically, this 
section brings to light how the leaders of the GCC suddenly ignored this article when 
they felt that their political systems faced a serious danger.    
 
The GCC position towards Article 5 is explained through the framework put forward by 
neorealist scholars.  Neorealists, as explained earlier, assert that survival and security 
are the main goals of states and that states use power as a means for achieving these 
goals.
41
  Waltz states that "States, which are deemed the major actors in the world 
affairs, are conceived as unitary actors motivated primarily by the will to survive."
42
  As 
politicians and not lawyers, the concern of GCC leaders, according to the neorealist 
position, is survival.  Even though neorealists mean the survival of countries when using 
the term 'survival,' the same analysis can be applied here to the survival of the political 
system rather than countries.  The GCC leaders control GCC membership only in as far 
                                                             
38Ibid. 
39 See in more detail the Western military present in the GCC countries in Said Saif (1987)  
40 See Al-Arabiya news, 1st Feb 2011.  
41 Waltz (1988), p.618. . 
42 Ibid. 
 
 
219 
 
as it supports the survival of their political systems, as will be shown through the 
following discussion which analyses the Arab Spring.  
 
 
7.3 The Influence of Democracy 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Democracy is a global phenomenon and for some scholars, democracy has brought a 
global culture to the world.
43
  A democratic political system is likely to lead to more 
justice and better conditions of human rights, but from the GCC perspective, the 
movement towards democracy should be smooth and gradual rather than dramatic.  The 
Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Saud Al Saud has stressed many times that 
moving towards democracy has to take its proper time.
44
  This thesis argues that just as 
the GCC stood up to Nasserist pressures for transforming monarchies to republics at the 
time of its establishment, it also stands up to the Western push towards democracy.  
This unwillingness is not because they deny the importance of democracy but because 
they want the movement towards democracy to take its proper time.
45
 
 
7.3.2 Why Western Powers Push Towards Democracy 
 
After the Cold War, the main concern of international politics was to transition all 
governments towards democracy and to push for greater democratisation. This push 
towards democracy has been a major concern of the policies of the chief Western 
international actors and it has been a main concern of several international institutions.
46
  
One of the principal reasons for the Western pressure towards democracy and liberalism 
may be that democracy is likely to cause stability and justice.  Liberals propose that 
democratic states do not go to war with each other.
47
  If this proposal were right, it 
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would imply that if Arab countries became democratic, there would be more stability in 
the Middle East and there would not be a threat of war.  Democracy is seen as the better 
means towards development and high standard of justice and human right.
48
  Many 
Western scholars have a very negative point of view about the political systems in the 
“third world” of which Arab countries, including GCC countries, are a part.  Writers 
like former diplomat Jean-Marie Guehenno believe that the traditional governance 
system which exists in many third world countries are the expressions of a society 
where state institutions have not yet become stable.  He claims that in this kind of 
system, the ruler has all the power to make vital decisions which could be affected by 
corruption and that decision-makers are few and known.  This situation makes it easy 
for corruption to grow, not because it is difficult to control since decision-makers are 
already known, but because there is a political refusal to control corruption. In short, 
there is actually no state.
49
 
 
For a very long time, the Arab world has not been influenced by the international 
movement towards democratisation, and even the few Arab countries which are 
perceived as democratic countries, are characterized as "poor cousins" of Western 
democracies.
50
  Some argue that the region will not accept democratisation due to the 
political culture in the Arab world where the leaders have a tendency to lean towards 
authoritarianism.  In the Middle East's political culture, "personalities rather than ideas 
determine the line of government" and "where personalism is the rule, democracy does 
not correspond to twentieth-century conceptions."
51
  Others blame the people of these 
countries, arguing that people in the region always rely upon their government to bring 
about political change, development or reform.
52
 
 
7.3.4 Why the GCC Countries Are Not Rushing Towards Democracy 
 
GCC leaders are in no rush to apply democracy in their domestic systems not only 
because they would like to keep enjoying the benefits of being the permanent high 
authority in their countries but also because they are, perhaps, influenced by some ideas 
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like those of Bernard Lewis.  In 1964, Lewis wrote about democracy in the Middle East, 
claiming that this is due to the way that it was applied and not to Arab political 
theology.
53
  It is easy for Western countries to merely transfer their own kind of 
democracy to the Middle East but it is not a useful way of achieving their goals for 
democracy.
54
  Lewis explains ”We of the West no doubt all share the belief that liberal 
democracy, with all its weakness, is the best instrument that any section of the human 
race has yet devised for the conduct of its political affairs.  At the same time we should 
remain aware of its local origin and character, and try to avoid the primitive arrogance 
of making our own way of life the universal standard of political morality."  Democracy 
is a good political system but it is not 'the law of nature.'
55
 
 
7.3.4.1 Enforced Democracy 
 
Historically, there have some serious attempts to export the Western democratic system 
to the Middle East.  Britain tried to create democracies in the Arab countries that used to 
be under its control before they got their independence, for example in Egypt and Iraq.  
But soon after independence, there were military coups in these countries, as explained 
earlier.  These countries were introduced to democracy by introducing the main 
democratic elements such as a written constitution, independent parliaments, elections, 
the freedom of creating political parties and free media.  These attempts of 
democratising these countries failed resulting in the search in alternative systems.
56
  For 
Lewis the reason of the failure of democracy in the Arab World is very clear. 
 
A political system taken over ready-made not merely from another country but 
from another civilization, imposed by Western or westernized rules from above 
and from without, could not respond adequately to the strains and stresses of 
Islamic, Middle Eastern society.  Democracy was installed by autocratic decree; 
parliament sat in the capital, operated and supported by minute minority, whose 
happy immersion in the new game of parties, programmes and politicians was 
ignored, or else watched with baffled incomprehension, by the great mass of the 
people.  The result was a political order unrelated to the past or present of the 
country, and profoundly irrelevant to the need of its future.
57
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Lewis highlights how Western democracy was created to meet the needs of Western 
countries, and criticises the way democracy was introduced to the Arab world.  Lewis 
explains: "The parliament at Westminster is the result of centuries of history, with its 
roots in the Anglo-Saxon witenagemot; it is the apex of a pyramid of self-governing 
institutions, with its base at the parish pump.  It was evolved by Englishmen, on the 
basis of English experience, to meet English needs.  The parliament of Cairo was 
imported in a box, assembled and ready for use, without even a set of do-it-yourself 
instructions.  It responded to no need or demand of the Egyptian people; it enjoyed the 
backing of no powerful interest or body of opinion.” 58  Having highlighted the problem, 
Lewis offers a solution for this dilemma of democracy in the Arab World.  For him, the 
main problem is that not enough time was given to Arab societies to adjust to the 
Western democratic system in their own situations and needs.
59
  The Saudi Minister of 
Foreign Affairs has already mentioned that he shares Lewis‟ opinion that the main 
solution for the dilemma of democracy in the Middle East is time: processes have to 
take their proper time. 
 
7.3.5 The GCC and Western Pressures for Democracy 
How can the existence of the GCC be one of the means of responding to Western 
pressures for democracy?  In a speech about democracy in Saudi Arabia, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Prince Saud Al Saud stated that democracy is a means but it is not itself 
a goal.
60
King Abdullah, the Saudi King, says that he believes that Saudi Arabia, is in a 
sense a democracy as it is.
61
 Ahmad Al-Jar' Allah explains the Saudi perspective of 
democracy, stating that the fact that the Arab Spring did not really affect Saudi Arabia 
and the rest of the GCC countries is due to a justice that prevails in the country, adding 
that the citizens in the Kingdom have easy and direct access to all the top leaders in 
government.  Citizens can go and raise their voices and speak to these leaders, even 
without titles.
62
 According to Al-Jar-Allah, if there is justice, but realised in another way 
and within the concept of privacy, religion, traditions and customs of Gulf states, then 
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the values of democracy are present.
63
According to King Abdullah, Western democracy 
is still too distant from this and the time has not come for Saudi people to switch to 
democracy.
64
 
 
Some GCC leaders claim that it is more important to reach the objectives of democracy 
such as human dignity and justice than to have democracy as a system.  This vision of 
GCC leaders is supported by some international relation scholars.  McDougal and 
Lasswell, for example, after discussing the reactions of dictatorships to international 
moves towards more human rights, state that the final goal is achieving human dignity 
no matter by which system.
65
  They state that there is a variety of political systems 
which "differ in many details of the institutionalised patterns of practice by which they 
seek to achieve such goals in specific areas and in the world as a whole.  The important 
point is that varying detailed practices by which overriding goals are sought need not 
necessarily be fatal to the future of mankind but can be made creative in promoting and 
expending freedom, security, and abundance.  The modern world is a cauldron of 
aspiration for a better life on the part of millions of human being hitherto devoid of any 
expectation of receiving serious consideration.  Unless the institutional details of all 
system of public order are open to reconsideration in the light of the contribution that 
they make to the realization of human dignity in theory and fact, the plight of the world 
community will remain as precarious as we knew it to be today."
66
 
 
Some may argue that these types of claims from GCC leaders, that they are closer to the 
values of democracy than others in the Middle East are, is merely resistance to change.  
GCC leaders argue that the values of democracy such as justice and the well-being of 
citizens are more important than the techniques for achieving democracy such as 
elections and the right of demonstrating.  In many supposedly democratic Arab 
countries, such as Egypt and Syria,
67
 presidential elections take place, even though the 
president never changes but always wins the election by nearly 99%.  Such governing 
                                                             
63 See Ibid. 
64 See Ibid. 
65 McDougal and Lasswell (1996), p. 116-117. 
66 Ibid.  
67 In June 2012, Egypt people enjoyed the first real election after the Egyptian revolution 2011 which is 
discussed below.   
 
 
224 
 
systems are nonetheless perceived as closer to democracy than the royal systems of the 
Gulf countries.
68
 
 
GCC leaders think that they are likely to succeed in convincing their people and the 
world that they are able to function and succeed in creating an effective international 
institution to prove their ability to achieve good governance as long as the rest of Arab 
countries cannot achieve a better governing system.  Many Arab countries failed to do 
so under Nasserism and no one knows yet if they will successfully become democratic 
or whether they will actually become real or vague democracies.  If other Arab countries 
become real democratic countries and succeed in achieving well-being for their people 
and succeed in economic cooperation then the GCC countries will face a real challenge 
and their political system will be in serious danger.  As this has not happened yet, it 
seems that GCC countries are doing well in protecting their governing systems.  
 
Together, the GCC countries have succeeded in standing together against the pressures 
of Nasserism and against the imposition of a Western democratic model.  However, 
since early 2011 the GCC has been facing different kinds of pressures, this time, 
emerging internally from their citizens, who are influenced by the people of other Arab 
countries demanding freedom and democracy.  
 
7.4 Recent Challenges (The Arab Spring) 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter has analysed how the GCC has attempted to ensure the 
survival of the political system of monarchy in its member countries, particularly in 
facing the external challenges posed by Nasserism and Western demands for 
democracy.  This part now examines how the GCC assists member countries in 
protecting national political systems from internal challenges from some GCC citizens 
demanding democracy.  More focus is given to this third type of pressure than the two 
previous ones because it reflects current events while the previous ones are more 
historical.  It analyses several key events which took place in 2011, as well as the GCC 
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response to them.  It therefore explores the Arab Spring and how the GCC extended its 
membership as a response; it also analyses how the GCC has been prepared to resist any 
internal challenges to the political systems of member countries even through military 
intervention, such as the GCC military intervention in Bahrain.   
 
 
7.4.2 The Arab Spring (2011) 
 
The modern revolutions in the Arab world that started in Tunisia (11 December 2010), 
Egypt (25 January 2011), Yemen (11 February 2011), Libya (17 February 2011)
69
 have 
led to the dramatic collapse, in each case, of a dictator's decades-long rule.  However, in 
some Arab countries, this domino effect on Arab dictators has not ensued without 
bloody conflict.
70
 Other revolutions are taking place in Bahrain (14 February 2011), 
which seems to end without real political change and in Syria (15 March 2011) which is 
still on going on.
71
 
 
7.4.2.1 Arab Frustration 
 
The President of Algeria Abdul Aziz Bouteflika states that the lesser development of 
Arab countries is due to the absence of: freedom of speech, obtaining knowledge, and 
women's rights.  Nations other than Arab, the president continues, have developed much 
more than the Arab ones.
72
  He believes that the majority of Arab people are not happy 
with existing Arabic policies and the rest of the world has come to see Arab countries as 
a threat to world security and reflecting a culture which does not accept the values of 
democracy.  He asks why Arab countries have not done anything right in anything that 
they do, since they have achieved independence. His response is that Arab ideas that 
have the same background and are influenced by the same factors sometimes lead to 
making bad decisions in matters of politics, economics and international relations.
73
 
 
Bouteflika is talking about two failures in Arab policies: the first is in the governmental 
systems that led to bad political and economic decisions and the second is not having 
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succeeded in international relations.  He believes that Arab policies have not achieved a 
minimum of success; indeed, it is not only his belief, but rather it is likely that the 
majority of Arab people share the same feeling, as evidence by the Arab Spring.  
 
7.4.2.2 The Tunisian Revolution 
 
Tunisia was governed by the Ben Ali regime which had been in power for 24 years 
(1987-2011), though Ben Ali used to claim that he was the one who got rid of the 
principle of "presidency forever" that the governing system of Tunisia was built on 
before him.
74
  The first Tunisian presidential election was in 1989, and Ben Ali won the 
first election and all the presidential elections thereafter.
75
  While he may be right that 
the previous Tunisian government was worse, the situation did not seem to improve 
much during his presidency.  The final moments of his presidency started when the 
police mistreated Mohamed Bouazizi on 11 December 2010, the moment regarded as 
the first spark of the Arab Spring or the modern Arab revolutions.  The police took 
Bouazizi‟s vegetable carriage, his only source to feed himself and his family, claiming 
that it was illegal to do this job.  He was a young man who immolated himself in the 
street as a reflection of the unjust treatment he faced by the police when a policewoman 
slapped him on the face when he was asking them to return his carriage and they 
refused.
76
  After this tragic event, millions of people went to the streets to demonstrate 
against Ben Ali's Government and the demonstrations continued, requesting freedom 
and democracy until Ben Ali escaped Tunisia for Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011.
77
  
The Tunisian army lived by their duty and never accepted to be used by their 
government to kill their own people; instead they advised Ben Ali escape Tunisia.  The 
Chairman of the House of Representatives then became interim president until the 
earliest presidential elections, for a duration of 45 to 60 days.
78
  Now in 2012, thanks to 
the Tunisian revolution, Tunisia is governed by an elected government and the Tunisian 
president is from the Al-Nahthah Party which was banned for three decades.
79
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7.4.2.3 The Egyptian Revolution 
 
It was not long before the Tunisian revolution influenced the Egyptian people and on 25 
January 2011 they started to demonstrate in millions. The most effective Egyptian 
demonstration was the one in Tahrir Square in Cairo and it was against Mubarak‟s 
regime, who had ruled the country for 30 years (1981-2011), asking for freedom and 
democracy. The demonstrations were led by young people communicating through the 
social networking website Facebook and some opposition groups including the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Kifaya.  This led President Mubarak to abandon his position as the 
President of Egypt on 11 February 2011 and instructing the Egyptian Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces to take control of the country.
80
  In June 2012, there was for the 
first time in Egypt, a real presidential election.  The main candidates were: Mohammad 
Morsi, the head of the Brotherhood Party and Ahmed Shafiq, the previous Egyptian 
Prime Minster.  Nearly half of Egyptians voted for Morsi and the other half for Shafiq, 
the official results of the election have not been declared, as of the writing of this 
thesis.
81
 
 
7.4.2.4 Revolution in Libya 
 
The Libyan Revolution has been a bloody modern Arab revolution, and in fact, it turned 
into a war between revolutionaries and Al Qaddafi‟s regime took the lives of many 
Libyan people.  Libyans surely wanted it to be like the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt 
and they may not have known it would turn into a civil war, but they were determined to 
continue their revolutionary war until the Al Qaddafi regime was dismantled.
82
  It 
started as a peaceful demonstration until Al Qaddafi opened fire and carried out heavy 
aerial bombardment to suppress unarmed demonstrators.  Consequently, the peaceful 
demonstration developed into an armed revolution aiming to bring down Al Qaddafi 
who was determined to fight until the last moment.
83
 
 
The UN passed Resolution 1970 criticising the use of aggressive violence against 
civilians in Libya and welcomed the expression of grave criticism by the Arab League, 
the African Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in relation to Libya‟s 
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grave breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law.
84
  On 12 March 
2011, the Council of the Arab League called for the imposition of a no-fly zone on 
Libya, which was actually a proposal from the GCC transferred through the Arab 
League.
85
  The UN passed its second resolution on Libya, recognising the situation in 
Libya as a threat to international security, which required the UN to act under Chapter 
VII of its Charter.
86
  This resolution led to the decision to start enforcing a no-fly zone 
on Libya to protect civilians from the Al Qaddafi regime,
87
 and NATO started to apply a 
military no-fly zone on all flights in the airspace of Libya.
88
  At the end of this civil war, 
Al Qaddafi was killed signalling the end of the Libyan civil war.
89
 
 
7.4.2.5 Revolution in Yemen 
 
On the same day that the Egyptian revolution successfully removed President Mubarak 
from the presidency of Egypt, 11 February 2011, the Yemeni revolution started.
90
  Just 
as in the other Arab revolutions, the Yemenis demonstrated against their President, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled the country for 33 years.
91
  The Yemeni people were 
also asking for freedom and democracy.  This revolution was clearly influenced by the 
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions that succeeded in removing their relative presidents 
and, as a result, in changing the governmental systems.  President Saleh has often 
warned that if the demonstrations did not stop, there would be a civil war in Yemen,
92
  
trying to say that the Libyan example is likely to be reproduced in Yemen rather than 
the Tunisian or Egyptian ones.   
 
One of the key tribal leaders in Yemen is Ali Sadiq Al-Ahmar who declared his support 
to the Yemeni revolution against Ali Saleh‟s Government.93  On 24-25 May 2011, the 
Yemeni army – under the command of Ali Saleh – initiated rockets attacks on Al-
Ahmar‟s house, during which some of his guards were killed.94  Al-Ahmar declared this 
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attack to be an attempt by Ali Saleh to draw the country into a civil war.
95
  Fortunately, 
the Yemeni situation has not developed into a civil war and was resolved peacefully 
thanks to the GCC initiative.
96
 
 
The GCC played a key role in finding a peaceful way for the Yemeni revolution not to 
end but to peacefully succeed in achieving its goals for freedom and democracy.  The 
GCC initiative was the main international help for Yemen.  It proposed a way of 
transferring the power from the Yemeni government to the Yemeni people in a gradual 
pace over a period of two years.
97
  First, the Secretary-General discussed the initiative 
with key Yemeni parties, and after they agreed on it, the GCC passed the initiative to the 
UN Security Council.
98
   All the members of the Security Council supported the GCC 
initiative and released their Resolution number 2014 which adopted the GCC 
initiative.
99
 After a lot of effort done by the GCC Secretary-General, Abdul Larif Al 
Zayani, the Yemini President as well as the opposition parties agree to come to Riyadh 
to sign the agreement in front of the Saudi King Abdullah on November 2011.
100
  Then 
in the Yemeni House of the President, there was ceremony for the transfer from the 
Yemeni previous President Ali Saleh to the new President Abed Rabboh Hadi.
101
  It 
would have likely resulted in a civil war if the GCC had not directed the revolution to its 
peaceful gate.  
 
This thesis sees a unique development in this GCC effort, not only in the success in 
resolving the matter but the clear role of the Secretary-General, Abdul Larif Al Zayani.  
He was acting more freely and independently, he travelled to Yemen several times.  
There are no authorised resources that confirm that he was given room to lead the GCC 
Secretariat General especially in this matter.  Yet, it was obvious that he was given the 
trust of the GCC leaders with a good level of independence.  It is may be one of the 
reason for this GCC success and may lead to the GCC enjoying a better level of 
independence in the future.    
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7.4.2.6 Syria 
 
The effects of the Arab Spring began to impact Syria on 15 March 2011.  The Syrian 
people started to demonstrate in many Syrian cities, demonstrating against President 
Bashar Al-Assad, who has ruled the country for 11 years since 2000 when he inherited 
the presidency from his father, Hafeth Al-Assad, who had himself ruled Syria for 30 
years (1970-2000).
102
 The Syrian police and army forced the people to stop their 
peaceful demonstrations and as a consequence, thousands of civilian people have been 
killed and even more arrested.
103
 
 
It has become the bloodiest revolution in the Arab Spring.  Since this revolution started, 
the media show killed men, women and children every day. The GCC shows a strong 
support to Syrian people.  Saudi Arabia and Qatar are more willing to support Syria, 
they suggest supporting the Syrian people with weapons so they can defend themselves.  
It is actually unusual for the Saudi external policy to be this strong.  For Saudi Arabia, 
the matter is not only Syrian revolution but it is a cold war between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran.  Iran, Russia and China are the main supporters of Syrian government.  Saudi 
Arabia does not want Iran to have more influence in the Middle East.  Iran supporters in 
the area are all Muslim Shi‟ah, while the Syrian President, Bashar Al-Asad and all the 
key people in the Syrian government are Muslim Alawi which is very close to the 
Muslim Shi‟ah.  This is maybe the reason Bahrain and Kuwait are not as strong as Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar in this matter because there is a considerable number of Muslim 
Shi‟ah citizens in these two countries who would likely support the Syrian government 
because they are Alawi.   
 
This chapter highlights the point that, although Saudi Arabia and Qatar strongly 
pronounced their will to support the Syrian people, they could not do anything, while in 
the Yemeni case they GCC was very successful.  This reveals the power of 
institutionalised work and the lesser power of states working individually.  This 
supports the institutionalist theory that international institutions can sometimes function 
better than states and that they are not mainly some tools in the hands of states as the 
realist claim.           
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7.4.3 Analysis of the Motivations Behind the Arab Spring 
 
Over the course of the 20
th
 Century many changes have taken place and the main focus 
of constructivists is on how these changes happened nationally and internationally and 
whether these changes occur within the framework of institutions or not.
104
  There is a 
relationship between history and structure which forces change in society, and this 
relationship facilitates the clarification of the nature of this change.
105
  Constructivists 
assert the importance of studying change, examples of change being the end of the 
Roman Empire and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
106
  What has happened in the 
Middle East is a recent serious change, which is applicable for analysis from a 
constructivist framework.  This section attempts to analyse the modern Arab revolutions 
(the Arab Spring) using the perspective of the work of constructivists in order to analyse 
the GCC response to this revolution.   
 
Constructivists assert that knowledge and learning can lead to some significant change 
in society.  They explain that people hold some beliefs about society and politics in their 
minds.
107
  Their belief guides their behaviour: “the world is in the eye of the 
beholder.”108 The question here is where these beliefs come from and how they affect 
behaviour.  'Social reality' is what people believe to be real social life, as people 
construct and constitute society, society constructs and constitutes people in turn.
109
  So, 
there is continuing interactive process of constructing and being constructed in any 
society which, individually and collectively, form people‟s awareness of reality; their 
understanding of reality forms the decisions they make.
110
  Arab people's beliefs about 
the reality of their political systems and the way they can be modified have changed.  As 
a result, Arab people‟s behaviour has changed as well.  
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In any society, impressive and revolutionary changes in collective opinions about key 
values, behaviour and political practice can take place.
111
  Different societies learn from 
each other and beliefs, opinions and behaviours can be transferred from one society to 
the next.  These translations of knowledge can only happen if the transmitting society is 
able to transmit their experiences to the receiver society.
112
  Today, technologies have 
facilitated these transmissions, especially with new social media tools that aide in the 
translation of knowledge, such as Facebook and Twitter, which played a significant role 
in helping the Arab Spring intensify.
113
 
 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff explain that in this sense, „Learning‟ means the capacity of 
actors to implement a “new interpretation of reality” in order to make this „new reality‟ 
internally and externally accepted as a new political system.
114
  The actors that initiated 
the Arab Spring were not the leaders of their countries or parties; rather they were just 
average young people.  Their movement was massive and effective, gathering millions 
of demonstrators into their cause.
115
  This chapter argues that all of this took place 
because people had already realised that there is a better government system that is able 
to provide them with a better life than a dictatorship is.  They had already observed 
other democratic nations being guided by an elected government that has led their 
countries to increased development, welfare, human rights and justice.   
 
 
7.4.3.1 The Importance of Knowledge 
 
Ernst Haas defines knowledge as “the sum of technical information and of theories 
about that information which commands sufficient consensus as a given time among 
interested actors to serve as guide to public policy designed to achieve some social 
goal.”116  Knowledge involves 'scientific notion' which is tied to social aim; this notion 
is usually influenced by ideology and by the interest of its supporters.
117
  Haas stresses 
                                                             
111 Ibid, p. 168.  
112 Ibid, p. 167. 
113See Asharq Alawsat, newspaper (7 Oct 2011), 12001. (in Arabic).   
114 Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (2001), p. 168. 
115See Asharq Alawsat, newspaper (27 Apr 2011), 11838. (in Arabic).   
116 Haas (1980), pp. 367-368 
117 Ibid, p. 368. 
 
 
233 
 
that new knowledge can lead to revolutionary change.
118
  Krasner differentiates between 
two kinds of change: evolutionary change which leads to the creation of new rules and 
procedures within the same old principles and norms and revolutionary change, which 
leads to the creation of new principles and norms and, consequently, new rules and 
procedures.
119
  Considering these points by Krasner and Haas, importance is placed here 
on knowledge as it relates to regime theory: their breakdown of knowledge is useful in 
its application to the discussion about the Arab Spring. 
 
Haas disagrees that extraordinary changes in society occur when there is change in 
'national power position,' Stating, "the reappraisal of national power is itself partly the 
result of changing knowledge about capabilities to act meaningfully.  The old national 
interest is questioned when a new claim to truth is generally accepted and when this 
claim is thought to contain a remedy for some generally experienced social ill.”120  This 
is what has happened in the Arab world: knowledge is what affects society not national 
power, it was neither liberal nor Islamic parties that led to this revolutionary change, but 
rather new knowledge.  This new knowledge came from Western experiences of 
democracy that led Western countries to become more developed while Arab countries 
remained underdeveloped, due to their poor political system.  What adds vital 
experience to this knowledge is the success of the first modern Arab revolution in 
Tunisia; the lesson Arab people learnt from the Tunisian Revolution is that people can 
lead to political change for better by themselves. 
 
When leading groups and individuals begin to believe in some key new knowledge, this 
knowledge may result in a reconstruction of the political regime.
121
  People in the Arab 
world are aware of three different kinds of political systems.  First, there are 
monarchies: in this system all the power is held by the king; many examples of this 
system are found in the GCC countries.  In a second instance, there are republics similar 
to monarchies, based on a system in which the president remains in his position for his 
entire life. This second example manifests itself in the majority of non-GCC Arab 
countries.  Finally, the third system is the Western democracy.
122
  While the first two 
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systems exist in the Arab World, the third one is hardly found in this region.
123
  It is not 
uncommon for people to compare their political system to the system of other nations 
and as a result, they may blame their political system for their poor and underdeveloped 
lives in economic justice systems, human rights and political rights.  Having been 
confronted with these changes in the Arab world, the GCC had to take action.  
 
7.5 Extending Membership to Jordan and Morocco 
 
One of the GCC responses to the Arab Spring was to declare its will to extend 
membership to the remaining Arab monarchies.  Considering that GCC membership has 
been a controversial issue since the GCC was first established, this section examines 
why the GCC decided to limit its membership to six members, refusing to extend it for 
thirty years only to suddenly decide to extend it in 2011.  It was not until 10 May 2011, 
when the Supreme Council held an irregular meeting in Riyadh, at which member 
countries declared their acceptance of Jordan's request to become a member of the GCC.  
In addition to this, existing GCC member countries also offered GCC membership to 
Morocco.
124
  This declaration led several commentators to discuss the link between the 
GCC and the Arab monarchical governing system.
125
  This extension of membership 
raises several important points which need to be highlighted.   
 
Morocco had not requested to become a member of the GCC; the offer came as a 
surprise to the Moroccan Government and people.  The GCC had never mentioned a 
membership for Morocco and had never notified the Moroccan Government about a 
possible membership.
126
  While the GCC had previously only held irregular meetings 
when there was an urgent and serious situation,
127
 but the Supreme Council held such a 
meeting in Riyadh only to declare the offer of its membership to Jordan and Morocco.
128
 
 
                                                             
123 Although Lebanon and Kuwait can be regarded as democratic countries, their government rarely 
become stabble.     
124 The Supreme Council thirteenth irregular meeting (10 May 2011) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
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Geographically, Morocco is the furthest Arab country from the Gulf while the GCC, as 
an organisation, has linked itself to a geographic region, namely the Arab Gulf.  It can 
be noted that the formal name of the GCC, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf, outlined some criteria for its membership.  The words Arab Gulf links this 
organisation to countries which have territory within the Gulf and the word Arab 
excludes Iran as it is not an Arab country, even though it has territory on the Gulf. 
However, the key excuse that the GCC has been using in the face of country asking for a 
membership is Article 5 of the Fundamental Statute.  This article states that the GCC 
members are only six members without giving any explanation.
129 
 
This section argues that the reason for which the GCC restricted its membership to six 
countries in 1981 is the same reason why the GCC decided to extend its membership in 
2011.  In the 1980s, many of the GCC countries, as mentioned earlier, were not strong 
enough to stand up alone to the threat of Nasserism, while Jordan and Morocco, were 
perhaps strong enough to handle such a threat to their existing political systems.  The 
2011 powerful internal pressures emerging from inside several Arab countries, with 
their own citizens demanding freedom and change – the Arab Spring – pose one of the 
most serious challenges to the political system of these countries.  Observing this 
internal threat facing the remaining monarchies of the Arab world (Jordan and 
Morocco), GCC countries decided to help the survival of these monarchies by offering 
them membership to the GCC. This chapter argues that the rationale behind this is may 
be that a greater number of monarchies provide a greater opportunity for such systems 
to be accepted and to survive.  
 
Some may question why the GCC did not invite Jordan and Morocco from the 
beginning if their goal was the survival of Arab monarchies.  This question can be 
answered in several ways.  Firstly, the GCC would not like to appear as a grouping of 
monarchies but as an international organisation.  Secondly, at the time of its 
establishment, GCC member countries were weaker, compared to now when they have 
become much stronger in many aspects: politics, economic, media, etc…  They are 
politically strong as they have been playing a significant role in the Arab Spring, by 
supporting the Libyan people against Al Qaddafi‟s regime.  They also helped Yemen 
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put an end to its revolution by signing an agreement between the Yemeni Government 
and the Yemeni people, helped Bahrain stand up against its domestic problems and now 
are leading the effort to help the Syrian people against the Bashar regime.  
Economically, they are very wealthy and strong due to the high price of oil.  They have 
also helped Bahrain and Oman economically for them to solve domestic problems.  All 
GCC countries have raised the salary of their citizen employees  by 50% –by 100% in 
some – and government spending on citizens has considerably increased in response to 
the Arab Spring.  In terms of the media, GCC countries have the most effective media in 
the Middle East: Al Jazeerah and Al Arabiya are the two strongest and most influential 
TV channels in the Arab World, both owned by GCC countries and both playing a 
significant role in covering the Arab Spring.   
 
All of these are strengths of GCC countries while Jordan and Morocco have no such 
strengths. Also, the people in these two countries have been more inspired by the Arab 
Spring and demonstrated more seriously against their government, but the two countries 
are not able to increase government spending significantly.  They need the GCC‟s 
support to survive while at the same time, GCC leaders would like these governments to 
survive to ensure the survival of monarchies as an accepted system of governance.     
 
 
7.5.1 The Rules of GCC Membership: Between Law and Politics 
 
It has already been mentioned that GCC membership is closed, with only six existing 
members, explicitly expressed in Article 5 of the Fundamental Statute. Article 8 of the 
Fundamental Statute states that only the Supreme Council has the authority to amend 
the Fundamental Statute, however, the Supreme Council did not try to change Article 5 
to open the door to more flexible rules about GCC membership and the dilemma that the 
GCC now faces is how to define the conditions that a state needs to meet to become 
eligible for membership of the GCC.  Nonetheless, the GCC has been referring to 
Article 5 as the legal basis for rejecting any request for membership.  The GCC just 
suddenly express its willingness to extend membership to Jordan and Morocco.  It did 
not justify why especially these two countries among the Arab World should have this 
privilege, nor did it justify the timing of this decision.  However, the one different thing 
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between these two countries and the rest of the Arab countries is that they have 
monarchy political system.  In this context, Morocco had not asked the GCC for 
membership before while Jordan had.      
 
This action by the GCC is likely to negatively affect its reputation and strength as an 
international organisation.  From a legal positivist perspective, Jordan and Morocco‟s 
membership to the GCC are not legitimate, because an international organisation cannot 
simply ignore it rules or create laws that they disregard without any explanation.  There 
is an existing GCC law that states that GCC membership is limited to the existing six 
members only.  This law is enshrined in Article 5 of the GCC FS and has often been 
used to refuse numerous requests to join the GCC.  This law is very precise and there is 
no doubt about its meaning.  In addition, there is a delegation for dispute settlement in 
the GCC which could provide advice about any dispute that may arise regarding this 
law.  The delegation here is weak because, as discussed in Chapter Three, it is part of a 
body (the GCC Commission for the Dispute settlement) that is already part of the GCC 
while the delegation should be linked to a third independent party.  However, the GCC 
membership law is highly recognised and highly precise which makes it hard law from a 
legal positivist perspective. The extension of GCC membership would satisfy legal 
positivism if the GCC Supreme Council had first amended Article 5 to allow more 
membership as the FS gives the Supreme Council the authority to change the FS.  Only 
after the Supreme Council has done this, can the GCC declare its willingness to extend 
its membership.  
 
This chapter perceives from this GCC action that the GCC is under the full control of 
politicians and that these politicians may decide at a certain point to ignore the 
instructions of international lawyers.  As in chapter four of this thesis, international 
lawyers or legal positivist have clarified the difference between hard and soft law and 
that hard law should not be ignored.  Doing so would not serve the goals of the GCC 
countries in developing their cooperation. The GCC has recognised Article 5 of its 
charter as hard law and legal positivists have explained how a charter can be change as 
analysed in chapter four of this thesis.  All that the GCC needs to do, if they are willing 
to extend their membership, is to change Article 5 of the GCC charter.     
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When law is contrary to political will in a given issue such as this, law should be taken, 
according to Koh, as "means of authority and social control."
130
  Law is a normative 
factor, as Koh explains: "legal rules generated by interactions among transnational 
actors shape and guide future transnational interactions."
131
  Koh also explains that one 
role of law is being "constitutive, in the sense of operating to reconstitute national 
interests."
132
  Therefore, when politicians obey and ignore laws only when and as they 
want, they are actually obstructing a law‟s function to be constitutive, normative and to 
guide future interactions between actors. 
 
7.5.2 Conclusion 
 
It has been mentioned that at the time of the GCC‟s establishment there was a collapse 
of some Arab monarchies, namely the monarchies of Egypt, Iraq and Yemen. These 
countries became republics, in a kind of dramatic revolutionary movement initiated by 
their armies.  Alsdairy characterises the old Arab revolutions the "madness revolution," 
arguing that the Saudi King Faisal Al-Saud succeeded in protecting Saudi Arabia from 
the „mad‟ revolutions in the Arab world.133  Alsdairy noted that  not only was King 
Faisal the only ruler standing up for their monarchy system against surrounding 
revolutions but also that it was one reason for closing the GCC membership since 1981.  
In 2011, history repeated itself with revolutions going on in several Arab countries, but 
this time they were not led by armies against monarchs but by the people against their 
dictatorial governments.  The GCC is simultaneously standing up to limit the influence 
of these Arab revolutions in GCC member countries and playing a key role in these 
revolutions in non-GCC countries.  
 
 
7.6 The GCC’s Intervention in Bahrain 
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The Bahraini people started their demonstrations on 14 February 2011.  If this chapter 
would list these Arab revolutions in chronological order, the Bahrain revolution should 
come before Syria.  However, this Bahraini case is the second case study of this chapter, 
which focuses more on this example because it is a member of the GCC and because the 
GCC took a historical action in this regard.  Thus, its needs more room than they 
previous ones and here is better place as it can be expanded on more.   
 
Demonstrations in Bahrain have already briefly been mentioned, but the matter is 
analysed in more depth here.  This part starts by giving details about the Bahraini issue 
before analysing the two dominant views. On the one hand, Iran holds the perspective is 
that the people of Bahrain are influenced by the Arab Spring and as a result are 
demonstrating against their government to seek more freedoms and democracy.  On the 
other hand, the GCC deems that Iran is directing the demonstrations, in order to remove 
authority from the Bahraini royal family and replace them by Shi‟ah people. 134  
Subsequently, the King of Bahrain Sheikh Hamad Ben Isa Al Khalifa asked for help 
from the GCC through the Peninsula Shield Force, which is the military part of the 
GCC.  Some of the GCC countries responded to the King‟s request and sent their forces 
within the Shield Force to Bahrain. The main part of this force was Saudi.
135
  This case 
study is very important, as it is the first time in its history that the GCC led this type of 
action and it shows how the GCC has become a more effective organisation when the 
matter involves a threat to the governing system in a member country. 
 
7.6.1 Bahrain Issue 
 
While the revolution in Egypt was still active and after the collapse of Mubarak, the 
previous President of Egypt, some Bahraini activists urged the Bahraini people through 
the internet to start mass demonstrations on Monday 14 November 2010 to call on the 
Bahraini government for reform and more freedom.
136
  Two days before the determined 
date, the King of Bahrain Sheikh Hamad Al-Khalifa declared that Bahrain government 
will give every Bahraini family 100 BD (about 2652 $).  However, anti-government 
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protests went ahead on the date (14 February 2011), mainly in the capital city Al-
Manama and especially in Alloloah Circle
137
 to make it as a centre place for their 
demonstrating as same as the Tahrir Square in Cairo.  The Bahrain government 
responded seriously and there were police checkpoints everywhere in Bahrain.
138
  
Bahraini Police fired tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the demonstration; one man 
was killed.
139
 Then after that date, the demonstrations happened from time to time, 
especially on Fridays.  There was some violencesometimes from the police against the 
demonstrators and sometimes vice versa and a number of people from both sides were 
killed or injured.  After weeks of these demonstrations, the King of Bahrain asked the 
GCC leaders to help Bahrain by sending in the Peninsula Shield Force.  More than a 
thousand Saudi military men and five hundreds from UAE with their military vehicles 
entered Bahrain as part of the Peninsula Shield Force to help the Bahraini 
government.
140
  
 
In Bahrain there is a Shi‟ah majority and he Bahraini government perhaps did not 
consider  that it would be safe to raise its army from a Shi'ah population as that could 
open the door to a military coup at any point.  So, the Bahraini government found a 
solution through the GCC, rather than asking Saudi Arabia to help the Bahraini royal 
government with Saudi Sunni forces against Bahraini Shi'ah people.  It appears that 
Bahrain used the force of the GCC because it is an international organisation that 
Bahrain has signed a security agreement with.  What supports this argument more is that 
the Bahraini proposal at the time of the GCC‟s establishment was to create a mobile 
force to respond to any threat.  That proposal, in 1981, reveals that Bahrain was always 
interested in using the GCC force in a first place to handle domestic problems, as it 
knew there was a demographic problem in terms of the ideological differences among 
its population.   
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7. 6. 2 Bahrain View 
 
Bahrain claimed that the protests were controlled by Iran.  Accordingly, Bahraini 
protesters were raising the photo of Khaminey, the Iranian religious leader.
141
 The 
Bahraini government‟s view is that considering the context of the Arab Spring where 
many Arab countries had similar anti-government demonstrations, one may think that 
what happened in Bahrain is the same as in other Arab countries where people were 
demanding freedom and democracy.  There is however evidence to suggest that what 
happened in Bahrain was not in fact revolution but rather an Iranian attempt to conduct 
a coup against the governance of Al-Khalefa because Iran want Bahrain to be like Iraq 
to be able to exert  control over Bahrain. This is supported by some Iranian 
announcements such as a statement by the Special Inspector General for the Supreme 
Leader of Iran, Ali Akbar, claimed in 2009 that Bahrain is not an Arab country, but that 
it is a Persian island and therefore a part of Iran.
142
  Meanwhile The Bahraini Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Khanem AL-Boayneen stated that the Bahraini Police found a lot of 
evidence that Iran was involved and led the Bahraini revolutions and that even Iran 
cannot deny their involvement.
143
  The Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Al-
Khalefa states that the Bahraini request for the Shield Force was to help the Bahraini 
government protect construction, government and public building against any external 
threats, but that they did not ask for help in controlling the national demonstration.
144
 
 
7.6.3  Iranian view 
 
The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Abbar Salehy meanwhile denied any Iranian 
intervention in Bahrain
145
 and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei refused the 
entry of the Peninsula Shield Forces into Bahrain.
146
  Iran declared that they would 
                                                             
141 See Ibid. (19 Mar 2011), 11910.   
142
Al-Quds Al-Arab, newspaper (23 February 2009). 
143 See Al-wasat. Online News. (23 January 2013), 3791. 
144 See Ibid, (12 April 2013), 8370.  
145
Ashaeq Alawsat Newspapers, 23 March 2013, 11803. 
146Ibid..  
 
 
242 
 
respond to the Saudi intervention in Bahrain;
147
 Iran views what happened in Bahrain as 
a Saudi occupation of Bahrain because the Shield Force that entered Bahrain was 
mainly a Saudi force.  Accordingly, Iran requested that the UN Secretary General 
protect the protesters in Bahrain.
148
  Iran also criticised the Bahraini royal family in the 
way they dealt with the protests.
149
  This chapter is not arguing that the Bahraini 
government has not done anything wrong in the way it handled the demonstrating, 
however, the Bahraini government has shown some responsibility.  The Bahraini 
government instructed an independence committee to investigate if the Bahraini police 
men had used unnecessary violence against the demonstrators.  The Committee, which 
was headed by the American/Egyptian law Professor, Cherif Bassiouni, issued a report 
revealing that there were a number of violations of human rights and systematic torture 
of detainees at the hands of the Bahraini Police.  The Bahraini government has 
confessed that there was unnecessary violence by the Police and stated that it will refer 
twenty accusing police men for  investigation. 150   
 
7.6.4 The GCC action 
 
Before the GCC took any action, the Council of Ministers held a meeting in Riyadh on 
10 March 2011 and declared that the GCC rejects any foreign interference in the 
national affairs of any member country.  If any such intervention takes place the GCC 
members will strongly oppose that.  The Council also considers any harm to the security 
of a member state harmful to the security of all member states and will be confronted 
immediately and without any hesitation.151 
 
In response to a Bahraini request, the GCC decided to send several groups of the 
Peninsula Shield Forcesto help the Bahrain government control the country and protect 
their economic assets and governmental buildings without engaging with the anti-
government protesters.  Armed forces from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar 
participated in the force that entered Bahrain under the flag of the Peninsula Shield 
Force, though the main part of this force was Saudi. That may be the reason the King of 
                                                             
147
 Reuters news (15 April 2011) available on http://ara.reuters.com [in Arabic]. 
148 Ibid. 
149  Ibid. 
150
 Ibid. 
151 The Ministers Council, session 118, 10 March 2011 
 
 
243 
 
Bahrain and the GCC Secretary General especially thanked Saudi Arabia in helping 
Bahrain.
152
  The Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Al-Khalefa expresses the 
Bahraini government thankful to all the GCC members especially Saudi Arabia for their 
military help and explains that the Bahraini request for the Shield Force was to help the 
Bahraini government protect construction, government and public building against any 
external threats, but that they did not ask for help in controlling the national 
demonstration.
153
 
 
This military action is in line with the GCC Security Agreement.  The GCC Security 
Agreement states that “out of the a spirit of the sincere brotherhood, stressing the bases 
and principles set by the GCC countries, adhering to the principle that preservation of 
the security and stability of the GCC countries is the joint responsibility of the GCC 
countries, counting on one's own capabilities and the available powers to protect 
security and stability.” 154   This chapter considers this GCC action as a sign of the 
importance of the GCC for ecurity cooperation among its member states.  In this regard, 
the GCC was a crucial body for ensuring the security and stability of the GCC countries 
but as a key tool in the hands of the leaders of the member countries rather than as an 
independent organisation.  In this matter, the GCC was used by its member countries as 
a smokescreen to shape the intervention in Bahrain in an internationally acceptable way, 
a way that is legitimate because it comes under an international organisation through 
which member countries have signed a security agreement giving any member country 
the right to use the GCC force when needed.     
 
 
7.6.5 Kuwait View 
 
There was debate in the Kuwaiti Parliament between two parties opposing those who 
agree that the Shield Force should support the Bahraini Government to control the 
national demonstrations to ensure Bahrain stability and safety and those who are against 
such an intervention because the Shielf Force was created by the GCC to defend 
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member countries against external threats, but not to assist governments against their 
people.
155
 
 
Therefore, Kuwait refused to participate in this force and declared that it would take a 
political and social role in helping Bahrain face the challenge.
156
  This position is in line 
with Kuwait‟s original position that the GCC should not focus on security cooperation, 
as seen in the first chapter.  However, this Kuwaiti position did not last long.  Due to 
significant public demands, the Kuwaiti Government agreed to send military ships to 
help Bahrain.  This chapter argues that this variety of views amongst the member states 
perhaps does not reveal the weakness of the GCC as an independent organisation but 
rather reveals that the main weakness wass that there was no independent decision by 
the GCC to use the force which is under the flag of the GCC, rather it was the decision 
of each member state separately.            
7.6.6 Conclusion 
 
Unlike the rest of the Arabic Spring countries, Bahrain got military support by the GCC.  
Another different was that, as this chapter has argued, there was evidence that the 
demonstration in Bahrain was controlled, to some extent, by Iran.  Without GCC help, 
Bahrain would be in unstable situation.  However, this chapter criticises that the GCC, 
as an organisation represented by the Secretary General, hasd no real role in this action.  
It was the decision of the member countries, mainly Saudi Arabia.  This chapter 
demonstrates that the member countries were able to decide decide whether they should 
participate or not and how many of their military men should help Bahrain, yet the GCC 
should have had a decision making role onthis matter, especially as the Peninsula Shield 
is the military part of the GCC.                   
 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has used the neorealist approach to analyse the identity of the GCC because 
it is a helpful approach in revealing the identity and nature of the GCC.  Neorealism is, 
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as was discussed in chapter two, a theory of security and survival.
157
  This chapter has 
revealed that the key concern of the member countries is the survival of their countries 
and of their Royal governing systems.  This chapter has analysed three main pressures 
which have faced the GCC from 1981 until the present and how the GCC responded to 
these pressures, exploring what this reveals about  the identity of the GCC.  
 
Firstly, the  Nasserism movement which started in the second half of the ninetieth 
century was a real threat to the Arabic monarchies as it involved the call to collapse all 
of the monarchic governments and was a key reason for the collapse or the monarchies 
in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Iraq.  One of the main Nasserism movement‟s goals was to 
free the Arab world from any foreign intervention, especially Western influenced.  This 
chapter has revealed that this political movement (Nasserism) was the main reason that 
the GCC at the outset confirmed its total refusal of any foreign interventions in the 
region, no matter where from, and its commitment to preventing the presence of any 
foreign military fleets or military bases.  It has revealed also that one main reason the 
GCC countries kept their membership closed was because the other Arabic countries 
was more affected by Nasserism.  
 
Secondly, the role of democracy.  The GCC countries tend to stand up for democracy 
because it should lessen the power of the Royal Families.  The leaders of the member 
countries agreed the potential impact of democracy in changing their political systems 
but they keen to slow down this change as much as they can.  This chapter has revealed 
that by the creation of the GCC, the member states leaders are saying “we can” achieve 
stability even without democracy.  This chapter has argued that the leaders of the GCC 
states have succeed so far in maintaining stability as evidence by the relative stability of 
these countries, apart from Bahrain, during the period of the Arabic Spring.   
 
This chapter has considered the Arab Spring as a real test for the GCC.  It has argued 
that the GCC has appeared as an effective tool which was used by the member countries 
to respond to the demonstrations in Bahrain.  This chapter has demonstrated that the 
GCC is an effective organisation but only when the member states want it to be such; it 
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has asserted that the problem here is that the GCC states are keen to present the GCC as 
an independent organisation in public, while in reality it is not.                                
 
Regarding the GCC membership system, this thesis has criticised the way that GCC 
leaders declared their offer of membership to Jordan and Morocco, as this could lead to 
an unwanted reputation that will diminish the position of the GCC as an authentic 
international organisation.  This unwanted reputation could imply that GCC leaders do 
not seriously regard the GCC as a genuine regional or international organisation as they 
ignore the GCC Charter, its history and laws, favouring their political decisions in the 
management of the GCC.   Considering that for the first time, GCC leaders declared 
their willingness to transition from cooperation to union in 2012, as long as the GCC is 
completely controlled by the personal opinions of GCC leaders, the GCC will not be 
able to create the required legal doctrine on which the GCC can develop the structure of 
its cooperation between member countries.  The future generation of GCC leaders will 
find the GCC to be an organisation that was built on the reaction of its leaders in 
accordance with the political environment and not based on legal rules.   
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council is a significantly under-analysed and under critiqued 
organisation in world affairs. This thesis is an attempt in some way to fill that gap. The 
thesis has explained the development of the GCC, as a response to the threats and 
challenges facing the Gulf region after the Second World War, including the rise of 
Nasserism. It has been asserted that the primary motivation of the GCC states was to 
protect their political structures. The structure and operation of the GCC has been 
examined and critiqued highlighting that, while the achievements of the GCC have been 
somewhat limited, they are most apparent in the economic field. Turning to the question 
of law and law-making, it has been argued that the GCC operates primarily through a 
process of soft law making, supported by the incorporation of GCC laws within the 
domestic law of member states. Throughout this analysis and particularly evidenced in 
the final two chapters of this thesis, the purpose has been to consider the role of the 
GCC in a broader, global and political perspective, to look not only at its past but also at 
its future and to identify what role, if any, the GCC has in the modern globalised world.  
 
After World War II “Arab leaders were euphoric at wining independence for their 
countries from colonial powers.  However, their euphoria was dampened by the 
challenge of nation-building”.1 Since then, development has been a primary concern for 
Arab leaders and with development comes change in its different aspects: political, 
social, economic, education etc. “Although Arab leaders were concerned primarily 
about staying in power, they also spent significant amounts of time, energy, and money 
to promote socio-economic and political development in their countries, they expanded 
educational opportunities for their citizens.” 2 While the rest of the Arab world, 
governments and people, were more able to change in response to political movement, 
the GCC countries have remained with their traditional Arabic custom in dealing with 
politics.  This thesis perceives that the GCC countries, when standing up to political 
change, are not afraid of change but they are afraid of leaving the system they know and 
which functions well for them, to an imported new political system.  This unwillingness 
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for political change did not affect their willingness to improve economically.  Jabbra 
highlights this point, he explains “In the oil-producing countries of the Arab World, the 
political leadership continues to consider comprehensive development as its major 
challenge and diversification of the economy as one of its major goals.”3 Many Arab 
countries switched their political systems from monarchies into republics influenced by 
Nasserism.  They then came under the rule of their armies, but in the last few years, they 
have been switching to democracy, but that transformation has not been an easy one, as 
evidenced by the on-going conflict in Syria and the recent civil conflict and unrest in 
Egypt.  This thesis argues that it is not yet time to judge whether the Arab Spring 
countries have succeeded or failed.  However, if they do succeed in becoming stronger 
countries, the GCC countries would face real challenges and pressures to move toward 
democratisation. 
 
The GCC is a realist organisation, mainly a tool in the hands of the leaders of the GCC.    
Realists can explain the primary motivation behind the establishment of the GCC: that 
the leaders of the GCC gathered under this organisation to balance their power against 
opposition countries (Iraq and Iran).  Thus, realists may be better able to tell why such 
an organisation was initially established.  They can explain that the GCC is dominated 
by member countries because, as an international organisation, it is not a real actor and 
cannot be unless member countries want it to be.  They analyse how the small weak 
states would seek to gather together in order to form a stronger union. The neorealists 
can analyse why the GCC has closed membership and why, at the time of the Arab 
Spring, the GCC decided to extend its membership.  They can argue that the concern of 
GCC leaders is not really about the laws that the GCC creates but rather their concerns 
are about their political survival.  Many of these IR scholars are from democratic 
countries.  Therefore, they do not analyse how countries ruled by absolute monarchies 
can be motivated in their international actions by their concern for the survival of their 
existence as rulers of their countries.  This thesis applied neorealist explanations that 
states act internationally in order to ensure their survival, on the actions of the GCC 
countries. 
 
                                                             
3 Ibid. 
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All this can be examined and analysed by the realists, but what the realist cannot explain 
is why the GCC was very successful in resolving the Yemeni Revolution that would 
have likely become a civil war while the GCC countries have not succeeded in resolving 
the Syrian revolution.  With respect to the different nature of the two cases and two 
countries, the GCC appears different in the Yemen case.  By tracing the GCC Secretary-
Generals, this thesis can assume that Al-Ziyani was given more power to freely 
function.  While in the Syrian case the GCC countries worked individually mainly with 
Saudi Arabia expressing its will to support the Syrian people and trying all possible 
means to support them but they could not. The institutionalists can explain here that an 
international organisation can function effectively if it were independent. In term of 
politics, the GCC has to have some level of independence to be able to function better 
and in term of legal framework, the GCC needs to be able to create law.  The legal 
system of the GCC would not be really developed without complying with Hart‟s 
theory, especially delegation, which is creating a GCC court of law.  The leaders of the 
GCC seem either to be unwilling or unable to do so.  It is clear that the GCC 
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes is not a court of law and the GCC therefore 
needs a long time to practice judicial precedents.   
 
Recently, the leaders of the GCC became more active and expressed their need to unite.  
In the Supreme Council meeting number 32 in December 2011, King Abdullah 
proposed to the member countries that they should move to the next step of cooperation 
to become a union.  However, the leaders of the GCC are uninterested or unwilling to 
take this next step. On the other hand, it is fair to conclude this thesis by mentioning that 
the GCC itself and the governments of member states wish to be seen internationally as 
more legitimate taking into account their positive and effective role in the Arab Spring, 
especially with the case of Yemen.  Nowadays, the international powers are discussing 
how to deal with the Syrian revolution utilising a similar initiative as the GCC did for 
Yemen.
4
  That means this recent political work of the GCC can become an example 
other countries may follow.  If this engagement continues there is hope for the future 
that there may develop a more important international role for the GCC in the future. 
                                                             
4
See AsharqAlawsat newspaper (19 Mar 2011), 11910.   
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Annex (1) 
 
The Gulf Co-operation Council's (GCC) 
Security Agreement 
 
The Agreement Reviewed at the GCC Summit in Bahrain, 9-11 November 1982. 
 
Out of the a spirit of the sincere brotherhood, stressing the bases and principles set by 
the GCC countries, adhering to the principle that preservation of the security and 
stability of the GCC countries is the joint responsibility of the GCC countries, counting 
on one's own capabilities and the available powers to protect security and stability and 
moreover to defend the Islamic faith and idealistic views from destructive atheistic 
views and party activities, and in order to make the current security cooperation among 
the GCC countries reach a desirable and comprehensive standard, the GCC members 
countries have agreed on the following: 
 
Chapter 1: General Views 
 
Article I: Abstaining from giving refuge to criminals and opponents of the regimes 
whether they be citizens of the GCC countries or other countries, in addition to 
combating their activities harming the security of any of the GCC countries. 
Article 2: Abstaining from allowing the circulation or transfer of pamphlets, printed 
material or posters that are antagonistic to the Islamic faith or that harm morality, or 
those directed against the ruling regimes of the GCC member Countries. 
Article 3: Every country which signs [this agreement] undertakes to adopt the necessary 
measures to prevent its citizens from interfering in the internal affairs of other member 
countries. 
Article 4: Exchange of information and expertise that helps developing the means to 
fight crime in its various forms, in addition to exchange of laws and regulations dealing 
with activities of the Interior Ministries besides exchanging of books, magazines and 
printed material issued by these ministries, in addition to explanatory method and 
training films that are available 
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Article 5: Providing the necessary facilities in the field of education and training for 
those who work in the GCC Interior Ministries and in the specialized institutes and 
colleges. 
Article 6: All the countries will inform the member countries of scheduled conferences, 
educational sessions and cultural seminars and those dealing with the fields of 
specialization of the Interior Ministries, particularly those dealing with crime fighting, 
traffic, education and 
training, so that the information can be passed on in enough time to those who would be 
most likely to attend. 
Article 7: The Interior Ministries of the member countries should hold consultations. 
Moreover, their representatives should cooperate in order to coordinate and unify their 
stands on issues on the agenda of Arab and international conferences. 
Article 8: Work in the direction of unifying the laws and regulations dealing with 
emigration, passports, residency, nationality and other matters included within the 
responsibilities of the Interior Ministries of the member countries. 
Article 9: The member countries should cooperate and provide the necessary facilities 
for the concerned authorities in these countries in order to put this agreement in to 
effect. 
 
Chapter 2: Combating of Infiltration and Smuggling 
 
Article 10 : the member countries should exert the necessary efforts to combat 
infiltration through the common borders and undertake legal or suitable disciplinary 
measures against those who carry out such acts or play a role in these activities. 
Article 11 : The infiltrators will be arrested by the concerned authorities of the member 
countries and legal or disciplinary measures will be taken against them. They will be 
arrested in accordance with the following: 
A. Those who infiltrate the territories of one of the member countries illegally will be 
returned to the border post of the country from which they entered illegally. 
B. Those with unknown identities and infiltrators who cross the border of a country after 
infiltrating another country's border or even making several infiltrations will be subject 
to the laws of the country that arrests them in regard to dealing with their cases. 
Article 12 : Pursuit patrols belonging to any of the members countries have no right to 
cross the border of a neighbouring country, except for a distance not to exceed 20 km in 
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order to arrest those being pursued. Those pursued and all they have with them, 
including their vehicles, are to be handed over to the nearest post belonging to the 
country in whose territory the chase began, if they were arrested within the said 
distance. The principle of the immediate handing over of [those pursued] will be 
applicable if said persons were arrested at a farther distance by patrols belonging to the 
sovereign country, in the event they took part in the pursuit operation. 
Article 13 : The following should be observed during pursuit: 
A. Pursuit vehicles should bear official marks and should be distinctive. 
B. The number of pursuit vehicles must not exceed three. 
C. The squad of pursuit must not exceed 13 persons. 
D. Vehicles and individuals are to be armed lightly in accordance with what the Interior 
Ministers will later agree upon. 
E. Pursuit operations should stop as soon as the patrols reach the nearest city, village or 
a group of  bedouin camps. 
The rules of this article apply to sea pursuit provided the means listed in the above 
points are 
made applicable. 
Article 14 : Security authorities at the borders are to be informed of the pursuit 
whenever possible and pursuit patrols should inform the nearest official body at the site 
where an arrest is made as soon as the pursuit operation is concluded in the territory of 
the neighbouring country, whether the result is positive or negative. This should be in 
accordance with an official report signed by both sides. 
Article 15 : Patrol meetings and joint patrols can be organized at the adjacent border 
regions of the member countries when there is a need to do so. Regular meetings are to 
be held between the officials of border post of the member countries for this purpose. 
 
Chapter 3: Crime Prevention 
 
Article 16 : The names of dangerous ex-convicts and suspects are to be exchanged and 
the movements of such persons are to be reported. They are to be prevented from 
travelling whenever possible. Names of personae non grata are also to be exchanged. 
Article 17 : Contacts among specialized bodies are to be consolidated through criminal 
detection and search in the member countries in order to report any information 
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available to these bodies on criminal operations that took place or that are being planned 
in the territories of these countries or abroad. 
Article 18 : The special body in each member country shall inform counterparts in the 
other countries of what they have in regard to new crimes, the methods by which they 
were adopted to pursue them and eliminate them. 
Article 19 : The specialized bodies in each of the member countries shall search for 
suspects, criminals and escapees, place them under observation or even under detention 
pending investigation when necessary, prior to their extradition in accordance with the 
rules of this agreement. In order to achieve cooperation in this field, official contacts 
through post, cable, telephone or other means will be approved. 
Article 20: The specialized authorities in each member country shall offer-in accordance 
with the laws and systems enacted therein-the required help with regard to crimes that 
are to be pursued by one of the member countries particularly as pertains to delivering 
extradition or present memoranda, implementing authorization to question suspects or 
witnesses and carrying out other services such as examining, searching and arresting. 
Article 21 : The member countries shall adopt the necessary measures to preserve the 
secrecy of information and materials exchanged between them whenever such things are 
characterized as secret by the country that delivers them. It is not allowed to hand the 
information and material delivered in accordance with this agreement over to any other 
country that is not a GCC member except upon the approval of the country that delivers 
them. 
 
Chapter 4: Extraditing Criminals 
 
Article 22: Extraditing criminals among the member countries becomes mandatory if 
the following two conditions exist in the request: 
A. If, according to its classification by the specialized body of the requesting country 
and in accordance with the rules enacted therein, the crime represents an offense whose 
penalty is not less than a 6-month imprisonment. 
B. If the crime is committed in the territory of the requesting country or outside the 
territories of both countries provided that both countries' laws allow punishment for an 
offense perpetrated outside their territories. 
Article 23: The country that requested to extradite criminals has the right to refuse to do 
so in the following situations: 
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A. If the person to be extradited held its nationality at the time of perpetrating the crime, 
provided that it will in this case prosecute him according to its laws and systems and in 
accordance with a report to be prepared by the authorities concerned in the requesting 
country. It also has to inform the requesting country of the result of its judgment. 
B. If the crime took place in the territory of the requesting country by the person to be 
extradited is not one of its nationals provided that the offense he is charged with is an 
indictable offense according to the law of the system of the country requested to 
extradite him. 
C. If the crime took place outside the territories of both countries, provided that the laws 
or systems of the country requested to extradite the offender do not consider his offense 
indictable if committed outside its territory if the indicated person is not a citizen of the 
requesting country. 
D. If the crime or penalty had already dropped when the extradition requested was 
received, in case the crime was committed in the territories of the requested country, 
provided the wanted person is not a citizen of the requesting country and provided the 
crime is not murder. 
Article 24: Extradition is not allowed in the following cases: 
1. If it is a political crime. The following are not regarded as political crimes: 
A. Sabotage, terrorism, murder, robbery and theft accompanied by acts of force whether 
committed by one person or a number of persons. 
B. Any financial assault against the leaders of the member countries, their assets, 
branches or wives. 
C. Assaulting the heirs apparent, royal family members. ministers and those ruling in the 
member countries. 
D. Military crimes. 
E. punishment for the above-mentioned crimes in Articles A, B, C D, if the laws of rules 
of the two countries cover such acts. 
2. If the crime was committed in the territories of a country which is requested to 
extradite. 
3. If the individual in question is a member of the diplomatic corps and has diplomatic 
immunity or any other individual with immunity according to international law or any 
other treaties and characters. 
4. If the person to be extradited has been tried or was under investigation or on trial for 
crime for which his extradition is requested, whether it was in the country which is 
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requested to extradite or in the other in which the crime was committed. the latter is 
duty-bound to the country requesting extradition. 
Article 25: 
A. If the country which receives the extradition request has a number of requests from 
other countries regarding the same person for the same crime, the deciding factor will be 
which country's interests were harmed by the crime rather than where the crime was 
committed. 
b. If the requests for extradition are for various crimes, the deciding factor will be the 
dates the extradition requests were made. 
Article 26: If the wanted person is being prosecuted legally or has been sentenced for 
another crime in the country which received the extradition request, the decision on this 
request will be postponed until his prosecution ends, or it has been decided not to try 
him, or he is declared innocent or not responsible, or he is sentenced for punishment or 
exempted, or his detention has ended due to the dropping of the charges. It is possible to 
send the wanted person temporarily to the country requesting him so that he may appear 
before the authorities concerned on the condition that these authorities guarantee to send 
him back after his questioning or trial for which his extradition was demanded, and keep 
him detained according to the sentence or decision issued by the authorities of the 
country which extradited him. 
Article 2 7: 
A. The extradition request from the concerned side in the requesting country must be 
presented to the concerned sued in the country which is requested to extradite. 
B. The file of the requested must include: 
1. a detailed statement on the identity of the wanted person and his description, with an 
accompanying photograph if possible. 
2. Memorandum of arrest or request for appearance from the concerned authority if the 
person has been sentenced. 
3. Certified copy of the texts that demand punishment for the deed and a detailed 
statement from the concerned side which includes relevant correspondence and 
evidences proving the responsibility of the wanted person. 
4. A certified copy of the sentence whether the wanted person has been sentenced or 
not. 
5. A statement from the authorities concerned with the case not to drop the charges in 
accordance to the laws of the rules of their country. 
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6. Confirmation that the request corresponds to the rules of this agreement. 
Article 28: An exception to the above-mentioned articles is that the country which is 
requested to extradite can extradite the wanted person, if he admits that he committed 
the crime he is charged with, the crime is one of those which requires extradition 
according to the articles of this agreement, and the wanted person agrees to be 
extradited without a file requesting his extradition, then the concerned authorities can 
order his extradition. 
Article 29: 
A. The authorities concerned in the country requesting extradition and the country being 
asked to extradite will de cede according to the laws or pertinent rules of each during the 
presentation of the request. 
B. The concerned side in the country which is requested to extradite will inform the 
concerned side in the country requesting extradition about the decision issued on the 
extradition request whether negative or positive, and explanation will be provided when 
an extradition request is denied. 
Article 30: The detention of an individual who has been requested for extradition should 
not exceed 30 days in the country which has received the extradition request. The 
individual should be released if during the above-mentioned period a request file does 
not arrive or the concerned country does not ask for the renewal of his detention for a 
maximum of 30 more days, on condition that the period of temporary imprisonment will 
be deducted from the sentence imposed by the country which requested the extradition. 
The authorities concerned, which are requested to extradite by post, cable or telephone, 
can ascertain the validity of this request by asking for further information from the 
authorities concerned in the country which made the request. 
Article 31: The country which is requested to extradite turns over everything related to 
the crime in the possession of the wanted person when arrested in accordance with the 
rules or laws of the country which has received the extradition request. 
Article 32: The wanted person is to be tried in the country requesting his extradition for 
the crimes he was extradited for and any deeds related to it, as well as any crimes he 
committed after his extradition. It is also possible to try him for crimes which were not 
listed in the extradition request as long as the statute of limitations has not run out in 
accordance to the laws or rules of the two countries. 
Article 33: The country requesting extradition pays all the expenses required for the 
execution of the extradition request. It also Pays all the expenses of the individual 
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involved, including those incurred in returning to the place he was extradited from if his 
not responsibility or innocence is proved. 
Article 34: The country requesting extradition must come forward to receive the wanted 
person within 30 days after the date the notification cable was sent regarding the 
issuance of extradition decision, or else the country which requested the extradite can 
realest the wanted person. He cannot be detained for extradition again for the same 
crime. 
Article 35: This agreement does not impair the bilateral agreements made between 
countries. In the event that the rules of this agreement contradict the rules of any of 
these bilateral agreements, the two countries should apply the more applicable rules in 
extraditing criminals. 
Article 36: This agreement will be ratified by the signing countries in accordance to 
their legal systems within 4 months after its signing. The ratification documents will be 
kept at the CCC General Secretariat, which will prepare a file on the ratification 
documents of each country and will notify all other member countries upon receipt of 
said documents. 
Article 37: This agreement becomes valid after I month from the date that all ratification 
documents are received from the signatory countries. 
Article 38: Agreement among one-third of the signatory countries is required to revise 
or cancel the terms of this agreement. 
Article 39: Any member country party to this agreement can withdraw from it by 
announcing its intention to do so to the GCC General Secretariat. The withdrawal 
becomes effective 6 months after notification of the intention. This agreement remains 
valid regarding extradition requests until the end of the 6-month period. 
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Annex (2) 
 
The Economic Agreement 
Between the GCC States 
 
Adopted by the GCC Supreme Council 
(22nd Session; 31 December 2001) 
in the City of Muscat, Sultanate of Oman 
Introduction 
 
This publication the contains the text of the Economic Agreement Between the Gulf 
Cooperation Council States (the “Economic Agreement”) signed by their Majesties and 
Highnesses GCC leaders, on December 31, 2001 (Shawwal 16, 1422 AH) during the 
22nd Session of the Supreme Council in Muscat, Sultanate of Oman.  
 
The new Economic Agreement contains a comprehe-nsive revision of the original 
Economic Agreement that was signed in November 1981 (Muharram 1402 AH), which 
laid down the ground for the economic relationship among Member States and 
established the GCC Free Trade Area. The 1981 agreement emerged from the economic 
circumstances prevailing at the time it was drawn up, just a few months after the 
establishment of the GCC. Similarly, the new agreement is a reflection of the current 
circumstances of the GCC Member States. The new Economic Agreement furthers the 
objectives achieved by the 1981 agreement, enhancing and strengthening economic ties 
among Member States, and harmonizing their economic, financial and monetary 
policies, their commercial and industrial laws, as well as their customs regulations. 
 
During the first two decades of the GCC existence, Member Sates succeeded in 
developing their economic ties to bring them closer to full economic integration and 
economic unity. The Supreme Council, during its annual meetings, adopted several vital 
resolutions in the economic field that pushed joint economic action great steps ahead. 
The most important resolutions have been those relating to the GCC customs union, the 
common market, development integration, and the economic and monetary union. 
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To provide the legal environment required to cope with these developments, the 
Supreme Council, in its 20th Session (Riyadh, November 1999), ordered a revision of 
the 1981 economic agreement to bring it into line with the new developments in GCC 
joint economic action and to complete the requirements of economic integration among 
the Member Sates, taking into account the new global economic environment.  
 
To carry out the Supreme Council‟s instructions, the Secretariat General was instructed 
to prepare a draft revised economic agreement and submit it to Member States to 
propose any addition, deletion or amendment to the provisions of the agreement, after 
which it was required to submit the revised draft to GCC competent committees. After 
the preliminary draft was prepared and submitted to Member States for consideration, a 
technical team was formed from Member States and the Secretariat General to examine 
the draft agreement in light of Member States‟ comments. The team held intensive 
meetings in February and March 2001 where the proposals and comments of Member 
States were discussed and the draft agreement was amended accordingly. A Committee 
of the GCC Deputy Ministers of Finance and Economy was convened in two meetings 
in April and September 2001 to study the new revised draft. The Financial and 
Economic Committee (FEC) in its 55th meeting (May 2001), and 56th meeting (October 
2001) reviewed the draft agreement as amended by the deputy ministers‟ committee. In 
its extraordinary meeting held in December 2001, the FEC adopted the final draft 
agreement, which the Ministerial Council (in its 81st Session, December 2001) then 
submitted to the Supreme Council for approval. Their Majesties and Highnesses GCC 
leaders signed the Economic Agreement between the GCC States on 31 December 2001 
during the 22nd Session (the Muscat Summit). The agreement is now in the process of 
being ratified by the Member States and will come into force thereafter.  
 
The preparation of the new Economic Agreement was an excellent example of joint 
work, as a large number of experts from various GCC governmental agencies and the 
Secretariat General contributed over two years to the preparation and revision of the 
draft treaty. The technical team assigned to this task and the other committees made 
great efforts in updating the original agreement, to come up with a text that reflects the 
achievements of GCC joint economic action in the past two decades and future 
aspirations of GCC citizens.  
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The new agreement contains new provisions or substantially revised ones that reflect 
Supreme Council resolutions and directives, as well as new developments in GCC joint 
work, such as provisions relating to the Customs Union (Chapter I), Common Market 
(Chapter II), Economic and Monetary Union (Chapter III), Development Integration 
(Chapter IV), Human Resources Development (Chapter V), Cooperation in the Fields of 
Scientific and Technical Research (Chapter VI), Transportation, Communications and 
Infrastructure (Chapter VII). 
 
 The new agreement represents a new style of GCC joint work as it does not only call 
for cooperation and coordination among Member States, but goes beyond that to 
expressly provide for the economic integration among Member States through the 
adoption of specific programs and workable mechanisms. The GCC working 
committees and the Secretariat General will follow up the implementation of the 
agreement according to specific timetables. Chapter VIII contains mechanisms for 
implementation and follow-up, as well as settlement of disputes that might arise during 
implementation of the treaty.  
 
January 2002  
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The Economic Agreement 
Between the Gulf Cooperation Council States 
(The Economic Agreement) 
 
The GCC Member States, 
Pursuant to the GCC Charter which calls for closer ties and stronger links 
among Member States; and 
 
In the light of reviewing the economic achievements attained since the inception 
of the Council, including accomplishments attained by the Economic Agreement 
signed in 1981 in developing, which include enhancing and strengthening economic 
ties among Member States, and harmonizing their economic, financial and monetary 
policies, their commercial and industrial legislation and customs laws applicable 
therein, including the agreement on the customs union; and 
 
Seeking to achieve advanced stages of economic integration that would lead to a 
Common Market and an Economic and Monetary Union among Member States 
according to a specific timetable, while enhancing market mechanisms and fostering 
the role of the private sector; and 
 
Desiring to enhance the economy of the GCC Member States in the light of 
recent global economic developments, which require further integration among the 
Member States to strengthen their negotiating position and competitive capacity in 
international markets; and 
 
Responding to the aspirations and expectations of GCC citizens towards 
achieving Gulf citizenship, including equality of treatment in the exercise of their 
rights to movement, residence, work, investment, education, health and social 
services, 
Have hereby agreed as follows: 
 
Chapter I 
Trade 
Article One: The Customs Union 
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Trade between the GCC member States will be conducted within the framework 
of a customs union that will be implemented no later than the first of January 2003. It 
shall include, at a minimum, the following: 
 
i. A common external customs tariff (CET). 
ii. Common customs regulations and procedures. 
iii. Single entry point where customs duties are collected. 
iv. Elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers, while taking into consideration 
laws of agricultural and veterinarian quarantine, as well as rules regarding 
prohibited and restricted goods. 
v. Goods produced in any Member State shall be accorded the same treatment as 
national products. 
 
Article Two: International Economic Relations 
To secure better terms and more favorable conditions in their international 
economic relationships, Member States shall draw their policies and conduct 
economic relations in a collective fashion in dealing with other countries, blocs and 
regional groupings, as well as other regional and international organizations. 
 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to achieve this objective, 
including the following: 
 
i. Negotiate collectively in a manner that serves the negotiating position of the 
Member States. 
ii. Collectively conclude economic agreements with trading partners. 
iii. Unify import and export rules and procedures. 
iv. Unify commercial exchange policies with the outside world. 
 
Chapter II 
GCC Common Market 
Article Three 
 
GCC natural and legal citizens shall be accorded, in any Member State, the same 
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treatment accorded to its own citizens, without differentiation or discrimination, in all 
economic activities, especially the following: 
 
1. Movement and residence 
2. Work in private and government jobs 
3. Pension and social security. 
4. Engagement in all professions and crafts 
5. Engagement in all economic, investment and service activities 
6. Real estate ownership 
7. Capital movement 
8. Tax treatment 
9. Stock ownership and formation of corporations 
10. Education, health and social services 
 
Member States shall agree to complete implementation rules sufficient to carry 
this out and bring into being the Gulf Common Market. 
 
Chapter III 
Economic and Monetary Union 
Article Four: Monetary and Economic Union Requirements 
 
For the purpose of achieving a monetary and economic union between Member States, 
including currency unification, Member States shall undertake, according to a specified 
timetable, to achieve the requirements of this union. These include the achievement of a 
high level of harmonization between Member States in all economic policies, especially 
fiscal and monetary policies, banking legislation, setting criteria to approximate rates of 
economic performance related to fiscal and monetary stability, such as rates of 
budgetary deficit, indebtedness, and price levels. 
 
Article Five: Investment Climate 
 
For the purpose of enhancing local, external, and intra-GCC investment levels, and 
provide an investment climate characterized by transparency and stability, Member 
States agree to take the following steps: 
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1. Unify all their investment-related laws and regula-tions. 
2. Accord national treatment to all investments owned by GCC natural and legal 
citizens. 
3. Integrate financial markets in Member States, and unify all related legislation and 
policies. 
4. Adopt unified standards and specifications for all products, according to the 
Charter of the GCC Standardization and Metrology Organization. 
 
Article Six: Regional and International Aid 
 
Member States shall coordinate their external policies related to international and 
regional development aid. 
 
 
Chapter IV 
Development Integration 
 
Article Seven: Comprehensive Development 
 
Member States shall adopt the policies necessary to achieve an integrated development 
process in all fields in all GCC states and deepen coordination between all activities 
contained in their national development plans. These policies shall include the 
implementation of the Long-term Comprehensive Development Strategy of the GCC 
Member States. 
 
Article Eight: Industrial Development 
 
i. Member States shall adopt the policies necessary to enhance the participation of the 
industrial sector in the economy, coordination of industrial activity on a GCC-wide 
integrated basis, including the implementation of the Unified Strategy of Industrial 
Development for the GCC Member States. 
ii. Member States shall unify their industrial legislation and regulations, 
including rules related to industry promotion, anti-dumping, and precautionary 
 
 
289 
 
safeguards. 
 
Article Nine: Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources 
 
For the purpose of achieving integration between Member States in the fields of 
petroleum and minerals industries, and other natural resources, and enhancing 
competitive position of Member States, 
 
1. Member States shall adopt integrated policies in all phases of oil, gas, and minerals 
industries to achieve optimal exploitation of natural resources, while taking into account 
environmental considerations and the interests of future generations. 
2. Member States shall adopt unified policies for oil and gas, and take common 
positions in this regard towards non-member states and at international and specialized 
organizations. 
3. Member States and oil and gas companies working within them shall cooperate in 
supporting and developing research in the fields of oil, gas, and natural resources, and 
enhance cooperation with universities in these fields. 
 
Article Ten: Agricultural Development 
 
Member States shall adopt the policies necessary to achieve agricultural integration 
between them, and long-tem optimal utilization of available resources, especially water, 
including the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the GCC Member 
States and related GCC legislation. 
 
Article Eleven: Environmental Protection 
 
Member States shall adopt the policies and mechanisms necessary to protect the 
environment according to all relevant legislation and resolutions adopted within the 
GCC framework, as representing the minimum level for national rules and legislation. 
 
Article Twelve: Joint Projects 
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For the purpose of enhancing ties between Member States in the productive sectors, 
utilizing economies of scale, achieving economic integration, and improving the 
distribution of integration benefits among them, Member States shall undertake the 
measures necessary to support, finance, and form joint projects, both private and public, 
including the following: 
 
1. Adopt integrated economic policies between the Member States for 
infrastructure projects and basic services such as transport; communications; 
electricity; information technology; health, education, and tourism projects; 
and oil and gas industry. 
2. Establish joint projects based on comparative advantages of Member States. 
3. Provide additional incentives for the private sector to form joint projects that 
interlink the economic interests of GCC citizens. 
4. Eliminate all procedural obstacles encountering joint projects and according 
them, at a minimum, the same treatment given to similar national projects. 
 
Chapter Five 
Development of Human Resources 
Article Thirteen: Population Strategy 
 
Member States shall implement the “General Framework of Population Strategy of the 
GCC States”, adopt the policies necessary for the development of human resources and 
their optimal utilization, provision of health care and social services, enhancement of the 
role of women in development, and the achievement of balance in the demographic 
structure and labor force to ensure social harmony in Member States, emphasize their 
Arab and Islamic identity, and maintain their stability and solidarity. 
 
Article Fourteen: Compulsory Basic Education and Eradication of Illiteracy 
 
1. Member States shall adopt the programs required for the total eradication of 
illiteracy in all GCC states according to a specific timetable, and enact 
necessary legislation to this effect. 
2. Member States shall adopt a timetable for the implementation of compulsory 
basic education and enact necessary legislation to this effect. 
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Article fifteen: Education 
 
1. Member States shall cooperate to develop programs and curricula of public, higher, 
and technical education, to ensure high levels of scientific content and compatibility 
with the development needs of Member States. 
2. Member States shall undertake to achieve integration between GCC universities in all 
fields. 
3. Member States shall adopt appropriate policies and mechanisms to ensure 
compatibility between the outputs of higher education and scientific and technical 
research on the one hand, and the needs of the labor market and economic development, 
on the other. 
 
Article Sixteen: Manpower Nationalization 
 
1. Member States shall undertake the policies necessary to develop and unify their labor 
rules and legislation, eliminate all obstacles restricting intra-GCC movement of national 
labor force. GCC citizens working in a member State other than their countries of 
citizenship shall be included within the percentages set for manpower nationalization. 
2. Member States shall adopt unified criteria for job description and classification for all 
professions and trades in all sectors, and undertake to develop and exchange all 
information related to their labor markets, including unemployment rates, job 
opportunities and training programs. 
 
Article Seventeen: Increasing Labor Participation Rates and Training of 
Nationals 
 
i. Member States shall adopt effective policies to increase participation rates of nationals 
in the labor market, especially in high-skill jobs, and adopt effective programs to raise 
the skill levels of national labor force, develop on-the-job training programs, participate 
in financing such programs, and provide incentives for job seekers in the private sector. 
Aid granted to the private sector shall be linked with the adoption of programs intended 
for the employment and training of national manpower. 
ii. Member States shall adopt the policies necessary for rationalizing the 
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employment of foreign workers. 
 
Chapter VI 
Scientific and Technical Research 
Article Eighteen: Scientific and Technical Research 
 
Member States shall adopt, as basic priorities for development, policies to support joint 
scientific and technical research, and develop their own joint scientific, technical, and 
information technology databases, including the adoption of the following policies: 
 
1. Increase the funds allocated to scientific and technical research. 
2. Encourage and provide the necessary incentives to the private sector to contribute to 
the funding of specialized scientific and technical research, 
3. Ensure that international companies operating in the GCC States sponsor specialized 
programs for scientific and technical research in the Member States. 
4. Establish a native scientific, technical, and information technology base that fully 
utilizes the expertise of international and regional organizations. 
5. Integrate scientific research institutions in the GCC States in order to develop and 
activate the scientific, technical, and information technology base referred to in this 
article and work jointly to set up common research centers. 
 
Article Nineteen: Utilization of the Scientific, Technical, and Information 
Technology Base 
 
For the purposes of developing and fully utilizing their scientific, technical, and 
information technology base, Member States shall take the following measures, as a 
minimum: 
 
1. Develop mechanisms for achieving optimal utilization of scientific and technical 
research in both public and private sectors, and continued coordination between the 
executive bodies on the one hand and the outputs of the scientific, technical, and 
information technology base, on the other. 
2. Make the outputs of the scientific, technical, and information technology base 
available to specialists, researchers, businessmen, and investors through simplified 
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procedures. 
3. Support and develop technical information networks, systems and centers in 
member states, and adopt programs to facilitate information dissemination and 
exchange among the institutions of scientific and technical research in the GCC 
States. 
 
Article Twenty: Intellectual Property 
 
Member States shall develop programs encouraging talented individuals and supporting 
innovation and invention; cooperate in the field of intellectual property and develop 
regulations and procedures ensuring protection of intellectual property rights; and 
coordinate their relevant policies towards other countries, regional blocs and 
international and regional organizations. 
 
Chapter VII 
Transportation, Communication, and Infrastructure 
Article Twenty-one: Means of Transportation 
Member States shall accord all means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging 
to any Member State, while transiting or entering their territories, the same treatment 
accorded to their national means of transportation, including the level of duties, taxes 
and facilities. 
 
Article Twenty-two: Marine Transportation Services 
 
Member States shall accord marine means of transportation belonging to any Member 
State and cargoes thereof the same preferential treatment they grant to their national 
counterparts in the use of their facilities, whether during docking or while calling at 
their ports, including fees and taxes, as well as services of pilotage, docking, freight, 
loading, unloading, maintenance, repair and storage. 
 
Article Twenty-three: Infrastructure Integration 
 
1. Member States shall adopt integrational policies for the establishment of the 
infrastructure projects such as seaports, airports, desalination plants, electric power 
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stations, and roads. These policies should aim to facilitate trade exchange between 
member states, realize common economic development, and interlink their economic 
activities. 
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure integration of their 
aviation and air transport policies. 
3. Member States shall develop and integrate the various means of land and marine 
transportation in order to facilitate the movement of citizens and goods and achieve 
economies of scale. 
 
Article Twenty-four: Communications 
 
Member States shall take all the necessary measures to ensure the integration of their 
communication policies, including telecommunication, post and data network services, 
which would lead to improving their service levels and economic efficiency and to 
strengthening the ties between GCC citizens as well as private and public institutions. 
 
 
 
 
Article Twenty-five: Electronic Commerce 
 
Member States shall take all necessary actions to facilitate banking and trade exchange 
through electronic means of communication, and unify their electronic 
commerce legislation. 
 
Chapter VIII 
Mechanisms for Implementation and Follow-up 
Article Twenty-six: Implementation of the Agreement 
 
1. Committees working under the framework of the GCC shall implement this 
Agreement, each within its competence. 
2. The Secretariat General shall follow up implementation of the Agreement. 
3. Member States shall provide the Secretariat General with periodic reports regarding 
implementation of the provisions of this Agreement and the applicable resolutions taken 
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to implement those provisions. In the light of these reports, the Secretary General shall 
submit a comprehensive periodic report to the Supreme Council. The Secretariat 
General shall set a mechanism for the preparation of these reports, their contents, and 
the completion dates thereof. 
 
Article Twenty-seven: Settlement of Disputes 
 
1. The Secretariat General shall hear and seek to amicably settle any claims brought by 
any GCC citizen or official entity, regarding non-implementation of the provisions of 
this Agreement or enabled resolutions taken to implement those provisions. 
2. If the Secretariat General could not settle a claim amicably, it shall be referred, with 
the consent of the two parties, to the GCC Commercial Arbitration Center to hear the 
dispute according to its Charter. Should the two parties not agree to refer the dispute to 
arbitration, or should the dispute be beyond the competence of the Center, it shall be 
referred to the judicial body set forth in Paragraph 3 of this Article. 
3. A specialized judicial commission shall be formed, when deemed necessary, to 
adjudicate disputes arising from the implementation of this Agreement or resolutions for 
its implementation. The Financial and Economic Committee shall propose the charter of 
this commission. 
4. Until the charter of the commission referred to in paragraph (3) above comes into 
force, all disputes which the two parties do not agree to settle through arbitaration and 
which could not be amicably settled by the Secretariat General, shall be referred to the 
competent GCC committees for settlement. 
 
Chapter IX 
Final Provisions 
Article Twenty-eight: Ratification and publication 
 
Member States shall take all measures necessary to ratify this Agreement and the 
relevant resolutions for its implementation, publish them in the official notification 
media, and implement them according to their provisions. 
 
Article Twenty-nine: Coming into force 
 
 
 
296 
 
This Agreement shall come into force after being ratified by all Member States. The 
Secretariat General shall notify member States of the date of its coming into force. 
 
Article Thirty: Exclusion 
 
A Member State may be granted a temporary exclusion from implementing certain 
provisions of this Agreement as may be necessary due to temporary local situations 
prevailing in that State or specific circumstances encountered. Such exclusion shall be 
for only a limited period and shall be authorized only by a resolution from the Supreme 
Council. 
 
Article Thirty-one: External bilateral agreements 
 
No Member State may grant to a non-Member State any preferential treatment 
exceeding that granted herein to Member States, nor conclude any agreement that 
violates provisions of this agreement. 
 
Article Thirty-two: Precedence of the provisions of the Agreement 
 
1. 1. The provisions of this Agreement shall have prevail if found in disagreement with 
local laws and regulations of the Member States. 
2. 2. This Agreement shall supersede the GCC Economic Agreement signed in 1981 AD 
(1402 AH), and the provisions contained herein shall supersede equivalent provisions 
set forth in bilateral agreements (between member states). 
3. 3. Until the GCC Customs Union is established, the provisions of Article 3 of the 
GCC Economic Agreement signed in 1981 AD (1402 AH) shall continue to be applied. 
The percentage of the added value provided for in said Article may be amended by a 
decision of the Financial and Economic Committee. 
 
Article Thirty-three: Amendment and Interpretation 
 
1. This Agreement may not be amended without approval of the Supreme Council. 
2. The Financial and Economic Committee shall be authorized to interpret this 
Agreement.  
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Signed in the city of Muscat (Sultanate of Oman) on Monday, 16 Shawwal 1422 
AH, corresponding to 31 December 2001 AD.  
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Annex (3) 
 
EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement 
 
 
COOPERATION AGREEMENT between the European Economic Community, of the 
one part, and the countries parties to the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf (the State of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of 
Kuwait) of the other part 
PREAMBLE 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, hereinafter referred to as 'the 
Community‟, of the one part, and 
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE COUNTRIES PARTIES TO THE CHARTER OF 
THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF (the 
State of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait), hereinafter referred 
to as 'the GCC Countries' of the other part, 
HAVING REGARD to the traditional bonds of friendship between the Member States 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Member States of Community, 
RECOGNIZING that the establishment of contractual relations between the community 
and the GCC Countries will help to promote overall cooperation between equal partners 
on mutually advantageous terms in all spheres between the two regions and further their 
economic development, taking into consideration the differences in levels of 
development of the parties, 
CONFIRMING their political will to establish a new structure for a comprehensive 
dialogue between the Community and the GCC Countries in order to broaden and 
consolidate cooperation between the two regions, 
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EMPHASIZING the fundamental importance attached by the parties to consolidating 
and strengthening regional integration, a key factor in the development of the GCC 
Countries and the stability of the Gulf region, 
EMPHASIZING the parties' determination to cooperate with a view to improving the 
world economic and energy situation, 
REAFFIRMING that cooperation between the Community and the GCC Countries is 
complementary to the Euro-Arab dialogue and not a substitute for it, 
REAFFIRMING their attachment to the principles of the United Nations Charter, 
RECOGNIZING the positive role of the GCC for the preservation of peace, security and 
stability of the Gulf region, 
RESOLVED to provide a sounder basis for cooperation in conformity with international 
obligations, 
HAVE DECIDED to conclude this Agreement and to this end have designated as their 
plenipotentiaries: 
FOR THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: 
Mr Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER 
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
President-in-Office of the Council of the European Communities, 
Mr Claude CHEYSSON 
Member of the Commission of the European Communities, 
FOR THE GOVERNMENTS OF COUNTRIES PARTIES TO THE CHARTER OF 
THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF: 
HRH Prince Saud AL-FAISAL 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, President-in-Office of the 
Ministerial  
Council of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 
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H. E. ABDULLAH YAKOOB BISHARA 
Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
WHO, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
General objectives 
Article 1 
1. The Contracting Parties hereby agree that the main objectives of this Cooperation 
Agreement are as follows: 
(a) to strengthen relations between the European Economic Community, on the one 
hand, and the GCC countries, on the other, by placing them in an institutional and 
contractual framework; 
(b) to broaden and consolidate their economic and technical cooperation relations and 
also cooperation in energy, industry, trade and services, agriculture, fisheries, 
investment, science, technology and environment, on mutually advantageous terms, 
taking into account the differences in levels of development of the Parties; 
(c) to help strengthen the process of economic development and diversification of the 
GCC countries and so reinforce the role of the GCC in contributing to peace and 
stability in the region. 
2. Cooperation in particular fields will be governed by the provisions hereafter. 
Econmic cooperation 
Article 2 
In the light of their mutual interests and in accordance with their long-term economic 
objectives, the Contracting Parties undertake to establish within the limits of their 
competence, the broadest possible economic cooperation from which no field shall be 
excluded in advance. 
Article 3 
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1. In the economic and technical fields, the Contracting Parties shall strive to encourage 
and facilitate, inter alia: 
- the efforts made by the GCC countries to develope their productive sectors and the 
economic infrastructure in order to diversify the structure of their economies, taking into 
account the mutual interest of the Parties, 
- market surveys and trade promotion by both parties on their respective markets and on 
other markets, 
- the transfer and development of technology, in particular through joint ventures 
between undertakings and institutions in the two regions (research, production, goods 
and services), and to this end, and in the framework of their respective legislation, 
appropriate arrangements between undertakings and institutions within the Community 
and those of the GCC countries, with a view to protecting patents, trademarks and other 
intellectual property rights, 
- the promotion of cooperation on a long-term basis between undertakings of the two 
Parties in order to establish more stable and balanced links between the respective 
economies, 
- the promotion of cooperation in the fields of standards and measurements, 
- the exchange of available information on short and medium-term prospects and 
forecasts for production, consumption and trade, 
- training. 
2. The specific aspects of cooperation will be dealt with by the provisions hereafter. 
Article 4 
In the field of agriculture, agri-industry and fisheries, the Contracting Parties shall strive 
to encourage and facilitate, inter alia: 
- the stepping-up of exchanges of information on developments in agricultural 
production and on short and medium-term forecasts of production, consumption and 
trade on world markets, 
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- the promotion of contacts between enterprises, research institutions and other agencies 
in order to stimulate joint projects in agriculture, agri-industry and fisheries. 
Article 5 
In the industrial field, the Contracting Parties shall strive to encourage and facilitate, 
inter alia: 
- the GCC countries' efforts to develop their industrial production and diversify and 
expand their economic base, taking into account the mutual interest of the Contracting 
Parties, 
- the organization of contacts and meetings between industrial policy makers, promoters 
and undertakings in order to encourage the establishment of new relations in the 
industrial sector in conformity with the objectives of the Agreement, 
- the promotion of joint industrial ventures. 
Article 6 
In the field of energy, the Contracting Parties shall strive to encourage and facilitate, 
inter alia: 
- cooperation in the two regions by energy undertakings of the Community and the GCC 
countries, 
- joint analyses of trade between the two regions in crude oil, gas and petroleum 
products and its industrial aspects with a view to considering ways and means of 
improving their trade exchanges, 
- exchanges of views and information on matters relating to energy in general and 
respective energy policies, without prejudice to the parties' international obligations, 
- training, 
- studies, notably on new and renewable sources of energy. 
Article 7 
In the field of investments, the Contracting Parties shall strive to take steps for the 
mutual promotion and protection of investments, in particular through the extension by 
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the Member States of the Community and the GCC countries of investment promotion 
and protection agreements with a view to improving reciprocal investment conditions. 
Article 8 
In the fields of science and technology, the Community and the GCC countries shall 
strive to encourage and facilitate, inter alia: 
- cooperation in scientific and technological research and development in the two 
regions, 
- the transfer and adaptation of technology, notably through research activities and 
appropriate arrangements between economic operators of the two regions, 
- the links between the scientific communities in the GCC countries and the 
Community, 
- access to data banks concerning patents. 
Article 9 
The Contracting Parties shall exchange information on developments in their respective 
policies on protecting the environment and the protection and development of wildlife. 
They shall encourage cooperation in these fields. 
Article 10 
1. The Joint Council referred to in Article 12 shall periodically define the general 
guidelines of cooperation for the purpose of attaining the aims set out in this Agreement. 
2. The Joint Council shall be responsible for seeking ways and means of establishing 
cooperation in the areas defined by the Agreement. 
Trade 
Article 11 
1. In the field of trade, the objective of this Agreement is to promote the development 
and diversification of the reciprocal commercial exchanges between the Contracting 
Parties to the highest possible level, inter alia by studying ways and means of 
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overcoming trade barriers for the access of each Contracting Party's products to the 
other Contracting Party's market. 
2. The Contracting Parties shall enter into discussions concerning the negotiation of an 
agreement aimed at the expansion of trade in accordance with the provisions of the Joint 
Declaration annexed hereto. 
3. Pending the conclusion of the trade agreement referred to in paragraph 2, the 
Contracting Parties accord each other most-favoured-nation treatment. 
General and final provisions 
Article 12 
1. A Joint Council for GCC/Community cooperation, hereafter referred to as the 'Joint 
Council', is hereby established which shall have the power, for the purpose of attaining 
the objectives set out in the Agreement, to take decisions in the cases provided for in the 
Agreement. 
The decisions taken shall be binding on the Contracting Parties, which shall take such 
measures as are required to implement them. 
2. The Joint Council may also formulate any resolutions, recommendations or opinions 
which it considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives and the smooth 
functioning of the Agreement. 
3. The Joint Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
Article 13 
1. The Joint Council shall be composed of representatives of the Community, on the one 
hand, and of representatives of the GCC countries, on the other. 
2. Members of the Joint Council may be represented as laid down in its rules of 
procedure. 
3. The Joint Council shall act by mutual agreement between the Community, on the one 
hand, and the GCC countries, on the other. 
Article 14 
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1. The office of President of the Joint Council shall be held alternately by the 
Community and the GCC countries in accordance with the conditions to be laid down in 
the rules of procedure. 
2. Meetings of the Joint Council shall be called once a year by the President. 
The Joint Council shall hold whatever additional meetings may be necessary, at the 
request of the Community or the GCC countries, as laid down in its rules of procedure. 
Article 15 
1. The Joint Council shall be assisted in the performance of its duties by a Joint 
Cooperation Committee. 
It may decide to set up any other committee that can assist it in carrying out its duties. 
2. The Joint Council shall determine the composition and duties of such committees and 
how they shall function. 
Article 16 
1. The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures required to fulfil their 
obligations under this Agreement. They shall see to it that the objectives of this 
Agreement are attained. 
2. If either Contracting Party considers that the other Contracting Party has failed to 
fulfil an obligation under this Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so 
doing, it shall supply the Joint Council with all relevant information required for a 
thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the 
Contracting Parties. 
In the selection of measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the 
functioning of this Agreement. These measures shall be notified to the Joint Council, 
which shall hold consultations on them if another Contracting Party so requests. 
Article 17 
Where, in the course of the exchanges of information provided for in this Agreement, 
problems arise, or seem likely to arise, in the general functioning of the Agreement or in 
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the trade field, consultations may take place between the Parties, in the Joint Council, 
with a view to avoiding market disturbances in so far as possible. 
Article 18 
Each Contracting Party may request the other Party to provide all relevant information 
on an agreement which has a direct and specific impact on the functioning of the 
Agreement. In such cases, appropriate consultation shall be held within the Joint 
Council at the request of the other Party so that the interests of the Contracting Parties 
may be taken into consideration. 
Article 19 
In the fields covered by this Agreement and without prejudice to its provisions: 
- the arrangements applied by the GCC countries in respect of the Community shall not 
give rise to any discrimination between its Member States, their nationals, or their 
companies or firms, 
- the arrangements applied by the Community in respect of the GCC countries shall not 
give rise to any discrimination between them, their nationals, or their companies or 
firms. 
Article 20 
1. Without prejudice to the relevant provisions of the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, this Agreement and any action taken thereunder shall in no way affect the 
power of the Member States of the Communities to undertake bilateral activities with 
the GCC countries in the field of economic cooperation or to conclude, where 
appropriate, new economic cooperation agreements with those countries. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the GCC Charter and any other agreements on 
GCC integration, this Agreement and any action taken thereunder shall in no way affect 
the powers of the GCC countries to undertake bilateral activities with the Member 
States of the Community in the field of economic cooperation or to conclude, where 
appropriate, new cooperation agreements with those Member States. 
3. Subject to the provisions of Article 11, this Agreement and any action taken 
thereunder shall in no way affect the power of the GCC countries to undertake bilateral 
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activities with other Arab League Nations in the field of economic cooperation or to 
conclude, where appropriate, new economic cooperation agreements with these 
countries. 
Article 21 
1. Any dispute which may arise between the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation of this Agreement may be placed before the Joint Council. 
2. If the Joint Council fails to settle the dispute at its next meeting, either Party may 
notify the other of the appointment of an arbitrator; the other Party must then appoint a 
second arbitrator within two months. For the purposes of the application of this 
procedure, the Community shall be deemed to be one Party to the dispute, as shall the 
GCC countries. 
The Joint Council shall appoint a third arbitrator. 
The decisions of the arbitrators must be taken by majority vote. 
Each party to the dispute must take the measures required for the implementation of the 
arbitrators' decision. 
Article 22 
The Declarations and Exchanges of Letters annexed hereto shall form an integral part of 
this Agreement. 
Article 23 
This Agreement is concluded for an unlimited period.Each Contracting Party may 
denounce this Agreement by notifying the other Contracting Party. This Agreement 
shall cease to apply six months after the date of such notification. 
Article 24 
This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community is applied and under the conditions 
laid down in that Treaty and, on the other hand, to the territories of the GCC countries. 
Article 25 
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This Agreement is drawn up in duplicate in the Danish, Dutch, English, French, 
German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Arabic languages, each of these texts 
being equally authentic. 
Article 26 
This Agreement will be approved by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their 
own procedures. 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month following 
notification that the procedures referred to in the first subparagraph have been 
completed. 
 
 
 
